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The first part of this thesis sets out the meaning and 
justification of equality in Tawney's writing (chapters one 
and two). 
The complex view of equality which this uncovers is seen to 
withstand the majority of ethical and theological criticisms 
(chapter three), and to be distinctive in relation to Christian 
and Socialist views (chapter four). 
Tawney' s view is then set in a wider context. First, the 
influence of this view of equality is examined both in theological 
and socialist writers. In this, it is argued that whilst 
there is broad evidence of a Tawney tradition, there are 
important differences in terms of equality in the writers which 
followed Tawney. These involve both fundamental differences and 
modifications or developments. 
Secondly, Tawney' s view is compared to recent views of both 
marginal and global equality. It is argued that the meaning 
and justification of equality as seen from Tawney's writings 
is more compelling than such views. 
The thesis concludes that despite some flaws in Tawney' s view 
of equality, it has an important contribution to make both to 
the theology and philosophy of equality, and that the Christian 
concept of equality should be more rigorously developed and 
defended both at a theoretical and practical level. 
Number of words in text: approximately 98,000 
1. 
Introduction 
The views of commentators on Tawney' s writings about equality 
are many and varied. 
Edwards suggests that ' Equality' 
'simply sets out the disadvantages of the class system.' 1 
By implication, there is no systematic statement or coherent 
theory of equality. 2 Others refer to his classic statement 
of the ideal of equality. 
3 
Edwards suggests that 'Equality' 
was very influential both with the Labour Party and post war 
New Conservatism. 
4 
Hobsbawm, on the other hand, suggests 
that the ' actual influence' of Tawney' s ideas on equality 
'is much less easy to pin down.' 5 
For some, this is a comment on the lack of distinctiveness of 
Tawney' s views. Hence, Tawney' s position was ' claimed' by many 
different groups. 6 Against this, some argue that Tawney has 
a distinctive position in the development of liberal equality. 
Finally, there are those who would argue that in some way or 
other, Tawney' s view of equality is no longer relevant. 8 
Against this are those who find 'Equality' still the finest 
account of the subject. 
9 
There are many possible reasons for such widely differing views 
of Tawney' s equali ty:- 
a) Tawney was not a systematic thinker. His college tutor 
referred to him as a brilliant but chaotic thinker. 
10 
He 
disavowed any skills in theology or philosophy and disliked the 
pursuit of abstract concepts or a theology not grounded in life 
11 or everyday meaning. 
2. 
In particular, he was suspicious of any intellectual activity 
which compartmentalized life in general and morality in 
particular. 
12 
 Given this, it may be that it is easy to inter- 
pret Tawney in different ways and that his influence is not so 
much due to any sustained ideas or developed theory, and more to 
their style 
13 
and moral vigour. 
14 
b) In some cases, the judgements on Tawney' s equality may be due 
to straightforward misunderstandings of his overall position or 
what it implied. Thus, for example, Joseph and Sumption argue 
that equality, by definition, is a concept which will lead to 
uniformity, however well intentioned are writers such as Tawney.15 
As shall be seen below (Chapter 3), this view ignores much of 
Tawney' s writing, in particular the implication of equality for 
democracy. 
c) Equality itself, it may be argued, is a concept, by nature, 
difficult to categorize, open to many different interpretations. 
Thus, J.F. Stephen could write that equality is 
'a word so wide and so vague as to be, by itself, without 
meaning.' 16 
Tawney himself acknowledges that 
' equality possesses a variety of divergent meanings' , it is 'an 
arithmetical metaphor for a relation between human beings, and the 
interpretation to be placed on it varies from age to age.' 17 
Rae, in an analysis of the logical structure of equality argues 
that there are at least one hundred and eight different possible 
definitions of equality as a social principle. 18 Given the risk 
of misunderstanding involved in the use of the term, Atherton 
questions its worth as a social principle at all. 19 Thus, the 
3. 
very openess of the concept may have contributed to commentators 
misunderstanding, or reading into Tawney's view, different 
meanings of the term equality. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that despite Tawney' s lack of 
system, he was aware of the theological and philosophical 
difficulties surrounding the term equality, and that in his total 
writings, elements of a systematic view can be found, which he 
does attempt to justify (chapters 1 and 2). Chapter 2 will also 
examine whether Tawney's equality had a distinctively Christian 
character ie. whether it is dependent upon elements of its 
deontological justification for its meaning, or whether he used 
equality as a conscious bridge between faith and practice in 
society (similar to the middle axiom method). Chapters 3 and 4, 
acknowledging that Tawney's view spans Christian morality, 
Socialist policy and philosophy, will examine the validity and 
distinctiveness of Tawney's equality. They will include an 
examination of the major criticisms of his theory and areas where 
it may require development. Chapters 5 and 6 will examine the 
influence of Tawney' s idea of equality in Christian and socialist 
circles. Chapters 7 and 8 will examine the relevance of Tawney's 
views to, recent egalitarian debates, both about the justification 
of equality as a social principle, and its implications. 
The conclusion of the thesis will be that Tawney's view of 
equality as such, is not as influential as many writers have 
assumed, but that it is very relevant to modern debates of an 
egalitarian nature. I argue that equality remains an important 
social principle, and that it requires a view and justification 
such as Tawney' s to sustain it. I further argue for specific 
4. 
developments in terms of participatory and distributional 
equality which are both implicit in Tawney' s writings, but which 
also deal with the difficulties in his theory of equality. 
My reasons for concentrating upon equality are two -fold. 
Firstly, there has been a paucity of writing since Tawney which 
concentrates on equality and relates it to theology. The last 
, e.L 
20 major work was Equality and Excellence' by. Jenkins. 
Any continuing debate has been largely in the field of philosophy 
and sociology. 21 Secondly, with reference to equality, most 
writers make mention of Tawney, without a detailed examination 
22 
of his views. Even the analysis of Gutmann, which places 
Tawney in the history of liberal equality, fails to appreciate 
either his views on participatory or distributional equality, 
or his strengths in relation to the modern debate and in 
particular, the egalitarianism of Rawls. 
23 
Other writers, of course, have examined Tawney in greater 
detail, but from the perspective of his total output, rather 
than the concept of equality. These writings include an 
examination of Tawney and socialism 24 and Tawney as a Christian 
Social Moralist. 25 During this thesis, it will be argued that 
such studies, whilst most valuable in their amassing of material, 
have tended to under- estimate the importance of equality in 
Tawney' s thought. 
This thesis will therefore attempt to cover the gap of the 
detailed study of Tawney's theory of equality, its origins and 
justification, its distinctiveness, influence and present - 
day relevance. It approaches the task in the knowledge that 
5. 
Tawney' s wri tings are not systematic and that therefore, what 
may be gleaned from them is, at best, the outline of a theory, 
which may require further developments. Nonetheless, in placing 
order on Tawney' s writings, it is hoped to demonstrate how 
significant they are in the development of the idea of equality. 
In doing this, I hope to contribute to the rehabilitation of 
equality in social and theological terms. 
6. 
Chapter 1 Tawney' s Theory of Equality 
For Tawney there is an intimate link between meaning and 
justification in equality. In order to fully understand his 
definition of equality, one has to examine his presuppositions 
about human nature, society, the state and the grounds for 
these. In the interests of clarity, however, this thesis will 
examine the two categories separately. Chapter one will discuss 
the definition of equality and chapter two the grounds for 
Tawney' s view. 
Given the different meanings that equality as a social principle 
can be invested with, Rae argues that the categories of equality 
of condi tion, outcome, means etc. are inadequate for an analysis 
of the logic of equality, and thus for any detailed examination 
of meaning. Z6 Rae suggests, therefore, five categories that 
may be used in examining any definition: - 
The subject of equality 
The value of equality 
Equality of opportuni ty 
The domain of ecp ali ty 
The degree of equality (absolute or relative). 
27 
It is these categories which will be used during the first chapter 
in attempting a detailed examination of Tawney's view of equality. 
The Subject of Equality 
Rae identifies three possible subjects of equality - the 
individual, the segment, and the ' bloc' . 28 Simple individual 
regarding equality claims equality for one class of equals, each 
7. 
to be the equal of every other within that class. Segmental 
equali ty requires equality wi thin various sub -groups, for 
example, the equality which exists within but not between the 
29 
various military ranks. ' Bloc- regarding' equality demands 
equality between classes, for example, between blacks and 
whites. Tawney's equality is of the first of these categories. 
Firstly, equality is demanded for all individuals ie. Tawney's 
class is inclusive of all humanity. Thus, he refers to the 
' supreme value of the individual.' 30 Secondly, equality is 
seen primarily in terms of equality of respect, the recognition 
' that all men, merely because they are men, are of equal value.' 
31 
Thirdly, however, Tawney also argues for simple - individual 
regarding equality with respect to the conditions of civilization 
ie. 'complete environmental equality in respect of the external 
conditions of health, education and economic securi ty.' 33 
With the individual so important, Tawney was unable to fully 
accept utilitarianism as the basis of morality. This was 
certainly a 'good first approximation' , but was ultimately 
unacceptable 
'precisely because the convenience of the majority could involve 
injustice to the minority', 
and no amount of convenience to the majority could justify 
such treatment of the minority. 
34 
From one perspective, Tawney was concerned about 'bloc-regarding 
equality', focussing on the poor and children. 
35 However, his 
concern was less to bring particular groups up to equality with 
other groups, and more to ensure that all received the necessary 
conditions of civilizations, including respect. Because of 
this, as shall be seen below, Tawney emphasized universal 
8. 
distribution rather than selective, le. universal entitlement 
based upon need rather than upon membership of a particular 
group. With respect to 'blocs' or groups, Tawney was equally 
concerned about attitudes between groups and in particular, 
those which led to inadequate criteria for evaluating individuals 
such as wealth or status. Those were precisely not relevant 
grounds for evaluating individuals, because they ignored 
the common elements in human requirements.' 
36 
The Value of Equality 
Rae's analysis contrasts two centres of value for equality, the 
lot or the person. The first sees the lot or good received as 
the focus of value, and argues that any individual should 
derive the same value from their lot as they would from any 
other person's lot. 
37 
In effect, this defines equality as 
identity of lots, everyone receiving the same resources regard- 
less of different claims. 38 Lot regarding equality thus 
avoids all problems associated with the claims of individuals 
and tends to become an end in itself. Person -regarding equality, 
on the other hand, argues against identical treatment and 
defines equality in terms of the response to the different 
claims of individuals. 
At times, Tawney appears to advocate a lot- regarding equality, 
especially in respect of health, education and economic security39 
However, he warns against seeing this as an end in itself, and 
especially against viewing increased material resources as 
the restoration of booty' and ' the great reform.' 
40 
' Wha t matters to a society' Tawney writes, ' i s less what i t 
8. 
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' Wha t matters to a society' Tawney wri tes, ' i s less what i t 
9. 
owns than what it is and how it uses its possessions.' 41 
Tawney also feared the effects of identical treatment, as 
reducing 
' the variety of individual character and genius to a drab 
and mono tonus uniformity.' 42 
Thus, equality of provision is not identity of provision, and 
'is to be achieved not by treating different needs in the 
same way, but by devoting equal care to ensuring that they are 
met in the different ways most appropriate to them, as is 
done by a doctor who prescribes different regimes for different 
constitutions, or a teacher who develops different types of 
intelligence by different curricula.' 43 
Tawney' s equality was thus person- regarding, accepting the many 
and important natural differences between individuals 
44 
and 
concerned to develop individual personality. 
45 
Such equality, 
however, requires some 'basis for comparison', 46 which will 
enable distribution to take account of relevant differences. 





The first of these bases comparison upon the needs of the 
individual, with the individual himself as sole judge of the 
utility of any good received. 
Ends -based comparisons refers to publicly stated ends or aims 
to which individuals commit themselves. This is concerned 
less with the attainment of, or instrument for attaining such 
ends, and more with the admissibility of ends. As such, it 
involves the principle of neutrality ie. 
'that no individual' s conception of the good is better than 
that asserted by his fellow citizens.' 48. 
10. 
Thus, all ends are equally acceptable, unlcss they lead to 
the violation of another' s autonomy. 
49 
In addi tion to this, 
it must be noted that some ends -based writers see equal respect 
for self declared ends, and thus individual autonomy or 
privacy, as not simply an end itself, but also a means to an 
end ie. to encourage individuals to develop self reliance 
and avoid dependence. 
50 
The third base of comparison returns to needs, with the diffe- 
rence from the first that individual requirements 
are determined by knowledgeable third parties.' 
S1 
In this 
case, the specified needs become the criteria for distribution. 
This does not exclude some form of merit being used as criterion 
of distribution. 
Tawney's equality is radically at odds with the first of these 
bases, but contains significant elements of the other two, 
especially the last. 
1. For Tawney, subjective judgements are only acceptable 
within a moral framework. 52 He writes as a Christian 
social moralist, 
53 
and views equality of respect not as 
one amongst many principles, but as the fundamental moral 
principle: 
'The essence of all morality is that every human being is of 
infini te importance' . 54 
From this 'unashamedly ethical' base, Tawney can accept 
disagreements about the methods of applying principles, 
but not ' variety in standards as to fundamental standards of 
conduct'. 
55 
The latter involves the possession of 'a common 
56 moral ideal' which is essential for harmony. 
11. 
Several points must be noted here:- 
a) Tawney argued that this basic moral principle of 
equality of respect applied to all disciplines and 
si tua tions. 57 
58 
b) This leads Tawney often to take the stance of a teacher. 
Far from relying upon subjective judgements about 
needs, he looks to the acceptance of leadership and 
authority. Progress itself depends upon 
'a willingness on the part of the mass of people to 
recognize genuine superiority, and to submit to its 
influence' 59 
For Tawney then, there was a proper subordination, 
necessary if order was to be maintained. 60 This 
subordination was both functional 61 and moral 
62. 
c) Equality of respect as put forward by Tawney differs 
markedly from the formal principle of equality. The 
latter simply asserts that equal treatment should be 
presumed unless there is sufficient reason for not doing 
so. 
63 
As such, the formal principle does not directly 
inform the practice of equality or the criteria of 
distribution. Not only does this leave the principle 
open to criticisms of being otiose, 64 but as shall be 
seen below, leaves the principle of equality of respect 
open to a minimalist interpretation. 
65 
Tawney's equality of respect however, is defined in 
terms of 'care' or 'consideration' , 66 and as such it is 
close in meaning to the concept of agape. 
67 
whilst Tawney 
does not use this concept specifically, he does quote 
with approval, Temple's words 
12. 
' to love another person is to desire that they should be 
themselves.' 68 
Whilst such a principle is too general to apply to 
particular action, it nonetheless does have both a 
commitment to the ultimate good of the individual and 
a concern for the relational dimension of equality 
referred to by Tawney as 
'a spiritual relation' or 'a spirit of humanity and 
freedom in social relations.' 69 
Thus, 'relations between human beings' which involved the 
right moral attitude towards others, were as important 
to equality as the distribution of commodities. 70 
d) The principle of equality of respect (also referred to as 
the 'humanist spirit') actually generates and informs two 
major principles - liberty and fraternity, which form the 
two central ends or objectives of society. Thus, Tawney 
writes of the humanist spirit as aiming to liberate and 
71 
cultivate the powers which make for energy and refinement. 
Liberty becomes the primary political good, 72 and the aim 
of social organization to liberate individuals to develop 
their capacities in 
73 
' growth towards the perfection of individual human beings.' 
Perfection here does not refer to some ideal or moral 
standard, but to the individual achieving his or her 
potential. 
74 
Fellowship for Tawney is something 
'ultimate and profound,' 75 which social organization and 
the attitudes behind it must not be allowed to obscure or 
discourage. As shall be seen below, these two principles 
are rarely if ever used by Tawney in isolation or as 
13. 
individual ends. Both arise out of equality of respect 
and both are necessary. It will also be noted that 
equality in any form other than equality of respect, for 
example distributional or participatory equality is never 
seen as an end in itself. Such equality is. rather an 
instrumental principle for example, a means of achieving 
liberty 
76 
or of guarding against division.77 Thus Tawney 
stands out against a simply calculative view of distri- 
butional equality. 78 The twin aims of freedom and fellow- 
ship thus provide a 'regulative function' with regard to 
any social, and specifically egalitarian, policies. 
79 
It must be noted, however, that whilst Tawney uses the 
principles of liberty, equality and fraternity in this 
way, he does on occasion simply lump the three together, 
without distinguishing their relationship to each other, 
which can lead to confusion. ß0 
2. Tawney stood out against ends -based comparison, arguing that 
examina tion of ends and their admi sseibi li ty is inadequate 
without examining their consequences, and that not all ends 
are equally acceptable. ß1 Nonetheless, Tawney showed the 
concern of ends -based writers for the development of a 
critical humanism, the autonomy of the individual, the 
development of self -reliance and enterprise, and a fear of 
coercion both physical and ideological. 82 Thus, he sought the 
cultivation of an 'independence of spirit 83 and ' free 
initiative and the power of self- direction, as against polite 
obedience.' 
84 
At one point, Tawney explicitly defines 
freedom as ' the right of men to live their own lives and 
14. 
express their own personalities.' 
85 
This included neither 
giving in to the 'dependence and subservience' S6 which were 
so often encouraged in, for example, industry, nor to the 
ideologically coercive power of 'infectious phrases' or 
'insane ideologies masquerading as revelations.' ß7 
For Tawney however, freedom was not simply about the absence 
of disabilities, but the presence of abilities and 
' freedom, to be complete, must carry with it not merely the 
absence of repression, but also the opportunity of self - 
organi za tion. 88 
The following points must also be noted about Tawney' s view 
of the concept of freedom: - 
a) Freedom for Tawney was not an abstract concept 'divorced 
from the realities of specific time or place.' 89 Hence 
he writes of liberty as being made up of liberties, 
which in turn he divides into primary and secondary 
liberties. 90 The former, for example, freedom of 
worship, association etc. are counted as essential for 
all. Secondary liberties, for example, freedom to own 
the means of production 91 are not essential for all. 
Freedom for Tawney, is thus also never an absolute 
imperative, being always judged by its purpose, in 
particular how it contributes to the growth of the 
individual.92 
b) Freedom is a social concept in that any individual' s 
freedom can affect anthers. 
Freedom for the strong is oppression for the poor.' 
93 
In this, freedom is related to power and in particular, 
94 
the power to control ones life in significant areas. 
15. 
Such power is a function both of material resources and 
of the individual personality. Hence, material resources 
can either empower or enable individuals, or the lack of 
them deny power and thus freedom. 
95 
Ultimately, however, 
the seat of power was, for Tawney, 'in the soul.' 96 
Here, Tawney' s view of freedom begins to move to 
autonomy in the sense of maturity. Precisely because he 
sees such freedom as most important, he does not form a 
necessary link between poverty and lack of freedom. 
Thus, 'character can, no doubt, overcome circumstances.' 
97 
However, experience suggests that the coercive effects 
of certain social organization will tend to diminish 
freedom. 98 This is so in two ways. Firstly, certain 
economic relationships ie. those which treated the individual as 
a means not an end tended to encourage ' subservience' and 
'dependence' (the antithesis of the proper subordination 
above), which involved 'a complete loss of liberty.' 
99 
In such relationships, the worker, for example, was often 
controlled by fear of loss of job. 100 Such relationships 
do ultimately involve 'slavery' precisely because of the 
potential effects on the character and will of the 
individual. 
101 
Thus certain economic relationships are 
'in themselves preferable to others, irrespective of the 
wealth they confer.' 102 
Once again this stands out against a calculative or 
materialist view of equality of distribution. 
The second coercive effect that Tawney feared was the 
denial of choice. Here, liberty was not identified simply 
16. 
with increase in choice. For Tawney, freedom to choose 
involved the means of achieving the choice, 
103 
and a 
choice which was meaningful and relevant. The latter is 
determined by duty - to the self, in terms of personal 
development, and to others, be it the basic obligation owed 
to all people 
104 
or the duty involved in particular 
relationships, from family to community. 
105 
Such 
relationships are not contractual but part of the social 
life of man and thus obligations cannot be simply ignored. 
Hence Tawney can refer to duties to the community which 
the individual 
'does not choose and responsibilities created for him.' 
106 
The precise content of such duties is not prescribed by 
Tawney, indeed he argues that the individual should work 
out the implications of duties for themselves. 107 It is 
precisely here that critical humanism has to be encouraged. 
c) Given such a view of freedoms and coercion, Tawney argues 
108 
that freedom cannot simply ' be willed' but requires planning 
Such planning as shall be seen involves planning for 
responsible use of power, 109 distribution of enabling 
material resources, and the encouragement and cultivation 
of critical humanism. The latter literally involved 
persuading 'men to be free.' 
110 
Only such action could, 
for Tawney, begin to plan for freedom in terms of increased 
relevant choice. 
111 
d) Tawney sees negative freedom as a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for personal or moral freedom. His 
17. 
concept of freedom, influenced by equality of respect, 
is far more complex, taking in the freedom to develop and 
the freedom to serve (duty to self and others). In all 
this, the agapaic understanding of equality of respect is 
strongly indicated. This is both in the balanced concern 
for the self and for others 
112 
and in the idea that 
freedom, in the sense of autonomy and subsequent fulfill- 
ment, is found precisely in service. 
113 
This further 
deepens the concept of subordination, from the recognition 
of superiority or functioning as the base of good order, 
to the moral concept of ' the essence of a good society.' 
114 
A 'good society' for Tawney is precisely that which allows 
individuals to fulfill duties to themselves and others. 
The conjunction of these two concepts of freedom and service 
also inextricably links the concepts of liberty and 
fellowship. 
115 
Given the link between equality of respect 
and liberty in Tawney, it is impossible to see the two 
as antithetical concepts. The same must be said of the 
relationship between liberty as an aim of equality of 
respect and equality of distribution and participation 
(equalizing measures) which are a means to that end. 
Thus Tawney can write of equality of distribution as being 
116 
a 'condition' of liberty. Indeed, liberty is 
'equality in action, in the sense, not that all men 
perform identical functions or wield the same degree of 
power, but that all men are equally protected against the 
abuse of power, and equally entitled to insist that 
power should be used, not for personal ends, but for the 
general advantage.' 117 
18. 
3. Tawney' s most important base of comparison for person 
regarding equality is in terms of needs. Need can be divided 
into two categories:- 
a) basic survival needs, ' such as light, fresh air, warmth, 
rest and food.' 
118 
b) emotional, spiritual and social needs. These were to do 
with relationships which held together family and local 
associations, the 
' loyalties, affections, pious bonds between man and man 
which express a man's personality and become at once a 
sheltering place for his spirit and a kind of watch tower 
from which he may see visions of a more spacious and 
bountiful land.' 119 
Neither of these areas of need were for Tawney determined by 
some 'knowledgeable third party.' 120 On the contrary, such 
a determination would tend to conflict with Tawney' s view of 
the importance of freedom and the development of autonomy. 
In any case, such need is perceived by 'common experience', 
which involves rational reflection upon experience. 
121 
Both the levels of need are necessary conditions for the 
individual to develop his or her capacities and skills. 
Both are intimately linked to fellowship as well as freedom. 
Basic needs could only be supplied to all by co- operative, 
collective efforts, 
122 
whilst emotional and spiritual needs 
could only be fulfilled in community or fellowships. The 
means of fulfilling those needs, the strategy of equality, will 
be considered below. At this point several factors about the 
concept of fellowship in Tawney must be noted:- 
a) As suggested above, fellowship and freedoms are intimately 
connected. The ignoring of social relationships in, for 
19. 
123 
example, economic matters is seen as a denial of freedom, 
and fellowship for Tawney is precisely the moral concept 
of right social relationships. The definition of right 
relationships involves once again a return to the concept 
of respect for self and others such as will develop 
'self -respect, self -reliance, mutual confidence and 
enterprise.' 124 
Such relationships discourage 'dependence and subservience' 
and avoid the 'ambulance work' of charity, which itself 
reinforces the old patterns of dependence. 125 Such 
fellowship was neither the romantic nor sentimental kind, 
26 
nor that of a heaven on earth. 127 Moreover, given the 
importance of liberty to Tawney, fellowship could in no 
way be compulsory, only encouraged or facilitated. Fellow- 
ship for Tawney is an holistic concept which is both 
social and moral. It is the strong basis of agapaic 
equality of respect which forms the link between freedom 
and fellowship, the two principles reflecting concern for 
the individual and concern for others. 
128 
b) Tawney's fellowship is inclusive, a necessary corollary 
of equality of respect. 
129 
Thus Tawney could not identify 
with sectional comradeship or sectional interests even of 
the Labour movement. He was apt to remind the Labour 
movement that the satisfaction of group or individual 
interests should not obscure the 'quality of life' in 
relationship. 
130 
c) Fellowship involves the idea of service. Terrill suggests 
that the concept in fact simply involves people 
20. 
' being within reach of each other, with class status and 
wealth not dividing common humanity.' 131 
This, however, is to confuse means and ends. In terms of 
strategy, Tawney advocated no more than a framework for 
fellowship le. egalitarian measures that would simply put 
individuals within reach precisely to avoid compulsory 
fellowship. Fellowship itself, however, is an ideal which 
involved service and which required development in local 
examples of 'community' . Thus Tawney argues for the 
'substitution of service for the ideal of getting on.' 132 
In both b) and c) something of the complexity of Tawney' s view of 
fellowship can be discerned. The concept of fellowship as 
inclusive, whilst accepting the importance of ' belonging' and 
expressing and discovering identi ty in a group or community works 
against exclusive sectional views of fellowslh ip. Such fellowship 
tends to emphasize bloc- regarding and lot- regarding equality. This 
has important moral consequences because such 'ends' tend to become 
predominant, excluding the higher moral principles of equality of 
respect, freedom and fellowship. 133 In that situation, equalizing 
measures become ends in themselves, no longer examples of an 
instrumental principle. 
It is all the more important then to be clear about the meaning 
of fellowship for Tawney. His view, for instance, does not 
fit ?featly into the Tonnes view of Gemeinschaft. He certainly 
accepts the importance of a society which shares benefits and 
misfortunes, encourages relationships and has a great sense of 
' rootedness and order.' 
21. 
However, even such a society can become exclusive, and Tawney 
wants to retain freedom within such a community, and service 
beyond it. This has particular reference to intermediate 
structures such as industry. 
135 
For Tawney, it is important 
for intermediate communities to be aware of their role and 
function vis -a -vis society, other groups, and social purpose 
in general. By implication therefore, Tawney has the same 
moral balance of self concern and other concern elevated to any 
discernible community (intermediate or not) - concern for 
communi ty, but also concern for the communi ty's role in 
society and its relationship with other groups. By further 
implication, the nature of fellowship itself, ie. whether it is 
inclusive or exclusive, will be affected by the balance given 
to moral considerations and in particular to equality of 
respect. 
136 
d) As noted above, fellowship is an end, or telos. However, 
it is not a straightforward end, with certain means or 
principles as purely instrumental to it. Thus, equalizing 
measures, do not, of themselves, produce fellowship. 
Emmet writes of two types of teleology. The first, A type 
refers to clearly achievable ends with particular means. 
Tawney often speaks of freedom in this light, in the sense 
of the provision of health, education, and economic welfare 
as providing basic freedoms. Fellowship, however, fits into 
Emmett/ s B type teleology, defined as 
'a kind of activity where the manner of achieving it is a 
constituent part of the purpose.' 137 
Such ends point to a style of life, so that one lives in 
22. 
order to realize oneself, or express God's glory. In 
Emmet%' s words, 
'One achieves such things in doing other things 
rather than by doing other things as means to achieving 
them.' 138 
Fellowship falls into the B teleology for Tawney, precisely 
because it involves a way of life, with the development of 
relational virtues, and of commitment to and concern for 
others. 
139 
In one sense this also affects the concept of 
freedom, at least in so far as freedom is discerned or 
expressed in service. 
140 
So freedom does not always 
remain an A type telos. In another sense, it strongly 
affects the whole area of distributional equality. If 
fellowship is to be encouraged and developed, much will 
depend upon how resources are distributed, not simply 
that they are distributed in an equitable or just way141 
e) Alongside need as a straightforward criterion of distribu- 
tion, 
142 
the idea of service and fellowship gives rise 
to a second criterion, that of function. This concept 
reveals Tawney as both moralist and realist. Firstly, 
reward for function refers to the service of a social 
purpose. 
143 
Once basic needs are met, this service 
should provide the basis for any differential rewards. This 
principle could be applied to property, industry and even 
rights. 
144 
g It was as Terrill observed, a useful concept, 
for, 
'since few people perform functions hundreds of times more 
socially valuable than other people, a system of rewards 
based upon social function is likely to be egalitarian.' 145 
23. 
Moreover, whilst d ;fferences in renumeration might remain, 
these would not be heightened by 
' the capricious inequalities of circumstances and oppor- 
tuni ty.' 
146 
Secondly, the principle of function was also an acceptance 
of the need for incentive and reward for positions of 
grea ter responsibility. 147 Tawney was not thus demanding 
an entirely selfless society, and indeed accepted the 
fact that self interest had encouraged certain important 
values. 
148 
The major problem of self interest for 
Tawney, was when it became the major motivation, excluding 
other values, or actually perverting them. 
149 
Whilst needs were discerned in common experience, function was 
a criterion which depended upon accepted social purposes. 
Given the concerns for critical humanism, alongside 
acceptance of basic moral principles, the definition of social 
purposes became a process involving several strands:- 
i) Tawney was concerned to trust the people and give them 
the responsibility for generating and expressing social 
purposes.  This was not the activity of discreet 
individuals but precisely a function of the community, 
because it involved developing commonly held attitudes 
and ideals. Thus the 'new culture' could be built of 
'matetials from the experiences and outlook on life, 
not of a leisured minority, but of the mass of the 
people.' 151 
Hence Tawney was concerned for opportunities of partici- 
152 
pation and sharing of ideas in education and industry. 
24. 
Democracy was thus a crucial element in Tawney' s 
egalitarianism, not 
'merely one of several alternative methods of establish- 
ing a socialist commonwealth' , 
but 
'an essential condition of such a commonwealth' s 
existence.' 153 
ii) Improving democracy would in itself allow the 
' light of popular culture to shine through.' 
154 
Behind this common culture, Tawney argued for a moral 
consensus. Such a consensus had several elements to 
it. Certain fundamental principles were the 
' common property of all Christian nations' , in 
particular basic obligation to treat others as ends and 
not means. 
155 
Tawney details 'certain sorts of behaviour' 
which 'we know' to be right or wrong (the latter includes 
deception for profit, taking advantage of anothers 
weakness) and which are all founded in the basic moral 
principle of equality of respect. 
156 
Such precepts are 
not only the product of tradition or conditioning but 
appraised 'as just by the conscience of mankind.' 
157 
Such a value consensus is, for Tawney, not a stable or 
static entity. It may suffer from the effects of a 
society which promotes interests above values. Moreover, 
it is a consensus as to basic moral values, not as to the 
precise means of applying them. 'New interpretations' 
of the principles in response to new circumstances are 
160 
inevitable and to be encouraged. It is precisely 
at this level within the context of the accepted broad 
25. 
principles that critical humanism may operate and 
flourish. Notably, Tawney implies that the objective of 
equality of condition is included amongst the known 
161 
It is the exact means of implementing principles,  
that which could be open to discussion. 
162 
The 
consensus thus involves the basic moral principle of 
equality of respect, the twin ultimate objectives of 
liberty and fellowship, and the instrumental principle 
of equali ty of condi tion. Such 'equali ty of condi tion' 
includes both participatory equality and distributional 
equality. The former includes the development of 
democracy and opportunities to develop control of ones 
situation, the latter involves the re- distribution of 
life chances through education, health services and 
financial measures. 
163 
Nonetheless, there is a genuine ambivalence in Tawney 
about the consensus. At times he speaks of ordinary men 
as standing out against materialism, 
164 as desiring 
proper respect for ' their' dignity as human beings 
165 
or of human nature demanding certain spiritual or 
relational ends. 
166 At other times, he writes of a less 
optimistic view of man as 'all (having) a false philosophy 
of life.' 
167 
Thus, whilst wishing to respond to the 
ultimate intuition of the good in man, Tawney accepted 
that these were not always recognized by individuals 
themselves. 
168 
Even such a consensus is often limited to certain areas 
of application. Thus, just as slavery at one point was 
26. 
seen to be outside the moral realm, industrial or 
economic fields, argues Tawney, are not judged from the 
standpoint of the basic moral principles. 
169 
iii) Given all this, Tawney argues for the need of a two 
pronged effort. Firstly, there is the need to articulate 
and maintain the basic principles which would sustain 
and develop consensus. Though Tawney was ambivalent 
about ideology, he argued that 'specific and distinctive 
aims' were necessary, providing both inspiration and a 
focus for unity, and a 'principle of limitation' íe. 
clear criteria as to worth and success. 
170 
Central to all this, as shall be seen in chapter two 
is a concern for intelligibility and moral meaning, 
and a close connection between principles and praxis.l 
The second need was to provide the 
'practical foundation of social organization' within 
which the 
'ordinary decencies of human intercourse' could be 
nurtured.172 
Terrill argues that Tawney' s writing shows a development 
away from 'philosophy to politics,' 
173 
In early 
wri tings, Tawney' s concern was primarily with a social 
philosophy 
'which would integrate man's knowledge of himself and 
society.' 174 
Later, the argument goes, Tawney was concerned less with 
rightness of thinking and more with social cohesion and 
right structures for facilitating i t. However, i t would 
27. 
be wrong to say that Tawney moved away from social 
philosophy to politics. He saw the disorders of modern 
society in organizational terms before the First World 
War, for example in his analysis of poverty as inequality, 
the product of social organization. 
175 
The need for reform of social organization was thus 
clear to Tawney from the beginning, and attempts at 
framing policies are evident before the Great War.176 
Equally, Tawney' s later work is a strong appeal to 
principles as providing the necessary 
'compelling motives for the sustained co- operative effort' 
which would appeal 
to the conscience and reason of all men of good willF7 
Tawney then, was always concerned for management by 
moral objectives, aware that success should not simply 
be judged by the effects of policy upon people but also 
in the light of stated aims - which themselves form the 
criteria of success. 
178 
In conclusion, Tawney' s person- regarding equality is the focus of 
his theory of equality. Equality of respect (based upon equal 
value) forms the basis of his theory and acts as the fundamental 
moral principle. Understood in agapaic terms, this generates the 
twin aims of fellowship and freedom. It may be noted at this 
point that Terrill argues that fellowship is the ultimate end 
179 
ignores of all Tawney' s wri tings. This argument  the 
importance of freedom in Tawney' s wri tings. As noted above, such 
freedom does have links with fellowship, and at one point there 
10 
is the implication that freedom is to be found in service. 
Lt5 
However, Tawney' s emphasis on freedom remains conceptually 
distinct. Some writers also suggest that Tawney was happy with 
a plurality of middle level principles which he had distilled 
from his Christian position. I have argued above, that whilst 
Tawney writes sometimes in a loose way about the principles of 
freedom, equality and fellowship, that in fact, he has a clear 
idea of the relationship between these principles. His view 
means that any so called 'plurality' involves always seeing 
these principles in relation to each other, with fellowship and 
freedom growing out of equality of respect,and equality of 
condition (through participatory and distributional equality) 
being an instrumental principle. Participatory and distributional 
equality are linked by distribution of power. 
181 
This 
balancing' of principles, and clarity about their function 
works against any forms of essentialism ie. pursuing any one 
principle at the expense of others. It also means, therefore, 
that such equality is more inclined towards appropriate responses 
to need ie. ensuring that it remains person- centred. 
182 
In one sense then, the instrumental principle of equality, by 
aiming to enable the twin telei of equality of respect, is 
actually expressing equality of respect in society. In all of 
this, it has to be remembered that both fellowship and freedom 
have a high moral meaning, based upon the agapaic view of equality 
of respect. 
183 
This holistic view of equality is its strength, but, as shall be 
seen in chapter three is also a potential problem. 
29. 
Equality of Opportuni ty 
In Rae's third category, two forms of equality are distinguished:- 
i) Prospect- regarding which is exemplified by a lottery, where 
each person has the same prospect of achievement and nothing 
about the individual affects the result. 
ii) Means- regarding where the same means of achievement is open 
to all, for example, the examination system. 184 
Neither of these two concepts were acceptable to Tawney. Means 
regarding equality was made 'short work of by economic realities.' 
The existence of equality of opportunity, he argued, 
'depends not merely upon the absence of disabilities, but on the 
presence of abilities In proportion, as the capacities of 
some are sterilized or stunted by their social environment, while 
others are favoured or pampered by it, equality of opportunity 
becomes a graceful but attenuated figure.' 
For equality of opportunity to be even approximated, then it had to 
involve equalizing measures. 
Prospect- regarding equality of opportunity had two problems for 
Tawney. Firstly, it set up scarce or limited goals as valuable 
with no moral justification for those goals. Indeed the motive for 
attaining such goals tends to be self advantage rather than for any 
social purpose. 
186 
Secondly, whilst Tawney was not against social mobility per se,187 
his concern was with the opportunity for the individual to develop 
as they are in the context of their capacities and moral relation- 
ships: 
'Individual happiness does not only require that man should be free 
to rise to new positions of comfort and distinction; it also 
requires that they should be able to lead a life of dignity and 
culture, whether they rise or not, and that, whatever their position 
on the economic scale may be, it shall be such as if fit to be 
30. 
occupied by man.' 
188 
This is precisely why Tawney argued for universal provision of 
education, and for methods of education which would 
enable all to develop the faculties which, because they are the 
attributes of man, are not the attributes of any particular class 
or profession of men.' 189 
Indeed, to restrict the goal of education to climbing ' from one 
position to another' would lead to a sterilization of talent.' 
190 
Central to this is an idea of social solidarity which is based upon 
equal value. This idea 
' which is the contribution of the working class to the social 
conscience of our age, has its educational as well as its economic 
applications. 'That it implies is not merely la carriere ouverte 
aux talents, indispensable though that is, but egalite de fait, not 
simply equali ty of opportun ty but universality of provision.' 191 
For Tawney, then, equality of opportunity was about equalizing 
measures and about the freedom for self -expression and development. 
The concept of equality of opportuni ty claiming an open road to 
individual advancement had been useful in the fight to remove 
political and legal inequalities,192 but, with the individual 
as subject and person as value of equality in an era of different 
oppression and coercion, 
193 
equality had to be more far -reaching 
and posi tive. This meant a whole range of enabling provisions. 
194 
Degree and Domain of Eouality 
By degree of equality Rae distinguishes absolute or relative 
equality. Absolute equality means that every pair of subjects 
which is supposed to be equal is fully equal. Tawney could not 
accept absolute equality, largely because he did not perceive 
inequality per se to be wrong. He accepted natural inequalities 
195 
o f talent and capaci ty and posi tively encouraged the 
31. 
development of such differences. He also accepted inequalities of 
income based upon function. Tawney' s concern was then with certain 
unacceptable inequalities: 
a) extreme inequalities of property and income, with their 
functionless base. 
196 
b) inequali ties of opportuni ty, based upon inequali ty of power. 
197 
c) inequality of power, often based upon extreme inequalities of 
wealth. 198 Though his major concern here was with the 
irresponsible use of such power. 
199 
d) inequality of status, based upon wealth or class. 
200 
All were unacceptable precisely because they either sustained 
social divisions and thus destroyed fellowship, or because they 
denied the individual freedom to develop or even to survive with 
g . 
201 
ni di t The latter points to a fifth unacceptable inequality 
that of 
e) the fulfillment of basic survival needs. Thus, 
' even in childhood, different strata of the population are 
distinguished by sharp contrasts of environment, of health and 
of physical well being.' 202 
Tawney sought to obtain greater equality in a) - d) (thus opting for 
relative equality) precisely to further his basic principles. 
His approach to e) was in absolute egalitarian terms, arguing for 
' complete environmental equality in respect of the external 
conditions of health, education and economic security.' 203 
However, even this involved relative inequality in so much as 
'equality of provision' did not entail ' identity of provision.' 204 
Responding to the needs of the person, precisely demanded different 
treatment, or the provision of an environment in which different 
needs could be met, or the same broad needs met in ways appropriate 
32. 
205 
to di fferent individual_ s. Thus, in one sense, erson- centred 
equality, by definition, involved relative equality. Such 
relational relative equality differs from simply measures of 
rela tive equality, though as shallbe seen, the two are not exclusive. 
Rae's final category refers to the domain of equality, which is 
206 
the classes of things allocated equally. Rae points to two 
ways of answering the question 'equal what 7' goad and narrow 
domains simply refer to the extent of equality, and Rae contrasts 
the narrow domain of Locke, Nozick etc., where equality is confined 
to certain limited goods, with the broad domain, as espoused by 
Socialism, which takes in economic and social rights as well.07 
A second distinction is both connected to the first, and more 
subtle. Marginal equality equalizes the domain of allocation 
(' the class of things that a given agent or agency controls for 
the purpose of allocation' ), 208 
yet leaves the domain of account 
(I the class of things over which a given agent seeks equality' ) 
unequally divided, ignoring the residue between the domains. 
Global equality aims to promote equalization of a full domain of 
account - so that there is no residue between the domains. The 
means of achiev ,eing global equality are either compensatory (where 
the domain of allocation is divided unequally to offset inequalities 
in a larger domain of account) or redistributive (where domains 
of allocation are enlarged to cover domain of account, for 
example, the development of economic and social rights.) 
In this category, Tawney is clearly advocating equality of broad 
and global domain. His domain of account involves equality of 
respect and its implications throughout society. 209 The means 
of this were redistributive, with a distribution of basic rights 
33. 
and opportuni ties. 
Tawney in fact seeks to extend political and legal rights to the 
210 
However, such rights, and social sphere. ,  they , whilst 
must be an effective guarantee of freedom and apply to all, 
211 
are nei ther simple nor absolute: 
' The State has no absolute rights; they are limited by its 
commission. The individual has no absolute rights; they are 
relative to the function which he performs in the community of 
which he is a member.' 212 
Tawney sums up by saying that all rights are 
' conditional and derivative because all power should be conditional 
and deriva ti ve.' 213 
The breakdown of society was precisely when rights were divorced 
from obligations which lead to defense of rights and thus 
private warfare. 
214 Rights must therefore ultimately be 
derived from the shared social purpose. 
Significantly, however, fulfillment of obligations etc. was not a 
condi tion of receiving the right in the first place. The very 
moral foundation of equality of respect was by definition, 
unconditional. Rather were obligations part of the meaning of 
rights and the process of education in industry or the social 
services, ' the cradle of fellowship', aimed to encourage and 
foster this shared meaning. This contrasts sharply with the 
marginal equality of, for example, Nozick, where, beyond the 
limited notion of rights (which are absolute), all relationships 
are, by nature, contractual and thus conditional upon some 
reciprocal arrangements. Tawney' s equali ty does not fi t easily in 
this category of domain. As noted above, the ultimate domain of 
account (equality demanded) is equal regard for all men. The 
34. 
very concept of a domain of allocation fulfilling that domain 
of account is difficult. Precisely because of the relational 
element, simple allocation is always inadequate, for the quality 
of relationships is of equal importance. This points to changes 
in attitude and a growth in community - 
'A change in the house rather than simply re- organizing the 
furni ture.' 215 
As shall be seen, this also creates some problems in measuring 
the success of any equalizing measures. 
216 Even if the domain of 
account is fulfilled in terms of equal resources, for example, 
for health and education, it is not simply the adequacy of the 
resources, but the quality and attitude of the services which 
have to be judged in Tawney's equality. 
217 
Tawney' s person- regarding equality was thus concerned to equalize 
the domain of account, but this was not to be a matter of 
absolute equality. All of this points for Tawney, to a strategy 
for equality which would seek to pool the na tion' s 
' resources by means of taxation, and (to) use the funds thus 
obtained to make accessible to all, irrespective of their income, 
occupation or social pos ition, the conditions of civilization, 
which in the absence of such measures, can be enjoyed only by 
the ri ch.' 218 
It is to this strategy that we must now turn to see Tawney's 
theory of equality 'in action.' 
The Strategy of Equality 
The redistribution of funds through taxation to the 'social income' 
of the social services, education and National Health Service 
forms an essential element in Tawney' s approach to egali tarian 
measures. However, Tawney' s strategy was ultimately neither so 
35. 
simple or limited. 
219 
His aims were: - 
i) To provide the basic conditions of civilization, such 
that the individual would no longer be in the power of 
another, subdued by fear. 
ii) To re- distribute wealth, particularly with reference to 
functionless property. 
iii) To re- distribute power, both in terms of providing 
opportunity for individuals to exercise appropriate power, 
and in providing safeguards against the irresponsible use 
of power. 
iv) To remove divisions which lead to inequality of status. 
As noted above, all of these are linked in some way so that, for 
example, equality of basic conditions would remove the privilege 
of status. Equalizing of power would also affect status. The 
use of the function as a criterionof distribution would also 
affect attitudes. Tawney' s strategy attempts to take account 
of such links and thus extends social policy into education and 
industry. Aware of these links also it looks to philosopy 
and attitudes, as well as simple egalitarian measures. 
In this process, equality of participation and distributional 
equality are very much connected. Distributional equality 
becomes broadly defined, distributing 'life chances' and power 
20 
which enabled the individual to gain control of their situation. 
Such control, however, also included participation, and for 
Tawney, this was spelled out in moral terms, ie. with respect to 
221 
the individuals duties to others as well as to themselves. 
36. 
Details o` the strategy must now be considered and below are 
some of Tawney' s major plans for equality. 
a) In terms of re- distribution through taxation, he did not 
advocate a severe progressive income tax, especially given 
his views on the importance of functional reward. 
222 
However, he did attack functionless property and wealth 
through death duties. 
223 
Equalization through taxation worked 
for Tawney in two ways. It re- distributed expenditure as 
well as income, creating the demand for different, more 
goods. 
224 
essential Great inequalities in wealth had often 
led to ' the misdirection of production' with the production 
of luxuries taking precedence over necessities. Also, 
of course non- functional surplus was to be re- distributed 
in the form of welfare programmes. 
b) In industry, Tawney sought to increase the opportunities for 
workers to control their own situation and re- distribution 
of power from the owners of production to the public ( a 
combination once more of the two criteria, both increasing 
the basic freedom of the worker and decreasing the power of 
the owner). The first of these was to be achieved by an 
increase in worker participation with nationalized industries 
225 
becoming 'experimental stations' for this. In itself, 
this was also en educational enterprise which involved 
persuading 'man to be free', and thus, far from prescribing 
particular methods, Tawney advocated the testing of 
different methods of making industrial democracy.' 
226 
Such participation was thus not the assertion of some 
37. 
'mystical self government', but the beginning of a relational 
process (which did not necessarily involve the layman 
227 
The aim of this process overriding the technical expert).  
was to increase the freedom /power of the worker, 228 to 
provide protection against economic oppression at work, 229 
and to confirm that any industry 'belonged' to the worker as 
much as to any shareholder. 230 In order to achieve this 
equalization, Tawney advocated three things; increased 
public ownership, careful attention to administrative methods 
and the nurturing of an ideal of service. 
On the first of these, Tawney does not advocate wholesale 
nationalization, but rather, 'mastering' the key positions 
of the economic world such as banking, transport, energy. 231 
He does not claim a right of state ownership derived from 
function, looking to industry to work responsibly for social 
purposes: 
' The important question is not whether an undertaking is 
described as private or public; it is whether, if it is 
pri va te, adequate guarentees can be established that i t 
performs a public function, and whether if it is public, it 
performs it effectively.' 232 
Nationalization was an important part of this process, 
precisely because it separated management from ownership, 233 
and because it made industry accountable to the public.234 
This, in itself, was a re- distribution of power, However, 
anyl re- organization of industry must not simply foster 
industrial freedom (industrial democracy), nor encourage more 
responsible use of power, it must also 
supply the machinery through which the public may secure 
efficient service.' 235 
38. 
Two important principles would be the basis of such 
administration. Firstly, this administration would be 
vested in a joint board, composed of representatives of 236 
the community, and of all grades of workers in the industry.' 
Secondly, administration should be decentralized 
'within the framework of a national system.' 237 
Local administrators would have a high degree of autonomy and 
be able to try methods of working best sui ted to the condi tions 
whilst having to reach targets for production. 238 This 
overall system would enable long term planning and invest- 
ment 239 to opera te with a responsiveness to local si tua tions 
and would inevi tably lead to greater concern for worker' s 
conditions and safety. 240 
Tawney also advocated state involvement with private companies 
along such lines, both by investing in them 241 and by 
legislating for hours of work, minimum safety standards etc242 
The third element, alongside the re- distribution of power was 
to work out a 
' code of public honour and recognized obligations in industries 
as it has been in the professions.' 243 
Not only would such a code or ethos emphasize service and 
encourage high productivity and standards of work, it would also 
bring in a level of accountability involving the professions 
themselves. 244 Whilst such 'professional spirit' should not 
be idealized, it equally should not be neglected. 245 A 
second level of accountability is the public themselves. 
Public opinion has great force, 
246 and the state has a great 
part to play in the 'development of a professional spirit' 
39. 
by insisting that industry be conducted on the basis of 
' complete publicity.' Thus, certain types of economic 
organ za tion 
'are likely, by their constitution, to put efficient service 
before considerations of profit.' 247 
In this respect, the very administration methods which Tawney 
proposed would tend to encourage the ideal of service. 
In industry therefore, the relative egalitarian measures 
proposed by Tawney, revealed an ultimate concern for the twin 
teloi of freedom and fellowship. Some nationalization was the 
necessary but not sufficient condition for these ends to be 
fulfilled. Only 
'a simpleton supposes that a change of organization is a 
prophylactic against the imbecilities of human nature,' 248 
and socialization of industry simply enables a process of 
reform to begin. However, for the process of relational equality 
to be effectively pursued, industrial democracy, efficient 
administration, openness and public accountability, and the 
propagation of an ideal of service were essential. In all this, 
industrial policy was, for Tawney, part of social policy. 
c) Education was also in the sphere of social policy, 
249 
and 
Tawney' s approach to i t was remarkably similar to his approach 
to industry. In one respect, Tawney advocated total equality 
of provision with free schooling up to the age of sixteen, a 
free school meals service, and provision of adequate nursery 
schools. 250 However, such provision was, for Tawney, to be 
infused with his moral base of equality of respect. Education 
was, in itself, 
40. 
' a spiri tual activi ty, much of which is not commercially 
profi table.' 251 
Though the needs of industry had to be born in mind, this 
meant that education should not be simply used for 
'selfish advancement,' 252 or occupational utility, but to 
develop 'spiritual goods' which 
'are worth any sacrifice of material goods.' 253 
Indeed, such education was the respect due to the individual, 
with individual attention being given to students, whatever 
254 their si tuation. In this light, equality in educa tion was, 
by definí tion, relative, involving the development of what was 
unique in the individual. Because of the moral foundation to 
such equality, this demanded education in critical humanism and 
in commun ty Living, 
'encouraging activity, free initiative and the power of self- 
di rec tion' , 
and preparing for ' life as a member of the community. 255 
Method and attitude were inevitably affected by this. Firstly, 
for individual attention and the development of individual 
a tti tudes and cri tical thinking, Tawney advoca ted smaller 
classes or tutorial groups which would enable individuals to 
learn by experience the skills of discussion and argument, 
256 Simple lecturing leading to the discovery of ideas,  
involved often 'a system of mutual deception', with no real 
communication. 257 Smaller group work would also lead to 
toleration and respect for others' views. 
In all this, the tutor or teacher remains important, but the 
emphasis shifts from 'what is done by the teacher' to 'what is 
258 
done by the child' in practical activities. The teacher 
41. 
becomes enabler arid guide with child or student a co- partner 
in the process of discovery. Many of these ideas were developed 
in the Workers Education Association, in itself an experiment 
in educational democracy. 
259 
However, the same principles 
were advocated for primary and secondary education. 
260 As 
with the approach to industry, these involve both a re- 
distribution of power, with the individual being encouraged 
to take responsibility for their own learning, and a commitment rc 
experiments in educational methods which would be most appropriate 
to the local situation. Thus, 
the greater the variety of type among schools, the better, for 
the need of education is experiment, individuality and the 
enthusiasm of the pioneer.' 261 
The second point about such a method was that it precisely 
encouraged the development of a common culture, the discovery 
of common moral values, and the development of community 
virtues. Thus, for Tawney, education was partly a 
'process by which we transcend the barriers of our isolated 
personalities, and become partners in a universe of interests 
which we share with our fellow men.' 262 
Such education would break down social barriers 
263 
and become 
the symbol and cement of spiritual unity transcending difference; 
of birth and wealth.' 264 
In all this, Tawney's relative egalitarianism both infuses the 
methods of education, whilst education itself is also a means 
towards the process of social reform. 
Tawney recognized that no institution could achieve total 
impartiality in its approach to education. Rather did he think 
of placing the partialities into the educational process, 
ensuring that they be openly discussed. Thus if anyone wished 
42. 
to propagate a creed, 
'they should do so by the frank exchange of open argument, not 
by subterranean intrigues.' 265 
As with industry, the very conditions of openness, publicity 
and democracy, were, for Tawney, an important element in 
avoiding coercion and encouraging responsible control of 
power. A further element of control was shared power in 
administrative and planning bodies, for example in W.E.A. 
representation being sought from academic institutions, public 
authorities and actual and potential students. 
266 
However, whilst planning and control were of importance, 
Tawney did not advocate the socialization of public schools, 
which are often 
' favourable to initiative, experiment and diversity of edu- 
ca tiona l type.' 267 
Instead, he recommends that private schools obtain a licence 
from a central au thoríty, ensuring uniform excellence and 
accessibility to all children who might profit from such an 
educa tion. 
268 
Thus, once again, Tawney seeks to balance control with individual 
or local initiative, and eschews equality of type between 
schools or equality of treatment within schools for equality 
which is both relative and relational. It must be noted that 
the equalizing measures in industry and education were not 
seen by Tawney as in isolation, but rather as part of total 
social reform. Thus, 
'as long as many hundred thousand children are poisoned by 
slums and half starved by every depression, the most 
important of educational reforms is social reconstruction.' 269 
43. 
d) Tawney' s social equality sought, not simply increased resources 
or incomes, but a 
social income, received in the form, not of money, but of 
increased well being.' 270 
Nonetheless, economic security was important. This was partly 
answered by Tawney' s strategy for industrial equality 
(providing power against economic oppression) and partly by 
a state- sponsored insurance scheme for the unemployed and 
retired. The level of benefit should be sufficient 
'not merely to keep them in physical existence, but for a 
self -respecting life.' 271 
Such a 'self- respecting' life was precisely one in which duties 
to self and others could be fulfilled, 272 and this, at the 
same time would remove the oppression which controlled by fear273 
In providing such benefit the state would be espousing a revised 
notion of social justice, where benefits were received as of 
right, acknowledging that, for example, unemployment was due 
to a collective breakdown. 274 The danger of this level of 
benefit encouraging social malingering and fraud was, argued 
Tawney, not severe. 275 He did not write directly on the 
danger of them creating dependence, partly because he saw the 
avenue of participatory equality as providing the means to 
encourage independence or interdependence. In any case, the 
notion of as of right benefits, precisely avoided the kind of 
'charity dependence' which did not respect the dignity of the 
individual. However, as of right benefits could be abused by 
the state. This form of ' social malingering' involved using 
benefits as a 




Thus, the priority of government had to be to deal dirctly 
wi th the causes of unemployment. 
Reisman 
277 
argues that Tawney does not in fact address himself 
directly to the means of curing unemployment. Questions of 
economic policy were not followed through by him. However, as 
Atherton points out, Tawney' s industrial strategy was seen by 
him as the answer to questions of unemployment. 
275 
e 
rejected policies advocating purely increased productivity as 
a means to end unemployment, 
279 
and approaches which Led to 
unemployment itself being a means of control. The answer for 
Tawney was therefore ' proportional' and ' relational' , 
28O 
involving government planning of industrial strategy, increased 
control of the work situation by workers 2b1 and the removal 
gross inequali ties. 
Conclusion 
282 
Tawney is often referred to as a moralist, and given his 
some times puri tanica 1 style, 233 and his battles for principles, 
this is no doubt appropriate. 
However, in so far as this ti tle implies a restriction in Tawney' s 
perspective to the moral view point' , it is perhaps unfortunate. 
Tawney, in fact, was a holist, aware of the complex relationship 
between the individual and society, between principles, and between 
principles and practice. Questions of value could not be restricted 
to certain areas, but were an integral element in the perception 
and organization of any si tua tion. From such a base, is developed 
an holistic and complex view of equality, with equality of respect 
45. 
as the fundamental principle, one which was defined in agapaic 
terms. This, in itself generates two principles or fundamental 
aims in terms of social organization, the high or moral view of 
freedom and fellowship. This produces 
'a synthesis which may do justice both to the values of the 
Liberal era, and to equally important aspects of life, to which 
that era, for all its virtues, was too often blind.' 284 
Such principles were to be achieved by equality in its instrumental 
sense ie. equality of distribution and participation. Such equality 
would aim to re- distribute life chances and power in a global 
domain, and be relative, responding to need. Such equality would 
aim for universal provision of the basic conditions of civilization 5 
but would also be concerned with a broader view of distribution 
linked to the moral basis of this view of equality ie. to function 
with respect to social purposes. 
It is a broad vision of equality, demanding comprehensive thought, 
both in terms of principles and of policy, and which lies at the 
centre of a changed society developing right relationships. Tawney 
himself realized this when he commented that the complete attainment 
of the ends in question was not in itself important. 'What was 
important was that they 
should be sincerely sought.' 
286 
Tawney realized then that equality was about a process of development. 
It was also therefore the basis of a radical view of justice. 
This gives rise to two questions: 
a) What were the grounds for such an ambitious, and some would say 
utopian view ? 
287 
b) How far could a vision which was so comprehensive be adequately 
sustained against criticisms from right and left? 
46. 
The next two chapters will consider these in some detail. 
47. 
Chapter 2 Tawney's Justification of Equality 
Many different arguments have been used to justify equality. The 
arguments themselves tend to vary according to the kind of equality 
argued for, and, as noted above, tend to not only form the ground 
for equality, but the basis of the particular meaning. 
The various kinds of argument may be briefly noted as follows: - 
a) Formal arguments, which appeal to considerations of logic 
rather than to empirical evidence. A bald version of this 
argument is that it is the unequal treatment of individuals 
which requires justification. Given that there are no reasons 
for unequal treatment forthcoming, it is therefore rational to 
treat people equally. 1 As a formal argument, however, the 
' presumption of equality' argument says nothing about what 
constitutes acceptable treatment or any criteria of distribution. 
It therefore has to be combined with empirical features such as 
an appeal to human characteristics, 2 to demonstrate what is 
meant by equal treatment. 
b) Consequential arguments, including utilitarian ones, urge that 
the consequences of equality, both for the self 
3 
and for 
society, are the crucial justificatory evidence. Such arguments 
aim to demonstrate that egalitarian social arrangements are 
more likely to yield greater social benfits overall than 
alternative sets of social arrangements. The problem with this 
approach is determining what is an acceptable benefit. 
c) A third line of argument may be termed deontological. In this 
approach, equality is seen to be founded upon ultimate values. 
4 
Such arguments often have a metaphysical or theological base 
5 
48, 
and tend to be perfectionist. The term perfectionist here refers 
to the belief that some forms of life are intrinsically superior 
to others. 6 This approach, in stressing some overall good for 
the individual and society, always runs the danger of paternalism 
ie. coercing or persuading the individual to follow the greater 
good. 
d) A fourth kind of argument may therefore be identified in contrast 
to this, that of the social contract. In this, an egalitarian 
posi tion is argued from an ' original posi tion' or ' sta to of 
nature' . From this it is argued that rational consideration 
of individual interests will lead to an egalitarian position. 
Such an 'original position' is said to achieve 
the same purpose as benevolence.' Notably similar arguments 
are used to defend both marginal and global equality. 8 
Tawney' s justification of equality contains elements of the first 
three arguments. He writes at times, of equality, and of the 
obligations consequent to it, as being self -evident. At other points 
he stresses the important consequences of egalitarian social policy, 
in terms of social well -being and increased efficiency. Having 
examined Tawney' s consequence arguments, however, this chapter will 
conclude that they are ultimately dependent upon perfectionist 
assumptions. These assumptions are grounded in his Christian belief 
which in turn provides the basis of Tawney' s deontological arguments 
for equality. 
In examining the latter, note will be taken of the relationship 
between Tawney' s Christian humanism and moral humanism. Note will 
also be taken of the difficulties this approach creates for adequately 
49. 
evaluating the success of any egalitarian measures. 
Finally, the implications of Chapters 1 and 2 on the position of 
equality in Tawney's thought will be considered. In particular, 
the view that Tawney used equality as a middle -axiom will be 
examined. 
Consequence Arguments 
Tawney' s consequence arguments involve the consequences to the 
individual and to society, and refer to equality of respect, 
distributional equality and participatory equality. 
One consequence of straightforward global re- distribution of domain 9 
would be individual self fulfillment. Such resources, opportunities 
and rights would allow the individual 
to make the best of such powers as they possess.' 
10 
Equality and self fulfillment do not have a necessary connection 
for, as Tawney remarks, no social organization of itself can change 
people. 11 It does, nowever, provide the conditions for freedom 
which are crucial to self- development. 
12 
Terrill comments that self -fulfillment is not, of itself, an 
egalitarian principle. That made it so for Tawney, he argues, was 
the social and economic conditions of England in the 1920's which 
made it impossible for some to simply survive, still less achieve 
self -realization. 
13 
Such individuals could hardly be said to have 
equal rights, since some of them will die before the rights can be 
exercised and others will be too enfeebled to exercise them 
14 
effectively. 
However, whilst it is true that Tawney was concerned about the effect 
of social conditions, Terrill's argument ignores the fundamental 
connection between self -fulfillment and equality of respect. 
50. 
For Tawney, equality of respect is a positive concept which actively 
seeks the good of the individual. This good is seen precisely in 
terms of the individual developing and being allowed to develop what 
is unique to them, their personality. 15 Crea ting condi tions which 
allow the individual to fulfill themselves is thus a clear objective 
of equal respect for persons. 16 Thus, for Tawney, self- 
fulfillment is intimately connected to person -regarding equality 
(equality of respect) and to equality of condition, which provides 
the freedom for self development. In all this, there is also the 
outline of a more down to earth argument ie. that more equal 
distribution will simply help individuals to live healthier, less 
painful lives ie. basic needs will be fulfilled. 
17 
Perhaps even more significant for Tawney were the social 
consequences of equality. Tawney saw order, social well being, social 
health, and efficiency in industry as in one way or another stemming 
from equality. It is precisely because Tawney envisaged such far 
reaching effects, even on industrial performance, that he did not 
18 
erson- of out   g spend time on economic policies. The working p
regarding equality in the organization of society was, for him, the 
essential first step in answering any economic problems, whatever the 
sta to of the economy. 
19 
Tawney's social consequence argument includes the following elements: - 
a) Straightforward distribution would decrease the gap between 
rich and poor, thus taking away a barrier existing to the 
development of community. 20 Making the distribution of 
' social health' universal and 'as of right' would also do away 
with the a tti tude of pa ternalis tic chari ty to the poor, both 
51. 
accepting the poor as equals and break; ng down a further barrier 
to commun ty. 
21 
b) The provision of welfare and education would lead to less waste 
of individual talent. Thus, for example if children of 
twelve were kept in school and not 'given' to industry, then 
both individual potential and potential for society would be 
developed. 
22 
p Also, widening university entrance would 
develop more talent. 
23 
c) Tawney argued that massive indqualities led to a misdirection 
of production effort, and thus, an inefficient use of limited 
resources. The free -market responds to demand, not need, thus 
giving priority 
24 
Planning and   to luxuries not necessities. 
co- ordination of industry in response to needs was thus 
necessary for a more efficient use of resources. 
25 
d) Provision of resources, less wastage and improved planning were, 
however, only part of efficiency. For Tawney, efficiency was 
dependent upon the motivation of the total work force 26 and 
ultimately on industrial peace. 27 Thus, whilst economy and 
efficiency are important, they are 
'not the last words in industry. ' 
28 
dha t is most important is that ' condi tions of corporate freedom' 
should be involved in social and industrial organization. 
29 
Such conditions would lead to both industrial peace and the 
emergence of a common culture. Such a common culture does not 
involve the lowest common denominator in humanity, but rather 
all the elements of social and moral relationships which are the 
essence of humanity. Such a development would, argues Tawney, 
30 
also depend upon the acceptance of common purposes. 
52. 
As noted above, the development of such a common culture 
would depend upon increasing participatory equality, equalizing 
of power, protection from irresponsible use of great power, and 
developing a common ethos and purpose. The power given by 
participation applies to education as well as industry. 
Crucial to these consequence arguments, is an interactionist view 
of society, which sees ideas as affecting social organization, and 
social organization affecting the life of the individual; a 
moralist' s view of society which sees it as a network of moral 
relationships; and an holistic view of the individual. At the 
base of this, as shall be seen below, Tawney sees self- respect as 
closely related to power and the structures of power, something 
which will depend both upon how the individual is treated and how 
the individual treats others. 
Tawney' s Social and Moral Psychology 
Underpinning Tawney's view of equality was his Christian faith, 
and in particular the doctrine of the Incarnation. Tawney did 
not systematically develop a theology of equality. This was 
partially due to an antipathy not just towards theology, 
31 
but also towards any academic discipline which was abstract or 
divorced from its moral context. 32 Tawney was a Christian Social 
Moralist rather than a theologian. 
33 
Like Gore, for whom faith 
had 'primarily a moral not an intellectual basis' , 
34 
Tawney 
saw Christianity as a way of life. This did not ignore the 
importance of doctrine. On the contrary, the relation between 
doctrine and conduct was analogous to prayer and conduct - 
53. 
prayer is all important and conduct tests it.' 
35 
Conduct also makes doctrine and principles intelligible, a point 
exemplified by the Incarnation. This revealed that God relates 
36 
not as a 'principle' or an 'absolute' but as a man. Here, 
Tawney does not contrast particular states of God, for example, 
transcendence and immanence, but rather ways in which God is made 
intelligible, God as principle or God 
fully expressed in a particular historical individual.' 
37 
By implication, the activity and nature of God only become fully 
intelligible through the Incarnation. This answers the 'down to 
earth' demand that might have been made by Henry Dubb,38 
' what we want to know is what kind of God He is, and what He is 
like in ordinary human intercourse.' 39 
The Incarnation is also at the base of Tawney' s thought on human 
nature and social organization. Firstly, God's assumption of 
humanity stands out against any dualist conception of man. He is 
rather an 'amphibious' being, 'both animal and spiritual' 
40 
sinner and heir to eternal life. Secondly, the Incarnation rules 
out any rigid divisions into sacred and secular, private and public 
morality. God was made man for all mankind, as mankind exists, 
in a frameowrk of social relationships. 
Thus, 
the distinction between the life of the spirit and mechanisms of 
society is a false antithesis.' 41 
He extends his moral psychology to include the effect of social 
organization upon the whole man, including the spirit. Social 
organization in one way or other, influences man' s 
'responsiveness and power of vision, his vitality and capacity 
54. 
foi- growth in spiritual as well as physical stature.' 
42 
Moreover, institutions or social organizations rest ultimately 
upon a series of decisions taken by human beings 
'as to the manner in which they and their fellowmen should live.' 
43 
Utimately then, such organizations are the 
'real clue to the spiritual life of any age.' 
44 
In all this, government is 'a servicable drudge' , a neutral 
instrument which can be used according to the aims of whoever is 
in control. 
45 
Its use will thus depend upon the principles of 
those in power. Hence, everyone has an interest in getting these 
basic principles and aims right. 46 On the other hand, 
the only sound test in the first place, of a political system, is 
its practical effect on the lives of human beings.' 47 
Law, for Tawney, was the mother of liberty ie. had the capacity to 
affect peoples lives and put into effect basic principles. 
48 
Thus, Tawney' s view of the state, given his Incarnation base and 
moral and social psychology, was of a neutral instrument, but not 
unconcerned. 
The notion then of Christianity as 'interfering' or 'intervening' 
in the mechanism of society made no sense to Tawney. 49 'Humanity 
involved society and if Christianity left humanity to itself, the 
devil would certainly not limit his liabilities. 50 Thus, whilst 
Christ seeks a personal response, and whilst God's Kingdom is more 
than any particular social institution, and to seek it only there 
would lead to disaster, 
51 
the spiritual element of man, both in 
social relationships and as a physical /spiritual whole, provides a 
context for equality which demands a global rather than a marginal 
domain. 
55. 
The Incarnation and the Christian view of man crov_ ie he basis 
for concern for humanity in society. However, the ho __ s fi = _ ev 
of man which Tawney has, is not confined to a spiritual: 
unity. Scattered amongst his writings are a number of e_ecents 
which may be listed as follows:- 
32 
a) He highlights the importance of personal qualities or virtues. 
b) He stresses the importance of mental characteristics and the 
development of the critical faculty. 
53 
This is closely 
related to the development of autonomy, in the case of 
ma turi ty. 
c) He views man as a moral being, both in terms of having 
atti tudes and values, and in terms of being part of a network 
of social and moral relationships. 
54 
d) Man is also, as noted above, a spiritual being. lawny does 
not define too closely what he means by spirituality, or the 
spirit. He is, 'however, clear that the spirit is an essential 
element of humanity and part of the holistic view of man, which 
links into social organization, and all those other elements 
o r human ty. 
55 
e) Finally, of course, there is the sinful nature of man. Cace 
again, Tawney does not define sin. However, he does give some 
hints as to his view. Firstly, sin is seen as a constant in 
human life, ie. however hard the individual tries, he or she 
will always fall short. 56 Secondly, sin is closely related 
to the idea of irresponsibility, especially the irresponsible 
use of power. The implications for a view of man' s sinful 
nature of this approach are several. Sin moves out of a 
simple individual definition and becomes connected to social 
56. 
injustice. Sin may refer to conscious irresponsibility ie. 
irresponsible use of power actively commissioned, but it also 
has the more subtle sense of lack of awareness of the totality 
of man and of the effects which any decision may have upon 
individuals or groups. Tawney does not explicitly state this, 
but sin at this point comes close to being defined (though not 
exclusively) as a narrowness of vision and relational awareness 
which ignores man as a social and moral being, limits any 
view of values and principles, and limits the responsibility 
of the individual, and thus their development. It is precisely 
such a broad view of sin which lies behind Tawney' s moral 
outrage at the capitalism of his age. 
57 
With respect to 
those in power in that capitalist society, he sees this 
limitation of vision as producing bad results, no matter how 
well intentioned the statesman in charge. 
o 
Interestingly, 
the principles underlying capitalism he lists as follows:- 
- the denial of responsibility. A man is not responsible for 
the results of a course of action pursued in the course 
of business. 
- the denial of personality. The mass of mankind may be 
treated as tools. 
- the denial of other than individual morality. 
- the denial of freedom, such 
that as long as man are well fed and well housed, the Halage 
of social relations which they enter in order to earn food 
and housing does not matter.' 59 
Sin then is seen by Tawney in the context of the holistic 
view of man, and recognition of such sin demands 
a) the encouragement of the development of awareness, an 
57. 
b) safeguards which will ensure that power is not used 
irresponsibly. 
dhilst Tawney does not regard concentrations of power as 
necessarily leading to irresponsibility, he does argue that 
the aquisitive ethos will tend to be a focus for irresponsible 
self centred behaviour, and even writes of privileges as 
producing 'wickedness' . 60 Nonetheless, he does not accept 
that the sinful nature of man will be changed purely through 
social organization. 61 Social organization can, however, take 
account of this nature. 
Three brief points must now be made about Tawney` s holistic view 
in general. Firstly, it implies a constant process or framework 
to develop awareness. Secondly, the fact of interconnections does 
not assume the development of an easy or largely peaceful process. 
At the very least Tawney' s holistic view requires that individual 
freedom and control be balanced with the demands of moral 
relationships. For Tawney, both were essent al. 62 Tirdl,;, 
shall be noted in more detail below, this holism makes it difficult 
to frame an objective view of society, at least in the sense of 
excluding moral values from that analysis. Yoral values are part 
of the data. 
As noted above, Tawney sees self respect _. affected 
treatment of the individual but also _._ _- _'_vi =_al" s treatment 
of others. At this point, I will not.:- some _s :ecific examples of 
how Tawney sees these connections wore ini.. 
i) Wi th respect to poverty, Tawney distinguishes two kinds. 
The first refers to a group w-"ho had 'fallen over the precipice' 




The second was that of the low paid manual 
worker. Such poverty left the individual at the mercy of a 
power received quite 'haphazard' , 64 and which was .caused by 
the power structures of that time. Hence, he could write 
of 
a unity underlying the individual cases of poverty.' 
65 
The low paid worker was 'controlled' not only by fear of 
unemployment, but also by guilt which was created by the 
attitude of those in power, based upon the idea that 
poverty itself is a moral failing ' to be condemned.' 66 In 
examining the power of attitudes, Tawney notes that certain 
virtues such as thrift, diligence and sobriety were 
encouraged as capitalism grew and that to applaud such 
virtues is 
'by implication to condemn the habits and institutions which 
appear to conflict with them.' 67 
Such attitudes in turn reflect values and principles held 
explicitly or implicitly. 
At the centre of poverty Tawney argued, was a loss of liberty. 
Indeed, this absence of liberty is the 
'supreme evil of modern industrial society,' not poverty per 
se. 
68 
It leads to 
'hopelessness, irresponsibility, recklessness.' 69 Tawney's 
argument here is compressed, but two elements are discernible. 
Firstly, lack of freedom affects the will of the individual. 
They have no hope for self- direction and thus lose 
the will not to be poor.' Secondly, lack of freedom in 
terms of resources given, can affect the moral behaviour of 
individuals. Thus, for example, i t is ' extremely difficult' 
59. 




tempted to neglect their duties to their families because 
it is so hopeless to discharge them.' 71 Thus, Tawney 
offers some searching insights into the poverty trap. The 
lack of freedom causeáby lack of reasonable resources leads 
to an erosion not just of the will, but of moral direction 
and of shared moral meaning. The only direction or moral 
purpose offered by an aquisitive ethos is material well 
being through self -reliant hard work, which, despite the 
examples of a few, in any case remains impossible for the 
majority trapped in poverty. 72 As shall be seen shortly, 
Tawney does not in all this seek to deny the moral 
responsibility of the poor, but rather points to complex 
subtle relationships between resources and attitudes and 
principles, which can exert great influential pressure upon 
the individual both as social and moral beings. An important 
implication of this is that the individual who is a physical, 
emotional and spiritual being 
73 
i s always being influenced 
in one way or another, whatever the social organization or 
underlying principles. 
74 
The choice facing society, 
therefore, is not between a society with a particular value 
base, or one which holds no value base with a morally 
neutral government whose aim is to simply balance a diversity 
o t interests. Rather, must the state accept the inevitability 
o,' the influence of social organization upon the individual 
and search for the best way of using or fulfilling that 
rela tionship. 
60. 
ii) Alongside the negative effect of resources and attitudes 
upon freedom, Tawney emphasises the positive effect of 
attitudes. In particular, Tawney writes of the importance 
of trust in motivation. 
'It is idle to expect that men will give their best to any 
system they do not trust, or that they will trust any system 
the control of which they do not share.' 75 
This 'new psychology' of confidence or trust remains through- 
out Tawney' s wri tings. 76 Of itself, it is more effective as 
a motivator, than fear or competition. 77 It is necessary, too 
for general social well -being. This 
'does not only depend upon intelligent leadership, it also 
depends upon cohesion and solidarity.' 
This in turn, depends upon individuals being able 
to lead a life of dignity and culture, whether they rise 
(in society ) or not.' 78 
The foundation therefore of industrial efficiency and social 
health and well -being is equal respect for persons, involving 
conditions and attitudes which demonstrate that individuals 
are valued for themselves. 
79 
The 'new psychology' involves 
trust at two levels. Trust of principles (and thus what 
mo ti va tes any organi za ti on) and trust demons tra ted in a 
sharing of responsibility. Recognition of a shared moral 
purpose indeed, is precisely what establishes trust, providing 
a clear view of the justice of the treatment of 
individuals. 
8O 
This does not lead to an ideal harmony and 
disagreement and discussion over particular objectives and the 
means of achieving them is actively encouraged. 
81 
however, 
such discussion can take place within a framework of trust, 
82 
founded on shared basic principles. Sharing responsibility, 
61. 
,nindustry, or community, is also a mark of trust, which allows 
individuals to participate without usurping the particular 
responsibilities held by officials in industry or community. 
83 
The ultimate result of this trust is a degree of 'harmony and 
peace' which leads in industry to increased efficiency. 
84 
In this context, trust also links closely with Tawney' s view 
of freedom. It is an important element in allowing the 
individual freedom to develop and to serve. 85 Equally, 
freedom and efficiency are very much complementary. 
86 
Indeed, i t may be argued from Tawney' s position that real 
efficiency is not achieved without industrial freedom. 87 
iii) The self- respect of the individual can be affected in many 
ways by what happens to them wi th a tti tudes, mental 
characteristics, values and relationships being affected by 
attitudes, resources, or lack of them, and social arrangements. 
However, equally, Tawney implies that self- respect is 
dependent upon the individual fulfilling his or her duties.88 
Finding ones work and doing it,' serving, and in this 
fulfilling ones role in relation to family, intermediate 
structures, or society as a whole is what 'spiritual well- 
being consists of.' 
89 
Hence, it is important, as noted in chapter one, to give the 
individual such opportunities to serve. In this, the control 
of ones situation involves also the response to the demands 
of moral relationships. 
90 
Such a consideration liesst 
the base of Tawney' s concern for participatory equality. 
However, this does not lead to any easy form of fellowship. 
62. 
On the contrary, the individual is challenged to take 
responsibility for decisions. hence, tied to service, has 
to be the development of virtues, and mental characteristics, 
from loyalty and sharpness of thought to self reliance and 
enterprise. Taking on responsibility also involves risk, 
which .Tawney finds ' bracing' if voluntarily undertaken, 
because 
a man balances probable gains and losses and stakes his 
character on success.' 91 
Such risk could be experienced at various levels in community 
and this kind of participation is contrasted with the 
au thori to ti ve style of management where the majori ty 
'do not decide what risks they shall bear. It is decided for 
them by their masters. They gain nothing if the enterprise 
succeeds: they have neither the responsibility of effort, nor 
the pride of achievement; they merely have the sufferings of 
failure.' 92 
Tawney' s holistic view then points to interaction in 
society at several levels.'These are parallel to the Tawney 
view of the relationships between principles and practice. 
As noted above, the Incarnation made God intelligible in 
life. For Tawney, equally, any principle required to be made 
intelligible in practice, for 
'principles, after all, are intelligible only in so far as 
their application is indicated.' 93 
With respect to equality, this means that any general 
principle of equality must be made substantive if it is to be 
understood. In turn, any society is to be judged not simply 
by consequences but by 
'the institutions which it creates, the relations between 
human beincs which those institutions establish, and the type 
63. 
of character, individual and social, which is fostered by 
those relations.' 94 
Underlying Tawney' s consequence arguments, are thus perfectionist 
assumptions ie. that one form of life is superior to others and 
should be pursued. 
95 
Hence, Tawney can advocate improved 
distribution of material resources as a particular objective, but 
notes, that this, of itself, is inadequate: 
the fact remains that certain economic relations are, in 
themselves preferable to others, irrespective of the wealth 
they confer.' 
' I f the way one earns ones living involves a complete loss of 
liberty, the living is not worth earning.' 96 
"ost tellingly, Tawney wri tes of the ethical foundations of his 
view of socialism as being superior whatever the outcome in terms 
of prosperity: 
even if the way of co- operation did not produce all the 
economic advantages expected from it, we should continue to use 
ít. 97 
Thus, the justification of equality does not depend upon the 
achievement of any particular consequence. Tawney was a sufficient 
realist to know that creation of wealth and industrial performance 
were important. Hence, he argues for the practical superiority of 
a respect based approach, over against competition or fear98 
Yet the achievement of that prosperity does not bear the full 
weight of the justification of equality, 
Two things follow from this. firstly, Tawney does not attempt to 
justify equality on any narrow view of self interest or even social 
interest. 'quality and the view of justice that this espouses 
' does pay' . 
99 
However, to base a justification purely on that, 
i s to ' sell the thins of God for gold.' By implica tion, the 
concept of equality held by Tawney requires altruism and thus, 
64. 
by definition, cannot be justified on, or motivated by purely self 
interest. On the one hand, this has the elements of an argument 
based upon the logic of Tawney's concept of equality ie. that a 
concept which is concerned with moral relationships cannot be 
justified purely on the grounds of self interest, however well 
understood. On the other hand, he is making a point about human 
nature and the tendency for self interest to ignore the claims of 
others and to actually subvert moral principles which take such 
claims into account. 
100 
The second point which flows from Tawney' s perfectionist base, is 
that any policies founded on equal respect could never strictly 
provide empirical evidence against the principle of equali ty per 
se. If the consequences of any particular policy were neither 
peace and harmony' nor ' prosperity' , this would demand examination 
of the methods used, not the basic principle and its key objectives. 
Tawney thus does not spend time gathering detailed evidence of how 
person regarding equali ty will eventually achieve the ' peace and 
harmony' . In this, he holds basically a natural law position, 
arguing that rational reflection upon human nature and relationships 
will lead to understanding of the process and its importance. 
Thus, the virtues of, for example, co- operation can be discerned by 
'all men of good will.' 
101 
such rational reflection would go 
hand in hand with analysis of society which would reveal the need 
for different methods to apply the basic principles in response 
to different situations in society. 
102 
However, Tawney did 
underpin rational reflection with evidence from history, especially 
to demonstrate the effects of attitudes or social activity, for 
example, the enclosures upon the poor. 
65. 
Given all this, Tawney could not build any justification upon 
utilitarian grounds. He saw utilitarianism as a good ' first 
approximation' , but attacked it on two grounds. Firstly, to 
rely solely on consequences for moral justification, leads to the 
end justifying the means. Secondly, the concept of happiness is a 
vague one which ignores all questions of 'right or wrong' regard- 
less of the consequences for the majority. 103 Hence, in Tawney, 
there is no question of justifying equality in terms of such 
arguments as the greatest good being achieved for the greatest 
number, by reducing the incidence of envy. 
104 
Tawney explicitly contrasts with the utilitarian approach, the 
criterion of moral judgement which he describes as a 
transcendental, religious or mystical one' that 
105 
the personality of man is the most divine thing we know, and that 
to encroach upon it is to efface the very title deeds of humanity.' 
Justification for Tawney then involves more than consideration 
of the consequences, it also involves examining the ground of 
equal value itself. 
The Deontological Argument 
Tawney' s major argument was that the equal value of all men was 
based upon God's love. God's assumption of humani ty precisely 
confirms His concern for all human beings - not in any weak sense 
of paternalism, but in the fullness of His self giving. Hence, 
Tawney links the Incarnation with the equal value of all, and the 
unique importance of the individual. Alorside this, Tawney has 
elements of the Imago Dei argument, referring to the personality 
106 
as ' sacred' or ' the most divine thing we know.' 
66. 
Several important points should be underlined in this view of 
equal value. Firstly, it is unconditional. yo action on the Dart 
of man is seen to merit value. Thus, no particular action of man 
can be used to justify equal value. Secondly, the value is not 
read off from, or dependent upon any particular characteristics 
or view of human ty. As has been noted, Tawney has a clear view 
of man as a social and moral being. This, however, is not used as 
the basis of value. Tawney links value to the Incarnation or 
Jod' s atti tude to mankind, or an irreducible atti tude to man 107 
in which, by implication, value is bestowed upon man by God. 
108 
This does not mean that equal value becomes a matter of subjective 
judgement. Indeed, For Tawney, God's Love is precisely objectified 
in the Incarnation. This has important consequences for the 
Christians view of man. 
the most important pact about human beings is not the na ture that 
they share with the animals, but their human ty which, by virtue of 
the Incarna tion, they share wi th God.' 109 
It is this ' capital fact' which makes humani ty per se unique and 
which gives ' din ty to man.' Thus the unique importance of the 
individual stems from the unique importance of humani ty as a 
whole to Sod. Hence, when Tawney writes of the 
'sacredness of the personali ty' or of the personality ' as the most 
divine thing we know' , he is both expressing an atti tude about 
human ty, but also pointing to the value which humani ty has of 
itself, ultimately dependent upon God. 
Thirdly, the equal value of each individual is the base of 
oblication of equal respect. This sets up the very i:antian view 
o f respect owed to all, such tha t 
67. 
' nothing can justify my using power which chance gives me 
to tii- full, that nothing can justify my using my neighbour as a 
tool, or treating him as something negligible (sic) which may be 
swept aside to realize my ends, however noble those ends may be.' 
110 
Of course, set out by itself, equal value and equality of respect 
cannot justify particular egalitarian measures. That it does do 
is to form the ground for equal care and concern, with, in 
Tawney' s case, an implied basis of agape. Such a concern for the 
individual in Christian terms involves the desire for the indivi- 
dual to develop as a whole person. This development is seen in 
terms of the holistic view of man and implicitly by the second of 
the great commandments. Both stress the importance of voluntary, 
individual responsibility and responsibility for others, concern for 
self and concern for others, as central to spiritual, whole 
development. As noted above, the principles of freedom and 
fellowship pick up the essence of this development and are thus 
viewed by Tawney as end principles, the criteria of success in 
any social policy. 
In a real sense therefore, there are two elements to Tawney' s 
total justification, both of which are essential. The first, 
equality of respect arising from equal value (unconditional), 
provides the obligation to care equally for all. The second, an 
holistic view of man, grounded in agape, demonstrates how the 
desired development of the individual may be accommodated. 
111 
I t is instructive to compare this with a more recent two tier 
argument, that of :lichard Norman. 
112 ?:orman argues that equality 
of respect is crucial for justification and the second level in 
his argument is that human beings need to associate with others 
'and to link our efforts with their common projects." 
113 
68 . 
In ':act, it is precisely such a need which has to be demonstrated, 
and i t requires ultimately some form of holistic view of man. 
114 
"ïawney's justification, or at least the elements of it in his 
writings, is thus in its own way, holistic and complex. It 
implicitly accepts that at the base of any justification has to be 
an ultimate attitude, and that attitudes will affect the argument 
minimally in terms of providing a basis for commitment. 
115 
It accepts equally the need for principles, but does not simply 
attempt to draw out the justification from a basic principle. 
116 
I t seeks confirmation from a view of mankind and from an inter - 
actionist view of society which is able to argue for consequences 
confirming the perfectionist stance. I t thus seeks to demons tra to 
rather than ' prove' a particular view of equality. 
iha t links the two parts together most powerfully is the Incarna tion 
itself. It is precisely this which provides the grounds for equal 
worth - bestowing value - but also this which demonstrates most 
clearly the holistic view of man as a spiritual, social, moral 
117 
being. Thus, implicit in Tawney' s view is a strong link between 
spiritual and social health, and social justice. 
118 
Several points may be made before passing on to consider the 
importance of Christiani tv to Tawney' s equali ty. 
Firstly, Tawney' s justification differs markedly from the straight- 
forward, formal justification of equality. This simply presumes 
equal treatment of individuals unless there is good reason for not 
doing this. 
119 
Strictly speaking therefore, such an approach does 
not attempt to justify a positive view of equality, it simply 
demands that inequalities be justified. Tawney's justification of 
equality is cuite different both in the positive concern at its base 
69. 
and in the consequent concern for differential treatment appropriate 
to the individual. Thus, the very element which stands at the 
base of Tawney' s justification, equal value, also sets the 
objectives in terms of the development of the individual in 
communi ty. 
Secondly, Tawney does not use rights as any part of the justification 
as such. He recognizes the importance of economic and social rights 
to sustain any social organization based upon equality, but 
reveals no argument from natural rights. This is largely because 
of his emphasis on duties and thus away from self- interest per se as 
the basis of an argument. Ultimately, of course, the grounds for 
equality may be viewed as prudential in the sense that the 
consequences outlined would provide the framework to enable the 
individual to develop as a whole person. 120 However, even such 
prudence, argues Tawney, could not be fully appreciated by anyone who 
operates purelyfrom self- interest; 
'A man must be a little altruistic even in order to appreciate the 
full possibilities of selfishness.' 121 
In this, Tawney is adding a basic psychological point to his foun- 
dation of unconditional value, and value in relation. Development 
of the individual is not really possible without altruism, an 
awareness of the value of the other, leading to respect of the 
other. Self- interest properly understooddemands other interest and 
concern. 
ven when Tawney argues for rights, then, he argues for n broad view 
of rights, not simply rights to a particular good, narrowly defined. 
Thus he can sound annoyed with the English Labour Movement as 
early as 1914: 
'They have aimed at comfort, instead o' alminq to het their ri_ _hts, 
70. 
including the right to do their duty.' 
122 
Thirdly, Tawney does not make explicit use of the doctrine of 
creation in establishing equal value. 
123 
Nonetheless, Tawney's 
view of freedom and his holistic view of man, does provide the 
basis for a theology of man as both created and partner in creation. 
This will be developed later, and in its own right adds to the 
justification of equality. 
Tawney also does not use creation doctrine as an explicit justifica 
tion for equitable distribution. .:onetheless, such a theology is 
implied in arguments for equitable distribution such as 
the resources of the community should be used to satisfy all, and 
not earmarked for the satisfaction of a few.' 124 
Tawney of course, went beyond the Ambrose view of property, arguing 
that property and wealth should be judged in terms of social 
purpose and service. 
125 
The important distinction in Tawney' s 
mind was therefore not between private or public property, but 
whether i t was functional or not ie. served the social purpose or 
not. However, this position is not based upon the doctrine of 
creation, but rather on all the elements of Tawney's holism and 
interac tioni sm. 
126 
Fourthly, Tawney occasionally touches on what may be termed the 
Christian family argument le. that all persons are children of 
God. 127 In fact, this is less a developed argument and more simply 
an image, which supports the agapaic base of equality of respect. 
Fifthly, it must he noted that the notion of a moral consensus 
does play some part in the justification of equality. This involves 
several elements:- 
128 
- the acceptance of duty relAtd to roles. 
71. 
- the acceptance of general principles on providing social 
purpose. 
129 
the acceptance of certain virtues as necessary for community or 
fellowship. 
130 
- the acceptance of basic moral guidelines, such as promise 
keeping, for any relationship. 
131 
The consensus overall is seen as the consequence of Christian 
influence. 
132 
Consensus for Tawney is another element in the 
demonstration' of the importance of equality, at times much akin 
to Rawls' s reliance upon ' considered convictions.' 
133 
The Importance of Chri s tiani ty to Equality 
Given the various strands in Tawney' s justification, involving 
consequential and deontological elements, a crucial question at 
this point is how far Tawney thought his Christian base as being 
necessary in the justification of equality. At times, Tawney 
wri tes o f our relationship with God as being the ultimate 
demonstrable justification of equality, 
'It is only when we realize that each individual soul is related to 
a power above men, that we are able to regard each as an end in 
himself.' 134 
This leads Tawney to argue for a Christian foundation of morality, 
in what seems to be a refutation of the autonomy of morality, 
'The essence of all morality is this: to believe that every human 
being is of infinite importance.... But to believe that it is 
necessary to believe in God.' 135 
This is further underlined in 'Christianity and Social Order' , 
72. 
where it is argued that the Christian view of man and what follows 
from it, is quite different from that of ' good pagans' , unless the 
latter have been influenced by the Christian tradition. 136 
As noted above, Tawney posits a ' necessary' connection between 
this distinctive anthropology and equality (clearly equality of 
respect). 137 
Alongside this, however, . therton detects a separate strand of moral 
humanism which seeks to justify equality purely in terms of 'common 
humani t.' y 138 Atherton cites three examples: - 
i) Tawney emphasizes the value of the human being qua human. 139 
ii) The origin of human rights is located in the nature of man 
himself. 140 
iii) Tawney gives support for the 
' autonomy of the value of humani ty in itself' ie. for the 
autonomy of moral humanism. 
:however, : .therton' s examples are not entirely convincing as an 
attempt to point to a non- Christian base for equality in Tawney. 
His first example occurs in the context of an argument that begins 
with the statement, 
' In order to believe in human equality, it is necessary to believe 
in God.' 142 
The second example is historical comment, upon the developments in 
the French Revolution, and, as such, does not necessarily express 
Tawney's own ar ;u /ments about the on gin or founda tion or humant 
ri.;hts. The third example does not explicitly argue `'or the s :: tcncry 
e 
o* moral humanism at all. in i t, awnev re cd: nazes the exfi §tëine 
of many 'admirable pa ;,ins' , but ,saes them as a product utttmately o 
the :hrístian tradi ti on And err °tr thLl t the ,11 Ls ttan ^oral t.xa 0111 
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is both distinctive and superior. 
143 
The most that can be taken from such examples is that Tawney does 
use the form of moral humanist arguments, for example in the formal 
justification noted above, but that even in these, the high value 
which he places on humanity is firmly rooted in his Christian 
position. The strand of moral humanism may also be noted in parts 
of the consequential arguments and also the moral and social 
psychology. However, as also was noted above, such elements are not 
per se the foundation of equality. All this evidence points firmly 
to a Christian humanist base for Tawney' s equality and the 
implication that morality is not really autonomous. 
However, one example not cited by Atherton points to a more 
interesting relationship between Christian humanism and moral 
humanism. In this, Tawney asserts that the 'humanist spirit' , the 
equ #i valent of equality of respect, is not the exclusive possession 
of Christians or non believers. 
144 
The essence of this spirit is 
the attitude which judges the externals of life by their effects in 
assisting or hindering the life of the spirit.' 145 
Having given some examples of moral humanists, Tawney asserts that 
such moral humanism and Christianity are: 
'using different dialects of a common language.' 
146 
There may be several explanations for this stress on moral humanism. 
Firstly, that there was an element of moral humanism in Tawney's 
thinking which was unsystematically and inextricably linked with 
his Christian humanism. '< This, however, would not explain why 
'Equality' as a whole is lacking in the explicit Christian under- 
pinning of the concept. Secondly, the stress on moral humanism in 
'Equality' may point to a development from the Commonplace Book to 
74. 
Equality, away from Christian humanism to moral humanism. Support 
for this may be found in Tawney's increasing frustration with academic 
theology and the role of the Church in social affaits, and an 
increasing stress upon the role of social organization as against 
social philosophy. 
147 However, as noted in chapter one, 
148 
Tawney' s concern for social organization did not preclude his concern 
for philosophy and principles and the spiritual development of men. 
Also, Tawney does not dismiss Christian humanism in 'Equality' , but 
rather points to a shared concern in moral and Christian humanism. 
In any case, elements of moral humanism were already apparent before 
the Great `.,lar in the Commonplace Book. Furthermore, Tawney repeats 
his argument for equali ty from a Christian base of ter ' Equali ty' 
in 'Christianity and The Social Order.' 
149 
The third explanation of the greater stress on moral humanism in 
' Equality' is simply that Tawney' s emphasis changed, according to 
the audience he was addressing and the purpose of the address, In 
the case of 'Equality' , Tawney was concerned not so much to simply 
justify the concept of equality, as to convince the general public 
of its importance and relevance to social organization, and so, 
the need for action based upon i t. Such an exercise involved 
building bridges between Christian and moral humanism, The 
evidence for this more convincing view is cumulative: - 
a) In other publications, personal or addressed to Christian 
audiences, Tawney is clear that the ultimate justification of 
equality involves belief in God. 
150 
Tawney saw himself very much as a bridge- builder, Such 
151 
pontífices he sees ass the real priests in society. 
75. 
c) Tawney makes use of one argument for equality which has 
common elements in Christian and moral humanism. This may be 
termed the argument from perspective ie. viewed from a 
particular perspective, or in relation to someone or something 
else, the differences between human beings become trivial. 
Significantly, in the Commonplace Book, Tawney gives this 
theistic form. Thus, having written of the importance of 
God to equality, he adds, 
'It i s only when one contemplates the infinitely great that 
human differences appear so infinitely small as to be 
negligible.' 152 
In 'Equality' , the same argument is used but now in relation 
to the universe. 
153 
In addition to this line of argument, Tawney reveals glimpses 
of an argument based upon ontological equality, what he refers 
to as ' identi ty of nature' or ' common human ty.' 
154 
Once again such an argument from sameness would pick up 
common themes with moral humanism. 
155 
d) With regard to equality, however, moral and Christian humanism 
not only share some similar justificatory arguments, they 
also share that attitude of commitment and concern which 
' judges the externals of life by their efforts in assisting or 
hindering the life of the spirit.' 156 
Such an ultimate attitude cannot be easily categorized or fi t 
neatly into a philosophical or theological concept. Under- 
standing of an attitude demands more than the understanding 
of a concept. Hence, Tawney can write in terms of ' belief in' 
equality, not simply comprehending equality. 
157 
The question of the link between Christian and moral humanism, 
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especially as regards equality, is then, more complex than Atherton 
seems to allow. Firstly, given that the idea of equality is 
holistic, taking in principle, attitude and practice, it is 
simply very difficult to neatly divide the two viewpoints. This is 
especially so given the fact that Tawney stresses the expression of 
theology not as doctrine but as a way of life. 
158 
Secondly, 
in any case, it is probable that Tawney intentionally wanted to 
highlight overlaps and common elements in the views. Thirdly, 
however, it is clear that ultimately Christian humanism was an 
essential part of his justification of equality, and in particular 
the Incarnation. In a real sense, the Incarnation was the holistic 
demonstration of the love which bestows equal worth ie. it is not 
simply a theological doctrine, but was a demonstration of the 
attitude of God, of 'what God is like.' 
159 
It is conceptual, 
but also experiential. The Incarnation indicates the kind of 
concern (unconditional) but also the strength of concern for all 
(each one unique). It provides therefore a high moral stance of 
person- centred equality, but also one that demands action. With 
the Incarnation at its basis, equality thus moves away from a 
simple philosophical concept and into a process or a way of life. 
This high view of equality then will be contributing towards and 
sustaining any view of equality, as well as searching for common 
elements in moral humanism. 
160 
All of this raises the question of how Tawney used the concept of 
equality, and in particular whether he saw it as a middle -axiom. 
77. 
Tawney's Use Of The Concept Of Equality 
According to R.H. Preston, Tawney uses the concept of equality as 
a middle- axiom. 
161 
The latter is found in the ground between 
theology and social action. It is not, argues Preston, part of 
a logical syllogism, enabling thought to move unerringly from 
gospel to clearly defined social action. A middle -axiom is rather 
the central part of a reflective process. It is a general 
principle, acceptable to non Christians, derived from theology. 
Against this principle, society or some part of society is 
analysed and questions asked of it, leading eventually to clear 
guidelines for social action or challenges to society. 
162 
At the stage of forming policy objectives and of planning measures, 
the theologian is joined by experts from other relevant disciplines. 
"iddle- axioms thus are a means of seeking agreement on the general 
direction of social policies. They help to direct Christian 
attention to forming judgements in social policy, and also help to 
influence opinion generally. Middle- axioms, Oldham argues, tend to 
be 'provisional' and subject to re- examination as circumstances 
change.163 
The term 'Middle-axiom' was coined originally by J.H.Oldham vho its 
common with Temple, was concerned not to enter into the field of 
detailed policy making, subject as it was to so many empirical 
uncertainties. 
164 
They were also concerned that the Church should 
not be associated with the policy of any particular party. 16 
Because the middle -axiom is part of a reflective process, ft ßs 
impossible to say how detailed they should be, except to say that 
166 they do not go as far as policy formulation.' 
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Bennett provides two examples of middle- axioms in the economic 
field: - 
i) The government has the responsibility of maintaining full 
employment. 
ii) Private centres of economic power should not be stronger 
than the government. 
167 
The search for middle- axioms, somewhere between general principles 
of theology and detailed policy, does nbt preclude the theologian 
from moving into the area of policy formulation. 'As citizens', 
wri tes Pre ton, 
'we have to support detailed policies in the direction they 
indicate.' 168 
On the face of i t, Preston has some grounds for his description 
of Tawney's equality as a middle- axiom:- 
a) Tawney was very concerned about mediative principles, 
'close to what I believe the logicians call axiomnata v.edii.' 
Terrill refers to Tawney' s 'distillation' of several middle- 
level principles such as fellowship and equality.170 
b) Tawney accepts that ' experts' should be involved in working 




c) Like Oldham, Tawney accepts that applications of any principles 
will vary according to different times, 
'new interpretations will be added to the old.' 
172 
d) Tawney asserts that there is agreement on the necessary policy 
objectives to overcome, for instance, mass unemployment, or 
disparities in health and education. 
173 
By implication, this 
assumes general agreement on social policy objectives, and 
equa li zing measures. 
79. 
However, despi to these similari ties and given Preston's very broad 
defini tion of middle -axiom work, wi th engagement of the partici- 
pants at several levels, it is difficult to see Tawney's equality 
as fitting into the middle -axiom method: 
a) Tawney' s stress is often not upon 'middle range' principles 
but upon basic social principles. In particular, Tawney sought 
agreement at the basic level of equal value. 
174 
The appeal to the humanist spirit in 'Equality' demonstrates 
the importance he placed upon agreement at the level of basic 
principle p and attitude. 
175 
Moreover, whilst Tawney argued 
for a consensus at the level of basic principles, he was also 
realistic enough about man's sinful nature to accept that for 
many there was, 
'a deeply rooted dislike of the principle involved.' 
Working for agreement at this level, was, crucial for Tawney 
precisely because agreement about attitude and relevance of 
such a fundamental principle would radically affect the 
content of any later policies. It is instructive in this 
context to note that even marginal egalitarians such as 
Friedman and Nozick argue for a form of equality of respect. 
177 
This is, of course, radically different from the 'humanist 
spirit' of Tawney. Thus, alongside the search for agreement 
wi th the basis of moral humanism, Tawney' s task was to convince 
people about this ultimate a tti tude and its associated 
principles. 
178 
Tawney, of course, felt confident that given the right conditions 
and framework, men would come to agree on the fundamental 
80. 
principles, how ever much they may disagree as to the means 
of implementing them. 
179 
In a very real sense, it was the contribution of the Church 
to ensure that these conditions were enabled and sustained. 
The high moral view of equality of respect has precisely this 
function, working against a limited or essentialist view of 
principles, and in particular, any exclusive view of fellowship 
or freedom. 
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Equality of respect, based upon equal worth, thus is used in 
several ways:- 
- as a bridge between Christianity and moral humanism, 
highlighting 'shared attitudes.' 
- as a means of deepening the very idea of equality, centering 
i t upon care and relationships. 
as the basis for an holistic discussion of issues. Such a 
high moral foundation keeps the discussion on attitudes and 
values open, and guards against limiting principles. 
Tawney, of course, was aware of the declining influence of the 
Church. At the same time, he saw no future for simple 
1=1 
evangelism, which involved too much 'cajoling' and 'enthusiasm'. 
Zauality of value and respect thus provide an excellent 
bridge for him, both avoiding any kind of moral coercion, yet 
through his holistic view, linking equality to altruism, and 
ultimately altruism to God. 
182 
Reisman suggests that 
acceptance of Tawney' s position ultima tely depends upon 
183 
' acceptance of the Christian basis. Tawney' s justification 
however, is not of that kind - demanding the acceptance of 
31. 
basic principles and working from that. As was seen above, it 
involves a balanced demonstration, with all the elements of 
justification re- inforcing each other. Equally he does not 
use the concept of equality in that way. Equality finds 
its ultimate expression in the Incarnation, in the person of 
Christ. This in turn will form the ultimate basis for a global 
view of person- centred equality. Such person- centred equality 
(based upon agape) is, in turn, essential if social policy is 
not to be fuelled by limited or limiting principles, and 
ultimately by interests. 
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b) Having said this, equality of respect is, for Tawney, part of 
a total process, which involves the interrelation of principles 
with each other and with an analysis of society, and the 
emphasis is precisely upon the process as such and not upon a 
particular element. This is necessarily so as meaning in terms 
of equality is a function of the interrelation of the process. 
c) At one point, Tawney gives the impression of using substantive 
equality, in the sense of distributive or participatory 
measures, as a middle -axiom. This, however, is not clearly the 
case. The principles of distributive or participatory 
equality are not per se provisional. 
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They may be 
instrumental in relation to fellowship and freedom, but remain 
important principles to be enshrined in social organization. 
What is provisional for Tawney is the interpretation of 
equali ty, the policy objectives for any egalitarian measures 
in a particular context. An example of an egalitarian policy 
aim in education may be that: 
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all children should have an equal opportunity to develop 
as persons.' 
Such an aim, if accepted would not be provisional. That 
would be provisional would be the chosen method of achieving 
this aim with the specific educational objectives involved. 
This would depend upon examining the whole range of principles, 
needs, resources, constraints etc. 
There is no doubt that there are general similaritiesin the 
egalitarian process of Tawney and the process in which several 
writers locate the middle- axiom. It is clear, however, that 
Tawney's approach to equality as such is not in terms of a middle - 
axiom, but is something farmore complex. It may be added at this 
point that one of the difficulties in this debate is in discerning 
a system or common vocabulary in the whole field of principles, 
aims, objectives etc. It is also made difficult by differences 
between middle -axiom thinkers on what they are describing. Thus, 
for instance, Oldham and Preston both see the middle -axiom as 
provisional whereas Bennett provides examples of middle- axioms which 
though they may be logically provisional, ie. some different 
middle -axiom could be developed given a change in circumstances, 
are hardly likely to be so. Indeed the middle -axiom that: 
private centres of economic power should not be stronger than 
the government,' 186 
in the light of certain principles, not least about equalizing 
187 
power, would seem to be absolute. 
Conclusion 
As befits a complex view of equality, -a: -e.: rte- _ fes _ c^-p_ex 
justification. Indeed, in his demonstration in i feynt _o- 
gical and consequential elements, as well as several G r 
arguments not fully developed, Tawney pro-rife-5 not simply 
justification, but the grounds for co-.n_ ment to 
in other words, is not concerned sin 
in favour of a concept, :ut with an arg=ent v- . - -- »- te 
action. His grounds for s _ -a __ tv are =n,- t =_:: ._-sect`_ to ers 
Christian faith and the t_.eclo,: : this does 
not exclude a non -Christian awareness _ - _ __ o - -_nt .n.. shar.inz 
in the commitment. Ta 7ev's use cf __a_ is in 
and responsive. This is necessarily so =_ _ 
that on the one hand all social oraniz,a ̂ on reflected_ 
spiritual ethos of a society in some way, includinz the principies, 
yet on the other hand that all efforts a: sooial policy or 
organization were provisional ar_t level:__,... =n th, -s sense, 
equality could never be applied as an ie. 
to respond to developments. Yet =em=-=. 
for Tawney, constant and funfa_en _. .fu__ zes _n socfer- 
affected any egalitarian objectives, so this more: _ =w := 
equality of respect is to ensure a _nt a f = -_n_ 
the egalitarian process. 
There are those, however, who wcu='_ ar that zLe =t th ong 
Tawney' s influence has been, his work has been 
lost in the ocean of instinctive approval,' 
and that when examined carefully many flaws are revealed, see 
perhaps fatal. I t is to those criticisms we nahst mow mozu. 
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Chapter 3 Criticisms Of Tawney' s View Of Equality 
Following the presentation of Tawney' s view of equality and its 
justification in chapters one and two, chapter three aims to 
examine more closely the validity and coherence of his theory. In 
order to do this, various cri ticisms of Tawney' s view will be 
examined. As shall be noted, some criticisms fall also into the 
category of general anti -egalitarian arguments in which the 
concept of equality and its relations with liberty are questioned.1 
Other arguments specifically examine the Tawney concepts of 
purpose, function and common culture, and how these relate to the 
concept of equality. 2 
In addition, the theological and anthropological ideas behind 
Tawney' s equality will be critically examined. 
3 
Finally, 
difficulties over the strategy of equality and its contemporary 
relevance will be discussed. 
4 
Several conclusions will be offered. Firstly, many of the 
criticisms of Tawney' s equality are based upon misunderstandings 
and even caricatures of his work. Secondly, Tawney's view of 
equality is valid and coherent, whilst containing limitations 
and difficulties which require development. Thirdly, in 
discussing cri tical views of Tawney' s equality, the argument tends 
to return to the fundamental question of how equality of respect 
is to be interpreted, and in particular, how it relates to the 
autonomy of the individual. 
A. The Concept of Equality and its Moral Justification 
In arguing against the concept of equality in general, though with 
specific reference to Tawney, Joseph and Sumption assert that 
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Tawney has not understood the nature of equality. Equality, i t 
is said, is, by definition an absolute concept. By this, it is 
meant that equality is a mathematical concept referring to the 
sameness between a pair of subjects. The concept, thus, cannot 
logically admit of any gradation of equality. 
'Two individuals are not more equal because they are less different; 
they are either equal or unequal.' 5 
The logic of such a view, if-espoused, demands equality of outcome 
or results. Tawney himself demands an equal start to life for 
every child which inevitably requires that every child should have 
the same standard of living. 6 Tawney then, they argue, must be 
inconsistent in allowing relative equality to exist. The absolute 
nature of equality also makes it ultimately impossible to control 
argue Joseph and Sumption, so that any attempt to soften its 
nature will necessarily fail. 
This argument involves two elements. On the one hand, the 
' zealous egalitarian' will always discover further inequalities 
to be eradicated, thus forcing the concept through to its logical 
conclusion in society. On the other hand, such zealousness 
could not be controlled easily. Simply to rely upon 'good men' or 
' soft -hearted egalitarians who would stop at freedom' would not 
be sufficient. 
8 
Equality then contains a logical and social force which would 
actually make it impossible to restrain. Of itself, this would 
not be unacceptable, providing the concept of equality could be 
justified as a political principle. Joseph and Sumption examine 
the justification of equality in terms of consequences and in terms 
of interests. In the first of these it is argued that: 
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'Political ideas are never intrinsically just. Their justice must 
be tested by their resu l s.' 9 
If the results are 'disagreeable' , then, however fine the principle 
upon which they are founded, 
' the principle ought to be discarded.' 
Thus, the egalitarian has the formidable task of demonstrating 
that an equal society would be one in which people would choose 
to live. This would be unlikely for the following reasons:- 
a) equality of result would necessarily preclude equality of 
opportuni ty. 
lo 
b) equality, and by implication, planning for equality would 
destroy the 'competitive chaos' from which emerge significant 
ideas and progress. 
11 
c) such a situation, with motivation discouraged and 
differentiation ignored, would, argue Joseph and Sumption, 
lead to a sterile state, with no tolerance and no discernible 
cul turc. 
12 
At the core of such consequences, most exemplified in Communist 
societies, lies an argument which directly attacks Tawney' s view 
of equality, liberty and fraternity. Equality, claim Joseph 
and Sumption, far from facilitating liberty and fraternity, 
actually destroys both. Fraternity depends upon tolerance, and 
13 
reserva tion tolerance requires difference, not sameness. The p 
of liberty demands that individual autonomy is not interfered 
with and the social application of any principle, however 
' elevated' will necessarily do this. 
14 At the base of this are 
the same arguments as put forward by Hayek and Nozick, that any 
ideological domination of society amounts to coercion. 15 This 
rests upon the view that 
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'autonomous individuals are prior to societies, and have rights 
independent of them.' 16 
Thus, Hayek can write of the individual as having 
' some assured private sphere.... some set of circumstances in his 
environment with which others cannot interfere.' 17 
Joseph and Sumption argue from this position that equality per 
se cannot enable liberty. On the one hand, this is because the 
absolute concept of equality will tend to be coercive, in any 
case. On the other hand, even if the range of choice were 
increased for individuals, this does not have a necessary connec- 
tion to their fundamental liberty or independence. Hence, Joseph 
and Sumption can argue that , 
'poverty is not unfreedom, 1., that the individual can retain 
independence and dignity whatever their position, and should be 
encouraged to do so. 19 
Thus, Joseph and Sumption argue that equality cannot be morally 
justified because the consequences of its implementation would 
lead to coercive policies which would destroy the important 
principles of liberty and fraternity. 
A second criticism of equality and its justification is not ain 
specifically at Tawney, but does have relevance to hin. Jo 
and Sumption argue that unless some natural right to equality 
be proved, then equality in terms of re- distribution of wealth 
by the State, 
' can only be justified by reference to criteria which tot:: 
groups recognize as valid.' 20 
an 
I t is argued that there is no basis for equality as a ri t- 
There is no ontological equality and, in any case, ha n beings 
' are so constituted that i t is natural to them: to pursue pri ss to 
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rather than public ends.' 21 
This being so, it is the duty of governments to accommodate 
themselves to 
this immutable fact about human nature.' 
Some measure of fe- distribution then would be acceptable, 
providing it was in the interests of everybody. Joseph and 
Sumption offer the example of the rich recognizing that their 
interests are best served by political stability, and that this 
can only be had 
22 
' if the differences between rich and poor are kept within bounds.' 
Ironically, this comes close to an alternative Socialist justi- 
fication of equality as shall be seen below. 2J Significantly, 
from such a base, Joseph and Sumption allow the possibility of 
some re- distribution for the relief of poverty, equality of 
opportunity and the fostering of a ' sense of brotherhood.' 
A further cri ticism of Tawney' s perception of equality and 
fra terni ty comes from qui te a different background. David 
Donnison argues that Tawney's case for equality is based upon 
man's need for fellowship. 24 Such fra terni ty or commun ty 
depends in Tawney's words upon a common culture and this 
' rests upon economic foundations.' 25 
Donnison applauds the important moral capacity which underlies 
Tawney' s view of fellowship, the 
capacity to perceive strangers as sentient, suffering human 
beings,' 
but differentiates this from the necessary 'common culture.' 
Against the latter, Donnison appears to have two arguments. 
Firstly, and implicitly, the notion of a common culture appears to 
89. 
go against diversity. Secondly, the very attempt to find 
fraternity in the sense of 'a common culture' will necessarily 
be an activity of exclusion. Thus, 
' a free world will be full of conflict: it cannot be a fellowship 
of friends ruled by love, because the search for friends soon 
degenerates into the exclusion of enemies, the suppression of 
conflict and , ultimately, rule by hate.' 26 
In short, to make fra tern ty the reason for equality in society 
runs the danger of encouraging an exclusive nationalism and 
falling into the coercive traps envisaged by Joseph and Sumption, 
and Hayek. 
A third criticism of Tawney' s equality moves away from 
consideration of equality as re- distribution and its relation to 
f. 
liberty or faternity, and explicitly accepts the importance of 
equality of respect in Tawney' s thought and of its relation to 
equality as re- distribution. Henry Drucker offers one observation 
on and one cri ticism of this concept of equali ty of regard. 27 
Firstly, he comments that equality of regard is easier to describe 
in action than to grasp as an abstract concept. Thus, equality of 
regard is generally exemplified in descriptions of communities 
such as the miners. 
28 
Tawney in this sense is 
' legitimately abstracting from the experience of working people,' 
when it comes to defining equality of regard. Secondly, Drucker 
argues that Tawney's emphasis upon equality of regard and his 
stance as a ' teacher' of society, puts him into an impossible 
posi tion, that of imposing equali ty of regard. In this, Drucker 
refers to the words of Tawney on progress: 
'Progress depends on the willingness on the part of the mass 
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o f mankind to recognize genuine superiori ty and submit to 
its influence. ' 29 
Underlying this argument are two strands. Firstly, Drucker 
stresses the simple impossibility of imposing equality of regard. 
Drucker does not develop this, but the wording implies similar 
objections to Joseph and Sumption ie, that true equality of regard 
and related fraternity, requires a free response from individuals 
and therefore cannot be imposed. 
The second strand is of a more particular nature. Drucker argues 
that the idea of giving equality is morally unjustifiable. The 
'act of giving imposes obligations on the recipient' , and 
'repeated one -sided giving serves nicely to remind both giver and 
receiver who is boss.' 30 
The very act of giving thus sets up a dominant or paternalistic 
relationship, with no real participation from the receiver. This 
process is wrong not simply because of the structure of the 
relationship, but also, because equality is not anyones to give. 
Hence, argues Drucker, equality must be taken and involves a 
constant class struggle for power. 
Thus far we have seen consequential arguments against Tawney's view 
of equality and cri ticisms of his view of the concept of equality. 
A final criticism in this section comes from John Charvet. 
Charvet has made several criticisms of equality, amongst which he 
argues that equality is self- contradictory and that i t will lead 
to the destruction of roles in society. 
31 
However, as those do 
not argue against Tawney specifically , I will not address such 
arguments here. At one point, however, Charvet forms an explici t 
criticism of Tawney which questions his moral justification of 
91. 
equality. In 'A Cri tique of Freedk.m and Equality', Charvet 
brackets Tawney with Williams, Rees and Vlastos, as building his 
justification of equality upon the central idea of individualist 
ethics, 
'consisting in the individual giving his value to himself.' 32 
At the base of this justification, is ' the requirement of authen- 
ticity' ie. the requirement of self determination, and the 
exclusion of other determination in respect of a particular life. 
This, in itself is the corollary of the absolute value of the 
individual ie. the 
'axiom that individuals have value in themselves,' and not 
unmediated value for others. What value they have for others 
is a consequence of the value they have in themselves - hence the 
value is mediated. 
Charvet's criticism is, of course, a blanket one of several 
wri ters. However, i t does strike at Tawney' s view of equal value, 
seeing this as based upon individualism and 
33 
the requirement that the individual has only himself as his end in 
his particular life.' 34 
The point of his argument is that such a justification of equal 
value is morally inadequate ie. it can never set up an adequate 
ground for shared morality. 35 Thus, Charvet argues that 
' the affirmation of the individual's value in relation to other 
individuals is a necessary condition of the possibility of 
morali ty.' 36 
Before examining the specific cri ticisms of Tawne s equality, two 
points are worthy of note. Firstly, the examples of criticism 
offered above, are not confined to any particular group, Ta y 
is criticised by both right and left wing. 
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Secondly, though the perspective of the criticism naturally 
differs, some arguments are common to all of the presentations, for 
example, the importance of freedom for fraternity. Further 
common elements in the criticisms are that they either begin from 
an inadequate understanding of Tawney' s equality, or from an 
understanding of equality as such, which arbitrarily restricts 
the meaning. A good example of both of these is the work of 
Joseph and Sumption. 
Firstly, they restrict the meaning of equality to that of an 
absolute concept. Their only attempt to justify this is to assert 
that equality must be understood as a literal mathematical concept. 
Thus, without any specific reason, they exclude the concept of 
equality of respect from consideration. This approach, much in 
the style of the logical positivists, 
37 
then proceeds to deny 
ally possibility of a deontological element in the justification 
of equality, again without exploration or justification, simply 
asserting that equality can have no intrinsic justification, 
only consequential. Finally, having characterized equality   
as necessarily involving equality of outcome, Joseph and Sumption 
assume that equality is being used as an end principle, ie. a 
fundamental principle which is the basic aim of a social policy, 
rather than an instrumental principle ie. a means of achieving 
other values. 
Tawney, however, does refer to re- distribution as instrumental and 
spends time arguing for the importance of both deontological and 
consequential justifications of equality, in particular equality of 
39 
respect which lies at the base of his thought. Not only do 
Joseph and Sumption not address the concept of person- centred 
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equality, they also fail to take account of the importance of 
liberty in Tawney' s thought. The 
'supreme good of public and civil liberty' 
40 
is one of Tawney' s aims which constantly works against the kind of 
sterile picture which Joseph and Sumption paint as the necessary 
end of equality. Tawney, as the authors rightly note, was concerned 
for individual growth and excellence, and this concern was 
precisely generated by his positive view of equality of respect. He 
would have accepted the assertion that 'poverty is not unfreedom' 
himself, noting that 'character can overcome circumstances.' 
41 
Nonetheless, he argues that in fact, poverty does often contribute 
towards lack of freedom, diminishing power in many spheres and 
badly affecting motivation. 42 However, the effect of distribution 
on freedom is seen by Tawney in the context of a wider view of 
equality, including distributional and participatory equality, 
a wider perspective which once again, Joseph and Sumption fail to 
address. In this context, to argue that Tawney equates freedom 
with simply widening of choice ignores his insistence that widening 
of choice should not be merely random, but relevant and meaningful, 
in the context of the duties of the individual to themselves and 
o thers. 
43 
It is precisely because of Tawney's emphasis upon duties as 
against rights, that the Joseph and Sumption argument against a 
right to equality, and for coincident self- interest, can have no 
relevance to his view of equali ty. For Tawney, rights were 
dependent upon function and thus tied to service. There is no 
attempt to establish a 'natural right' to equality, for equality 




Equality of distribution and participation facilitate these 
relationships, and give expression to equality of respect. 
Joseph and Sumption' s fundamental ideas about human nature and the 
state will be examined below. At this point, a final note on 
their argument against Tawney must take account of their use of 
consequential arguments. Having argued that equality is, by 
definition, an absolute concept, the range of their empirical 
evidence is inevitably restricted to nations who do aim for 
equality of outcome or uniformity. 
45 
Not only does this ignore 
the evidence of non Communist countries who have had some egalit- 
arian policies, it also ignores the complex issue of interpreting 
equality sociologically and economically. Communist states, for 
instance, could equally supply evidence which suggests that equality 
has never really been achieved or that social stratification has 
been more influenced by the historical and social content of the 
nation than by any egalitarian measures. 46 The issue of the 
status of sociological evidence in consequence arguments for or 
against equality will be examined in more detail in succeeding 
chap ters. 
In turning to Donnison' s cri ticisms of Tawney, two points are 
worthy of note. Firstly, like Joseph and Sumption, he does not 
take account of the importance that freedom has for Tawney. Thus, 
like Terrill, he gives the impression that equality was only for 
fra tern ty. In that context, Donni son, secondly, provides too 
limi ting a meaning for fraternity as common culture. yore 
specific cri ticisms of common culture will be examined later in 
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this chapter alongside common purpose. However, it is important 
to note at this point, that Tawney was very aware of the dangers of 
47 
th an exclusive form of fellowship. It is not surprising en, 
that his references to fellowship should be cast frequently in 
the general moral terms of duties, or service, concepts which 
can apply to all communities or institutional relationships 
without being tied to any particular expression. 
As noted above, Tawney never seeks to impose fellowship through 
a change in social organization. He does, however, encourage 
mediation structures, such as industry or trades unions, to view 
their community in terms of their purposes and duties to society, 
4.8 
and to work out how to fulfill then. 
Behind many arguments against equality, especially in terms 
consequences, lies a very real anxiety about the effects of 
equali ty in terms of allowing tyrannies to take power - either of 
the masses, or of nationalism, or of communist bureaucracies . 
In many respects, it is these elements which supply for :oseph. 
and Sumptíon, the 'inevitability of uniformity' with respect to 
equali ty. 
49 
Along with this, there is used a subtle form of argument ad 
hominem, in which the forces of oppression, envy, er 
seeking are ranged against 'a good man', a 'soft hearted egali Arian" 
a 'saintly' man, encouraging 'generous, gentle, gift g~ gl-g.` 
By inference, a man such as Tawney could not really hope to stand 
against the immense powers waiting to fill any vacuum. orecv r, 
by implication, such a saintly man could not know how to ensure 
that socia 1 organizations could wi the tand such power. once aLn, 
there i s revealed genuine ignorance of Tourney' s approach. ka 
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noted in the first chapters, he was acutely aware of power and 
the tendency of man to misuse power, and was thus concerned to 
disperse power and make decision making far more open. 
51 
Tawney was thus, in many respects a realist. His altruistic 
nature or saintly character, in any case, have little relevance 
as to the validity of his view of equality. 
Drucker's cri ticism of Tawney reveals a complete misunderstanding 
of the way in which Tawney sees the principles of liberty, 
equality and fra tern ty relating. Tawney certainly takes on the 
role of teacher and accepts the need for a hierarchical society 
(both points are mentioned in criticisms later in this chapter). 
However, Tawney nowhere suggests that the State 'distribute' 
equality of regard. In arguing that Tawney does, Drucker actually 
seems to confuse several concepts, equality of regard or respect, 
fellowship, and power. Tawney certainly does advocate the re- 
distribution of power both in terms of opportunities and resources, 
and does advocate education for the use of that power. 52 All of 
this is to increase freedom and to encourage fellowship. 
53 
However, none of this is imposed or ' given' in any sense which does 
not require the individual to take advantage of the distribution 
ie. to use the resource or ' good' in fulfilling duties to self or 
to others. Drucker' s observation that Tawney abstracted equality of 
regard from the examples of closed communities is only partially 
true. On the one hand he was deeply affected by the cameraderie 
of the 'common man' , especially as experienced in the war. 
54 
On the other hand, fellowship being one of Tawney' s twin aims, was 
55 
precisely non -exclusive. 
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Turning to Charvet' s view of Tawney' s justification of equali ty, 
there are elements in his writings which seem to support this. 
Tawney's deontological justification, with its focus on equal value 
has the individual and his or her unique importance as the 
foundation of the moral attitude. 56 However, in examining his 
justification in chapter two, it became clear that Tawney viewed 
57 
the individual not in isolation, but in relation to others. 
He accepts that individuals are both determiners and determined, 
shaped by society as well as shaping the (World, and part of a 
network of moral relationships. In such a context, it is impossible 
Iir, 
to say that the individual only has value for mss. 
Charvet' s own basis of morality, seeing the individual' s value in 
relation to other individuals 
58 
could itself be questioned 
Indeed, it could be argued that Tawney provides a corrective 
that the value of the individual is both in relation to him or 
herself and to others. 
59 
However, in the context of this thesis, 
it is sufficient to conclude that he misrepresents the basis of 
Tawney' s view of equal value. 
In conclusion, I would argue that none of these criticisms 
seriously disturbs Tawney' s concept of equality of respect, and its 
relation to freedom, fellowship and distribution. They do, however 
raise serious questions about how it is possible to have dialogue 
on equality. Tawney and his critics share many important values 
which the critics seem unable to recognize. Perhaps, more 
interestingly, from right and from left (Joseph and Sumption, and 
Drucker), Tawney' s cri tics share an insistence that social relation- 
ships with respect to equality should be interest and rights 
based. For Joseph and Sumption, i t is the interest of the individual 
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which is paramount, and their right to retain goods unless it is in 
their interest not to. 60 For Drucker, it is the interest of the 
underprivileged classes which is paramount, and they must take 
equality. He does not say from whom, or how, but the implication is 
from the rich, and is to be taken by right. 
These criticisms rarely meet Tawney at his holistic and balanced 
view of equality. However, in turning to criticisms on concepts 
such as function, and the practical aspects of Tawney' s equality, 
arguments would seem to be better founded. 
B. Equality and Other Principles 
For Tawney' s equality, the most problems begin to emerge when viewed 
in relation to second level principles such as function and purpose. 
As noted above, the term function, is used as a criterion of 
distribution of resources, in particular salaries and wages. 
61 
Reward for Tawney, was to be based upon function in serving the 
common purpose, so that 
'distribution should never fall out of relation to service rendered 
to the community.' 62 
Whilst this criterion of distributi on would tend to diminish great 
differences between rewards, precisely because most would have some 
claim to serving the common purpose, 63 nonetheless, it is a 
relative equality of distribution, which is, by definition, 
conditional. This conflicts with the express character of equality 
of respect, which is, by definition, unconditional. Equality of 
respect leads logically to distribution of resources based upon 
relevant reason, for example, illness is the relevant reason for 
health care, not ability to pay. 64 Behind the cri terion of need, 
was, for Tawney, that of enabling the individual to fulfill their 
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duties to society, family etc. ie. enabling them to contribute to 
the common purpose. Thus, it may be argued that for Tawney, to be 
consistent in terms of equality, function should be recast as an 
enabling criterion, rather than a criterion of reward. If reward 
were still deemed to be important in some way, then non -financial 
65 
means of reward such as those advocated by Crick could be encouraged. 
A second problem for function was its dependence upon purpose and 
the idea of the common good. The precise content of the common good 
was, for Tawney, open to question. Tawney wanted the common good to 
be collectively defined. 66 This places Tawney upon the horns of a 
dilemma. Either the concept of the common good was still developing, 
in which case there could be no clear content to the criterion of 
function, or the concept of the common good was clear, and its 
meaning Shared, in which case Tawney has to explain how a society 
can come to freely agree on common interests or goods, without being 
'persuaded' or 'coerced' in some way. Indeed, i t could be argued 
that concepts of purpose and function would necessarily require 
sufficient central control to enforce its egali tarian standards 
across a whole economy. Anything less, would leave the way open to 
' local' perceptions of functional reward which might differ 
markedly from other perceptions, thus destroying the whole point of 
function. 
However, even if problems of meaning were solved, the concept of 
function would still have difficulties. As it stands, it is still 
a general concept which requires interpretation, and which, of 
itself, cannot reveal how the differential distribution is to be 
made. It does not provide criteria for determining which functions 
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are more worthy of reward than others, nor what is an acceptable 
difference between rewards. It may be argued that reward led 
distribution will always tend to widen the gap between rewards in 
order to ensure that key positions are filled. 
Gutmann takes some of these considerations further, arguing that 
distribution according to function 
invites the creation of a status hierarchy.` 
67 
Status in this situation would depend upon the relative ability to 
contribute to the common good. Self- respect may then be based upon 
this relative ability, making 
fellowship psychologically untenable.' 
68 
Thus Gutmann argues that even a status hierarchy based upon service 
to the common good, could lead to division and deference, precisely 
one of the reasons that made inequality in England undesirable to 
Tawney. Gutmann continues, 
'But if social justice might also produce deference, would that be 
preferred? Even if so .... Tawney's discussion of equality, 
directed primarily at reducing established class privilege offers 
few clues as to why.' 69 
Gutmann's discussion inevitably takes us back to the question of 
condi tional and unconditional equality. Behind her hypothetical 
status hierarchy is the assumption that different rewards are an 
estimate of the value of the individual in their contribution to the 
common good. If this were taken further, it would be possible to 
envisage a newly defined form of poverty, the 'poor in service' 
ie. those who were unable to contribute to the common good, for 
example, the handicapped, the unemployed etc. It may be retorted 
that in fact all such individuals do have somecontribution to 
make and are equally valued by society for them. If this is so, 
101. 
then it would seem not only inconsistent, but morally wrong to tie 
contributions of service in with financial rewards at all. Either 
all should receive the same, to reflect equal value, or value should 
be rewarded by non -financial means, or financial distribution should 
not be tied to reward for function, but rather seen as enabling 
functions to be performed. 
The consequences of these arguments for Tawney' s overall view of 
equality are considerable. The need to provide different rewards 
in order to fill the key posts in society was a major ground for 
accepting any inequality in distribution. If this concept of 
function were no longer tenable then the idea of an acceptable 
relative equality might also fall. In the event of no support for 
relative equality in distribution, Tawney would be faced with 
radical or absolute equality. Thus the logic of the Joseph and 
Sumption argument would begin to re- emerge, ie. that Tawney' s 
equality would, in practice, inevitably lead to radical equality. 
Closely connected to the question of the relationship between 
equality and function, is the broader issue of the relevance of the 
idea of a common purpose in a pluralist society. If it were found 
not to be applicable, then this would seriously affect the plausi- 
bility o f Tawney' s equa li ty. Atherton argues that the idea o f 
common purpose underlying function leads to a holistic approach to 
egalitarianism which simply cannot relate to the plurality of 
values in modern society. Thus, Tawney' s 
continuing emphasis... on a strong social purpose suggests the 
persistence of an underlying belief in a form of Christendom no 
longer relevant to a modern society.' 70 
In effect, Atherton is arguing that the concept of social purpose 
102. 
is no longer the appropriate framework for any moral dialogue. 
It limited Tawney' s ability 
to recognize that the moral contribution of collective realities 
would have to be evaluated not only in relation to social purpose, 
but also in relation to their value in their own right as 
relatively autonomous bureaucracies, and political mechanisms or as 
means and expressions of procedural agreements.' 71 
Atherton is thus arguing that Tawney' s concept of social purpose 
tends to deny the autonomy of morality. Thus, if equality were 
inextricably connected to the concept of social purpose, it is hard 
to see how it could realistically be applied to a complex society. 
Behind the concept of common purpose, lie the ideas of a common 
culture and a moral consensus. Reisman notes several problems 
relating to these ideas, quite apart from the argument that a 
consensus simply doesn' t exist in modern pluralist society. 
Firstly, it depends upon a very optimistic view of individuals, 
as accepting the moral consensus and rejecting materialistic ends. 
(This will be further examined in section C of this chapter). 
secondly, Tawney' s method of social change is not clear. 
Zgalitarian views, given their moral base, would best be introduced 
from above, yet Tawney was determined to see change from below as 
the consensus emerges. 72 Thirdly, consensus can represent a 
threa t to the ' crea ti ve deviance' . 
73 
In this, Rei sman re turns to 
the basic criticisms of Joseph and Sumption and Donnison, with 
coercion from above leading to lack of creativity. 
This series of arguments provides serious difficulties for Tawney. 
Not only do they point to possible serious inconsistencies between 
equality and criteria of distribution, they also question the 
practicality of the application. Concerning the first criticism, 
103. 
i t could be argued that the contrast of condi tional and un- 
conditional equality is too simplistic. Though function does 
imply a relative equality based upon contribution, this is so only 
in the context of equality of respect, and, in particular, 
fraternity. If the spirit of fraternity prevails, then inequalities 
based upon service to a common end would be acceptable. Hence, 
Tawney was concerned to foster fraternity by breaking down 
barriers in education, wealth, etc., and by encouraging both a code 
of service and reflection upon duties. 
74 
The concept of function then cannot be starkly compare{to equality 
of respect without taking into account the framework of fraternity 
which both enabled the inequalities to be accepted, provided a 
legitimate criteria for reward and was explicitly encouraged in 
the institutional organization advocated by Tawney. 75 However, 
all this tells us is that there is no necessary conceptual clash 
between equality of respect and function. Nonetheless, whilst it 
may be logically possible to contain both ideas, is it likely to 
work, given our knowledge of society ? Tawney would argue in 
support of it that, precisely given our knowledge of humanity, some 
incentive to fill responsible posts was necessary. 
76 
Gi ven the 
importance of fraternity, the idea of function would be the best 
possible. Certainly, a concept such as this was necessary, if 
Tawney was to have both morality and efficiency in a hierarchical 
society. 
77 
Gutmann, of course, also appeals to human nature in her hypothetical 
' status hierarchy' , 
79 
and it would be hard to deny the possibility 
of human nature always tending to create such structures. 
However, her vision of an entirely new status hierarchy is perhaps 
104. 
too grand for TaTlney' s writings to bear. It seems to assume a 
hierarchy qui to different from the one of Tawney' s time, wi th 
function according to the common good as the new ground for 
deference. However, it must be noted that for Tawney, function 
only directly applied to matters of resources in property and 
industry, 
79 
and that whilst an equalizing of power was argued for 
in all these areas, from increased participation to selective 
control of industry, 80 Tawney did not envisage a radical change in 
the hierarchical structure of industry or society. Thus, 
81 
a) the skill of the manager was the object of legitimate deference 
b) proper subordination was not only acceptable in society, but 
actually necessary for progress. 
62 
Tawney therefore, looks to the same kind of hierarchical structure 
and simply to a modification of perception of the roles within 
that structure such that individuals are not treated as 'means' 
rather than ends. 83 Increased participation and public control 
would support this shift in perception, ensuring that individuals 
are not abused. 
At the core of this position, once again for Tawney, is equality 
of respect. This is directly relevant to the work place, because 
it precisely demands mutual respect within any given hierarchical 
structure. It neither demands the destruction of hierarchy as 
such, ß4 nor the rigid adherence to established power structures.85 
Rather does equality of respect demand that respect in any social 
organization be based upon 'acceptable' grounds ie. where the 
individual is valued for themselves and their contribution to the 
overall effort. In Tawney, these two elements of simple respect 
for the individual and respect based upon the contribution of the 
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individual are held together. His emphasis upon duties, both to 
industry and community, precisely reveal that respect for others 
and self -respect is tied in with our moral relationships and our 
fulfillment of duties to family, to work, to community. ß6 
If the two elements were divided, then Gutmann' s scenario might 
well be relevant. If unconditional equality were allowed free 
reign, then the logical result might be the rejection of hierarchy. 
If only respect based upon functional contribution were accepted, 
then indeed a new status hierarchy would be a danger. However, 
Tawney precisely holds the two together. Mutual respect in the 
context of a joint enterprise thus becomes more important than 
respect based upon contribution and ability to contribute. Cnce 
again then, function in Tawney has to be viewed in the context of 
Tawney's total egalitarian views. It is in this context that it 
becomes clear that function for Tawney cannot be seen simply in the 
light of an enabling concept ie. distribution according to 
functional requirements. The concept of function does provide a 
framework for recogniz ing important contributions and thus, 
affirming them. In all this, however, Tawney talks far more in the 
language of realism, recognizing that individuals will still need 
incentives to serve in positions of responsibility. ß7 In thi s 
respect, Tawney remains a realist. On the one hand he accepts that 
human nature both requires incentives, and also that it will tend 
to abuse too much power in only a few hands. Thus, he suggests 
realistic measures for incentives and sharing of power. On the 
other hand, he is aware that only a long term development will 
provide the ' civilization' necessary for a recognition of 'common 
88 identity. This goes some way to answering the criticism 
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that Tawney does not really address the question of how a society 
can come to agree freely on common goods or interests (the base 
of function) without having sufficient central control to enforce 
' egali tarian standards' across a whole society. The only ' control' 
which Tawney argues for is precisely that which guards against 
the abuse of power and which gives more control to the 
individual. The basis of common purpose for Tawney would come 
through education, especially with its strong emphasis upon 
individual and social duties, 89 and through the already existent 
consensus. 
90 
Tawney never specifies this consensus too closely, 
noting a consensus over basic principles and basic moral rules 
which reflect those principles. 91 Tawney's desire to generate 
debate about basic principles is very much one which aims to uncover 
this common bedrock of principles. 92 These are the ones which 
precisely provide the moral meaning essential to any community. 
93 
Thus, Tawney stresses the necessity for agreement at this level. 
94 
This is very relevant to the whole debate about mutual respect. 
I f this is to be encouraged and developed, then some acceptance 
of general meaning or purpose must be a basis for it. Indeed, 
Tawney has the makings of an argument that mutual respect (his view 
of a healthy social situation) cannot flourish where there is no 
agreement on basic principles. 
95 
Wi thout agreement as to the 
latter, there can be no real, shared understanding as to what 
mutual respect means, or involves in practice. This level of 
consensus then is to be discovered over basic principles, and really 
comes down to the idea of equality of respect for persons and the 
96 
resultant aims of freedom and fellowship. 
107. 
At this point, Tawney then falls open to Atherton' s cri ticism that 
any social purpose based upon such a narrow set of principles 
cannot hope to engage a pluralist society. Alongside Atherton, 
McIntyre suggests that no moral consensus is possible in 
contemporary society. The argument from this point could take 
several routes. On the one hand, one might attempt to empirically 
test Tawney' s position. It is, however, not clear how this might 
be achieved, for the notion of moral consensus in Tawney is not a 
static one. As an interactionist, he frankly admits that views 
on society are constantly developing in various ways. A second 
way may be to examine the cultural heritage of society and examine 
the assumptions on which it is built. Thus Tawney before the 
First World War, viewed a nation still under the influence of 
Christian moral views. 
97 
Another possible approach would be to 
compare the different philosophies that are present in any society 
and look for the 'family resemblances.' Preston, for example, 
holds that there is a striking resemblance between various faiths 
and philosophies. 
98 
However, it is hard to see how any of these approaches of them- 
selves, could conclusively defend Tawney's position, especially as 
he accepts that man is both aware of the important moral principles 
but is also prone to sin and thus the forgetting of them. 
99 
At the very least, however, it can be argued that contemporary 
pluralism requires far more rigorous analysis before it is accepted 
that different philosophies are not compatible. 
How far, for instance, do we simply assume that different interest 
groups, or different cultural groups, necessarily reflect different 
fundamental values or principles ? Equally, where there are clear 
108. 
differences, how far are these at the level of fundamental 
principles or at the secondary level of mechanisms and policies ? 
Tawney does not follow such questions through in detail, but he does 
suggest that any discussion should take account of these different 
levels. If policy making followed such a process, either at 
national, local or industrial level, then consensus would be not 
a static thing, but something constantly being discovered or 
affirmed. It is perhaps sufficient to note at this point that the 
whole debate about consensus and pluralism is still very much 
open, 
100 
and thus simply to argue that Tawney' s equality cannot 
rely upon a consensus of opinion is not sufficient to endanger his 
egalitarian argument. 
Reisman' s cri ticism that the consensus either emerges or is placed 
from above, is answered once the idea of the process is accepted. 
In Tawney' s eyes, the consensus is a function of movement from 
below and above. Government provides frameworks and institutions 
within which basic moral values and resultant aims can be clarified 
and given meaning in particular policies at all levels. A basic 
assumption here, underlined by Tawney's view of sin, is that 
consensus or even recognition of different and important values will 
not be achieved without some framework. 
A more sustained defence of Tawney and his position on pluralism 
is to note that Tawney' s equality precisely did encourage diversity, 
of individuals and of institutions. He is concerned that indiv- 
101 
iduals work through duties in the way they feel most appropriate, 
both to themselves and to the various institutions or individuals 
that they relate to. Hence, Tawney sets out a view of complex 
equality which is similar to that of Michael i4alzer, though again 
109. 
not as systematically set out. Walzer argues that equality can 
exist in a pluralist society providing that each distinctive 
institution allocates goods in regard to its own appropriate 
values, and the values of one institution should not be imposed 
upon another. Thus are recognized different spheres of justice, 
for example, health, where care should be allocated to those in 
medical need. 
102 
Tawney thus sees health and education as 
spheres of allocation based upon need. In industry he argues for 
participatory equality alongside distributional relative equality 
based upon function. Thus whilst all individuals are entitled to 
respect, this would not require equal distribution of wages. In 
the case of industry, the needs which determined equality were both 
needs of the individual and the needs of the industry as a whole 
103 
(hence the desire for efficiency and order). What Tawney sees 
more clearly than Walzer is that despite the relative autonomy of 
the different spheres of justice, there are connections which exist 
between them. Thus the sphere of the family generates needs and 
duties which may Depend upon adequate distribution at the work 
place, for fulfillment. Walzer's view also runs the danger of 
falling into a relativism, such that injustice is defined exclusively 
104 
as the values of one sphere invading another. Tawney avoids 
such relativism precisely because equality of respect is at the 
base of his complex equality and provides the consistency between 
all spheres. 
For Tawney then, with his emphasis upon diversity and upon the 
different means that may be appropriate to fulfill the major 
principles and aims, the idea that equality and pluralism should be 
110. 
dichotomous is unfounded. Indeed, respect for persons properly 
carried through should lead to a flowering of diversity. 
This extended attempt to defend Tawney' s equality and its relation- 
ship to moral purpose, cannot, however, disguise remaining 
difficulties: - 
a) the concept of function still does not give clear or detailed 
guidance as regards distribution. For such a concept to be of 
use, either it would need to be developed in more detail, or 
social mechanisms will need to be developed with the role of 
interpreting the general idea of function in a local context105 
b) there remains in Tawney, a tension between equality for 
self determination and adherence to moral purposes. I have 
suggested that the stronger strain in Tawney is precisely the 
one which seeks to enable the development of moral purposes 
through mechanisms which involve self- determination and the 
development of critical humanism. 
106 
However, firstly, 
Tawney tends to simply assert the holistic view of equality 
which balances self -determination and a moral framework and 
not always provide a clear understanding of how this can be 
achieved, or to assume that it has been achieved. Thus, for 
example, the democratic experiments in industry advocated in 
the'Radical Tradition' do not achieve great detail. 
107 
Equally, his faith in British political democracy is boundless. 
He does not question whether its mechanisms really do enable 
any real degree of participation or self- determination. 
108 
Tawney seems to assume that once power has been equalized 
elsewhere, i t will enable individuals to use their poli tical 
rights more effectively. 109 
Secondly, there are places where Tawney does assert a strong 
moral regime, for example, where he demands that the Church 
oversee its members on the basis of a strong code of social 
ethics. 110 Wright also mentions the advice of Tawney to a 
socialist government, not to be deterred by the fact that 
industrial workers seemed to be reluctant to accept the 
responsibility of industrial freedom. The goveLanent should, 
take the initiative, force the pace, and - I won' t say compel 
- but persuade men to be free.' 111 
This example, however, is interestingly poised. It remains 
open as to whether this is paternalism or a legitimate 
challenge to the individual. In a later chapter, I wi l l 
suggest that the challenge is legitimate and not coercive, 
precisely because it does not prescribe a particular course of 
action, and that it is an important part of a theology of 
equa li ty. 
Another area of potential tension, remarked upon by Gutmann,112 
with regard to liberal egalitarians, is between participatory 
equality and distributional equality. The two tend to null 
in opposite directions. Distributional equality dands 
centralism, to ensure that distribution is ecuajtable across 
society. Participatory equality demands increasing de- 
centralization with solutions appropriate to a local situation. 
As noted above, Tawney gives some important indications as 
to how they are linked both in terns of e.uaali ty of respect and 
in distribution of power. However, his ;t__ne rez i es 
developed further. 
112. 
The difficulties examined in this section have tended to move 
from discussion of concept to discussion of mechanism. They 
raise the interesting question that perhaps the so called 
possible tension between equal respect (as moral base) and 
self -determination (freedom) can never be re-solved at a general 
level, but only with respect to a particular situation or 
problem. Once again this will be examined in the final 
chapters. 
c) Tawney' s use of empirical evidence, with respect to equality is 
not convincing. As noted above, the whole issue of what 
constitutes empirical evidence of a consensus (an important 
part of evidence for accepted social purposes) is not clear. 
This is especially so if one accepts an interactionist 
113 
y can point Tawne to a broad view of consensus 
in terms of roles, general principles and procedural values.114 
However, his assertion of a consensus based upon Christian 
tradition is not backed up by empirical evidence. In fact, 
on the contrary, there is some evidence against any form of 
115 
ideology as dominating all society. However, as noted 
above, Tawney' s view of equality does not depend upon a static 
view of consensus. 
d) Tawney's tensions between centralism and participatory equality 
and moral purpose and self- determination, are also mirrored 
in his views on community and upon the importance of common 
purposes. A prominent example of common purpose providing a 
focus for communi ty, given by Tawney, is the Second ::orld 
116 
War and its effects in Bri tain. The problem wi th such a 
113. 
a model of community is that it is reactive and survivalist 
and precisely depends upon individuals sacrificing some degree 
of self -determination. 117 Compared to this, the community 
which Tawney sees as developing in industry is quite clearly 
proactive with individuals contributing towards aims and plans 
in decision making. 118 More precision is required for Tawney's 
position with respect to the role of common purposes, both in 
intermediate groups and in society as a whole, if participatory 
equality is to take greater shape. 
To sum up this section, Tawney' s views on function, consensus 
and a moral framework require development if his view of equality is 
to remain coherent and valid. There is no doubt that the broad 
view which Tawney sets, could exist without function. It could not 
exist, however, without the fundamental moral purposes and this 
area will be addressed in the last chapter. It must be noted that 
the difficulties raised in this section should not give the 
impression that Tawney's view of equality was not substantive. On 
the contrary, as noted above, he insisted upon taking equality into 
policy. The cri ticisms here, are rather in the perspective of 
Tawney' s comprehensive view of equality i e. that his view was so 
comprehensive that he did not always produce the detailed mechanisms 
to cope with potential tensions and difficulties. 
C. The Fundamental Ideas Underlying Tawney' s quality 
In cri ticising the egalitarian posi tion of Tawney, the argument 
tends eventually to move either to the difficulties experienced in 
putting such a view into practice, and these will be examined more 
fully in the next section, or to the ideas underlying the theory 
114. 
itself, the subject of this section. 
Joseph and Sumption criticize both Tawney's view of human nature in 
general and of self -interest in particular. Firstly, they argue 
that competition and ambition are a part of human nature. Both 
are necessary if society is to develop, for progress is 
119 
'born from the unco -ordinated energies of countless individuals.' 
At the base of this, the authors assert that the individual exists 
prior apart society. The implication of this to or  from  ,
position is that the individual's identity, and thus, self- respect 
and esteem is ejCtablished also apart from society and through the 
exercising of talents and pursuit of interests. The consequences 
of all this for society can be seen in technological progress and 
greatly increased wealth for all levels of society. 
121 
Given this, Joseph and Sumption argue that planning and co- 
operation required by equality, are not only coercive, but also 
against genuine progress and ultimately, against nature. 
122 
Joseph and Sumption also argue that Tawney, along with Temple 
denies any possibility that the stimulus of self- interest can be 
good and that it must therefore be ignored or controlled. 
123 
In fact, the case of equality is not only based upon a negative 
view of self -interest, but also the 
'insulting untruth that men will always find it in their interest 
to be uncharitable to each other, so that self- interest must be 
stamped out if civilized behaviour is to be encouraged.' 124 
R.H.Preston takes up a related point in his discussion of Tawney as 
a Christian moralist. Preston argues that Tawney's alternative of 
service or self- interest was too simplistic. Self- interest or 
the 'profit motive' is not of itself wrong. On the contrary, 
self- interest is a 'powerful' element in life which cannot be 
115. 
repressed and thus 'has to be allowed for alongside service. 
125 
In developing this point, Preston argues that Tawney' s perspective 
as a Christian moralist has actually obscured the possibility of 
an objective analysis of society and its institutions. 
126 
In 
this, Preston focuses two major problems. Firstly, Tawney makes 
too direct a connection between faith and the empirical structures 
of life. Preston argues that there are no Christian principles 
of which a particular economic system can be said to be a simple 
expression. 
127 
Secondly, Tawney's simplistic moral stance assumes 
that the basic principles behind any empirical structures must be 
either good or bad. Thus, any vacuum or principle must be filled by 
128 
exemplified either a religion or a counter religion. This is   
for Preston, in Tawney's analysis of capitalism, which, by 
129 
defini tion, becomes anti- Christian. However, as Preston 
argues, by Tawney's own admission, any economic or political system 
is but a 'serviceable drudge.' Thus, any system depends upon how 
it is used, and the basic principles or aims behind it. A mixed 
economy, with some element of market distribution does not, of 
itself, denote control by the ' profit motive' any more than 
socialist planning need demonstrate the control of Christian 
principles. 
Alongside this simplistic moralism, which, if proven, would cause 
great difficulties for Tawney' s view of the distribution of power 
and the application of equality in general, Preston argues that 
there exists a utopian strain in Tawney. Preston is not precise 
in his use of the term utopian, but he appears to use it in a 
negative sense to denote firstly, an unrealistic vision for society 
and secondly, the idea that the ultimate, in terms of Christian 
116. 
ideals can be achieved in society. In this, Preston suggests that 
Tawney was misled by Gore. Gore argues that the Sermon on The 
Mount is the moral law of a new Kingdom, 
'a law which recognized and accepted by the individual conscience, 
is to be applied in order to establish a new social order.' 130 
Thus, Tawney can wri te in ' Aquisi ti ve Society' of the aim 
to make a new kind, and a Christian kind, of civilization.' 
131 
This misses the crucial eschatological background to the Sermon on 
The Mount, which demands not only a radical cri tique of political 
and social institutions, but also emphasizes the provisionality 
of any social organization. Thus, 
the idea that there is a social order and some Christian law or 
principle which can be realized in it, is quite alien to the 
teaching of Jesus.' 132 
With particular reference to the Aquisitive Society, Preston argues 
that the idea of such an order does exist in Tawney's thought. 
Furthermore, 
the abolition of functionless private property is the main item in 
establishing i t. There are several empirical forms i t could take; 
but the basic change required by Christian principles would have 
been made.' 133 
Such an approach runs the danger of encouraging others to imagine 
that particular embodiments of justice are more than partial, 
making them an easy prey to fanaticism, and Preston traces the 
influential utopian strain in Tawney's egalitarianism to other 
socialist thinkers. 
134 
I t must be noted a t this point, that Preston's criticisms of 
Tawney are ambiguous. On the one hand he notes that Tawney 
qualifies most of the statements which Preston criticizes. 
135 
On the other hand, he clearly stands by his cri ticism of Tawney' s 
117. 
utopianism and lack of an eschatological perspective. Preston then 
develops this criticism by arguing that Tawney never developed a 
strategy for dealing with conflict and in particular, the legitimate 
conflict of interest that might develop between different groups 
in society, for example, producers, marketers, and consumers. 
136 
Conspicuously lacking in Tawney is a theology of power which would 
recognize the reality of interest conflict without demanding the 
acceptance of one set of values. Thus, once again, the problems of 
individual or group autonomy versus a broad moral stance, emerge. 
In this, the theological cri tique of Tawney' s egali tarianism tends 
to deal with the same issues as the more obviously philosophical 
cri tique above. 
137 
In the light of such criticisms, Tawney' s equality thus has to face 
several difficulties: - 
a) the underlying assumptions about human nature are questioned. 
b) the balance of the concept of equality and its usefulness or 
relevance in dealing with disputes is questioned. Here 
Atherton' s later cri ticism of the concept as a whole are 
relevant ie. that the concept is simply not clear enough to 
be fruitfully used in discussion of social policy. 
138 
Several commentators observe that because of Tawney's moralist 
stance, he thus does not actually address the major arguments of 
modern capitalism, especially that it provides a 
' dynamic means of running a modern economy wi thout poli tical 
coercion.' 139 
In discussing Tawney's view of human nature, it is important to 
distinguish groundless criticism, from that which may have some 
118. 
evidence. Joseph and Sumption' s blanket criticism of Tawney' s 
view of human nature is simply wrong. 140 Tawney held a balanced, 
realistic view of human nature, viewing man's capacity for good 
and awareness of moral principles along with man's sinful nature 
and his inclination to abuse power. 141 ;hilst this required 
control to ensure a responsible use of power, this did not deny 
power per se, nor the need for individual talent to be given full 
reign. 142 
At the centre of Joseph and Sumption' s criticism is not an 
argument against Tawney' s underlying assumption, so much as 
simply a counter -assumption that the individual exists prior to 
143 society. In this , there is no attempt to examine the complexity 
of the relationship between the individual and society, of how the 
individual may be affected by social organization or affect 
society, nor of the possible moral obligations that are involved in 
relationships. Tawney examines such connections, and his conclusion 
that there are moral relationships which cannot be avoided nor 
entered into purely by contract or motivated by self- interest, is 
never really addressed by Joseph and Sumption. 144 
Despite the assertions of Joseph and Sumption, it must also be 
noted that Tawney was aware of the importance of self- reliance and 
independence, and did note the good effects of capitalism and 
competi tion. 145 Moreover, Tawney was well aware of the importance 
of the individual developing responsibility, and of the need for 
individuals to be involved in risk -taking. 146 This was as mucha 
part of progress and creativity as was the recogni tion of experience 
147 point expertise. His i was that such risks should be shared. 
Such risk, in terms of assessing options and making or helping to 
119. 
make decisions, was one of the signs of equality of respect. 
Concerning self -interest, nei ther Joseph and sumption' s 
assertion that Tawney has a biased view of it, nor Preston's tha t 
Tawney does not really address the subject, can stand. Much of 
the problem here comes from both critics being imprecise about the 
meaning of the concept. Tawney was perhaps more precise in his 
use of the idea without using the specific words ' self -interest.' 
Firstly, he implicitly recognized the importance of self -interest 
in his advocating differential rewards according to function. 
Secondly, he had a clear sense of self- interest in terms of the 
obligation of the individual to fulfill all that they are capable 
148 
of. 149 As noted in the first chapters, Tawney did not see all of 
the individual' s development as being fulfilled in service. His 
obligation to develop as an individual, however, was a broad one, 
which included the development of mental capacities as well as 
simply enjoyment. 
150 
Thirdly, Tawney points to a view of self- interest which actually 
does involve service. 
151 
This involves both the importance of 
service in self -development and spiritual fulfillment, but also 
involves co- operation and service as ultimately achieving better 
planning and greater efficiency. 
152 
Finally, Tawney does not argue against self -interest per se, only 
cri ticizing i t where i t is the sole motive and where i t leads to 
policies which demean the individual ie. ignore equality of 
respect. 
153 
ith respect to the charge of simple moralism which makes it 
difficult for Tawney to analyse society objectively, there is 
154 
clearly some truth. Tawney does roundly criticize ca italis^s. 
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He even goes so far as to list the underlying false assumptions 
or principles including denial of other than individual 
responsibility, denial of personality, denial of freedom. 
155 
Despite this, however, there are indications that Tawney's view was 
not so simplistic. 
Firstly, Tawney recognizes that there are different forms of 
capitalism, and he states that his criticism is addressed to the 
156 
particular manifestation of it in his time. Secondly, he 
recognizes that the development of capitalism has involved the 
focus on and development of some important personal qualities. 
157 
Thirdly, though Tawney attacks the underlying principles of 
contemporary capitalism, he does not thereby assume that the 
statesmen' involved are necessarily evil ie. they may be well 
intentioned. 158 Further analysis of the 'principles' underlying 
captialism at this point reveals that they do not represent 
principles, at least in the sense of a normative concept, so much as 
a narrowness of mind and a lack of awareness which limits the 
response of those in power and thus limits options with regard to the 
development of capitalism. Tawney' s emphasis upon 'principles' tends 
to obscure what is, in fact, a broader holistic perspective. In 
the light of such a perspective, the Tawney position looks far 
stronger, though it does require some development which will occur 
in later chapters. At this point, it is worth simply underlining 
that the capi talist process at Tawney' s time did precisely re- 
inforce a limiting view of humanity and of its purpose. i th power 
and decision making limited to a few, accountability limited to a 
small group of shareholders, the broader aspects of human personality 
and society noted in chapter two, were simply not part of the 
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decision making process. Such a limited perspective will, in turn, 
seek to legitimize itself, developing the virtues which re- inforce 
i t. This at least, forms the basis of an ' alternative religion' , 
i f not qui to the dramatic ' counter -religion' Tawney describes. 
Tawney' s analysis of society is, of course, very influenced by his 
interactionist view. 
159 
Such a view inevitably includes reference 
to principles and in particular to the principles which explicitly 
or implicitly underlie any social policy. The underlying principles 
set the aims of any policy,with an understanding of society helping 
to devise appropriate methods. As noted above, in all this, Tawney 
does not see society as an overarching organism, but rather as the 
sum of a series of interactions at the levels of individual, groups, 
and intermediate structures. Given this, it is very- difficult for 
Tawney to achieve an 'objective' overall view of society. Accepting 
that values have a part in the analysis will, inevitably raise 
questions of purpose and ultimately what is the most acce. 
purpose or purposes for humanity. The question remains thus, 
whether any analysis of society can be undertaken apart fran values 
and principles. 
160 
In the context of all this, the utopian strain in Tawney is not as 
clear as it appears to Freston. Tawney explicitly denies associating 
a future society with the Kingdom of Heaven. 
161 
He is also very 
aware of the difficulties that exist for any attempt at social 
change. The concept of a functional society clearly was important 
to Tawney, and in 'Aquisitive Society' it does provide a 
challenging vision. However, from the perspective of 'Equality' 
and ' The Attack' , such a society is not to be achieved at a stroke 
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and may well have very different empirical manifestations at 
different times. 
162 
Function remained for Tawney, part of the 
total aims based in equality of respect, and in itself, depended 
heavily upon an understanding of fraternity and freedom. E quality 
of participation and of distribution were of equal importance to 
Tawney and thus, function could not be deemed to be the key 
mechanism in changing society. 
163 
Turning to Preston's point about power, whilst there is little 
explicit material in Tawney about the constructive use of power 
conflicts in society, he nonetheless, had a great awareness of 
power, and contributed several factors that would enrich a theology 
of power. Power, for Tawney, was not static but relational or 
dialectical. Thus, as Terrill comments 
'It cannot be understood apart from the response it elicits or 
seeks to elicit.' 164 
As such, Tawney' s view of power was closely linked to his holistic 
view of man, and to his interactionist view of society. At one 
level, the seat of power 'is in the soul' and rests upon attitudes 
and response to attitudes. Therefore to destroy power ranged against 
one, 
'nothing more is required than to be indifferent to its threats, 
and to prefer other goods to those which it promises.' 165 
The power to do this, however, clearly required an integrated 
personality able to withstand the various manifestations of power in 
society. 
166 Such power is not exclusively economic or political,167 
but manifests itself in many areas from military organizations, to 
religions, to 
the strength of professional organization, in the exclusive control 
of certain forms of knowledge and skill, such as the magician, the 
medicine -man and the lawyer.' 168 
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Closely connected to great concentrations of power is man' s sinful 
na ture in the sense tha t man tends to exclude others either for 
self -protection or simple pursuit of profit. 
169 
Power, is thus 
able to move into many forms, each affecting the other. 
170 
Given this complex view of power, Tawney saw power dispersion not 
simply in terms of controlling great sources of power, but also in 
terms of increasingly sharing power. Sharing power involved not 
simply providing individuals with the opportuni ty, but also, the 
skills to control their situation, and this situation included 
moral relationships as well as individual development. All of this 
provides a basis not simply for a theology of power, but also, as 
shall be seen in chapter nine, an extension of the doctrine of 
creation. In all this, Tawney's view of power is more far reaching 
and realistic than he is given credit for. 
In this context, there is no doubt that Tawney did not see that any 
institutions could, by definition, be a precise embodiment of 
social justice. Given his views on the Kingdom of Heaven, upon 
human nature, and upon the continuing process of interpretation 
involved in applying principles and aims, no one institution could 
171 
ever fully embody the justice defined by those principles and aims. 
Indeed, the crucial point for Tawney was that 
'in a changing world no programme can pretend to finality.' 
172 
Thus, whilst programmes could and did express principles there was 
no sense in which they could be said to totally embody them. 
Tawney' s position on this was not a reflection of any eschatological 
doctrine but rather a deep awareness of the provisionality of all 
policies, even actions, and also perceptions. Hence, he could 
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accept that even the definition of socialism was provisional. 
173 
Implied in all this is very much a learning model of development 
which avoids methodological or conceptual essentialism. This 
will be further developed in the final chapters. 
Nonetheless, there could be agreement as to the general direction 
in which the institution should be moving and all institutions could 
be judged as to how far they are fulfilling the major aims of 
freedom and fraternity. To this extent, however, there was, for 
Tawney, a minimum ' level' of justice in institutions ie. one that 
involved participatory and distributional equality. However, 
participatory equality and democracy, by definition, involve a 
continual development in the definition and application of justice. 
of the 
We may conclude in this section that criticisms underlying ideas 
of Tawney's equality, theological, sociological, or psychological 
do not affect the overall view of equality. Such ideas, and the 
perspective arising from them, do, however, demand a complex and 
far reaching view of equality, one which demands a much broader 
view of justice than distribution. 
174 
The question then is raised as to how far such a view can be put 
into practice, whether the strategy of equality as such did, or 
could work. 
D. The Strategy of Equality 
Having no ted the cri ticisms of Tawney' s theory of equality and its 
underlying assumptions, it is necessary to turn now to criticisms 
of Tawney' s application of equality. The cri ticisms can be divided 
broadly into two kinds:- 
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a) developing the criticisms of function and the problem of equality 
and a pluralist society, there is the argument that Tawney 
actually ignored important mechanisms for achieving equality or 
efficiency. 
b) the argument that the strategy for equality simply did not work, 
precisely because re- distribution via the social services does 
not take account of the complexity of achieving equality. 
McIntyre' s review of Tawney' s ' Radical Tradi tion' is an example of 
the first argument. In this, McIntyre argues that on the one hand, 
Tawney' s socialist principles were too vague, whilst on the other 
he lacked ' political imagination' in terms of practical application. 
There are, in fact, several levels to cIntyre' s cri ticism. 
firstly, he cri ticizes Tawney' s defini tion of socialism. He argues 
that this is too vague, based as it is upon the values of equality and 
fraternity. These are 
'unhappily terms too vague and general for political guidance 
until they are embodied in specific social practices or 
ins ti tutions.' 175 
Secondly, he argues that Tawney' s socialism is defined by a limited 
concept of capi talism: 
176 
the replacement of private ownership by public ownership or control, 
and the states acceptance of the responsibility for social welfare.' 
Because of this, Tawney was unable to see how the capitalism of 
the big corporation could, for its own purposes, accept the Trades 
Unions and the welfare state. Hence, the high ideals of Tawney 
could never really be effective as he was oblivious to the realities 
of modern capitalism. Indeed this led to his declared aim being 
co- 
curiously at odds with his chosen means. McIntyre is not precise 
in his defini tion of means here, but seems to refer to the pragmatic 
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policies of post war socialist governments which he sees as not 
truly socialist. 177 McIntyre' s argument parallels both Atherton 
and Preston. 178 However, whilst Atherton sees the moralist 
Tawney as finding it hard to address a pluralist society, and Preston 
argues that the moralist perspective obscures an objective analysis 
T of systems in society, McIntyre implicitly accepts that capitalism 
per se is not compatible with socialist aims, and that Tawney' s 
vague moralism obscures a realistic assessment of a capitalism 
which might adapt to some of the challenges of equality. Thus, in 
Rae's terms, McIntyre is accusing Tawney of allowing equality to be 
tamed.' 179 Rae argues that it only requires a marginal egalitarian 
in power in any one of the five categories which he details, for the 
effect of equali ty in all the other categories to be tamed. To 
avoid such a danger, requires, according to McIntyre, ' practical 
skills' not used by Tawney. Thus, he concludes, 
'The Socratic question of whether one would rather have ones shoes 
mended by a good cobbler or a good man has relevance in politics 
too. Goodness is not enough.' 180 
The general point about Tawney' s ignoring of important practical 
elements is examined in more detail by Reisman, with specific 
reference to 'Aquisitive Society.' 181 Reisman in effect argues 
that Tawney' s preoccupa tion wi th equali ty of power and equali ty 
of participation, led him not simply to ignore the model of a mixed 
economy, 182 but also key areas in the total industrial process. 
Thus, the professional ethic of service commended by Tawney, which 
underpinned function, referred to technological rather than economic 
efficiency. The ethic thus refers to the activity of producing 
goods, and the activity of exchange falls short on two counts. 
Firstly, the trader is portrayed as not understanding the whole 
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creative side of indu:try, and being preoccupied with the profit 
motive. 183 Secondly, concentration upon the production side of 
industry leaves the reader unclear as to how 
' workmanship is to be translated into priced goods in the shops.' 
184 
Reisman also notes how Tawney never really resolves the question of 
ownership in industry. It is neither seen in terms of a property 
owning democracy, nor a producers co- operative where workers and 
owners decide collectively on ends and means. Reisman sees this 
as being incongruous when the administration of the functional 
society is to be based in the industry. 
Such administration was to aim at 
'open dealing and honest work and mutual helpfulness' as a 
subs ti tute to competi tion. 
185 However, if competition were 
removed from industry, it is not clear, argues Reisman, how costs 
and prices are to be determined. Moreover, simple emphasis upon 
altruism in the economic market would remove from industry the 
kinds of external discipline which would 
' compel it to supply the consumer with what he wants, not what 
he needs.' 186 
In placing administration in the hands of industry, Tawney incurs 
further problems. To leave industry to estimate the common good 
without guidance from central government places a heavy burden on 
industry itself. Reisman argues that administration would better 
have been in the hands of central government, thus giving operant 
meaning to 'common ends and social purposes.' 
187 
and placing 
decision making in the hands of democratically elected 
representa ti ves. 
Reisman finally notes Tawney's disregard for the question of scale 
in industry; 
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'Once the issue of the character of owner ±ip has been settled, the 
question of size of the economic unit can be left to settle itself.' 
188 
Such a statement, however, leaves open several questions about 
scale. Are the larger firms necessarily more efficient and if so, 
how can equality of participation be achieved in them ? If smaller 
firms are necessary in order to achieve fellowship, how will this 
affect efficiency? Simply to do away with the capitalist class 
owning production does not begin to answer such detailed questions. 
Thus, alongside McIntyre' s accusation of lack of political skill, 
Reisman argues the lack of practical skills of industry or at least, 
the ignoring of these on Tawney' s part in his haste to achieve a 
moral base for his thoughts. Such arguments would further support 
the argument that Tawney' s equality is neither practical nor 
relevant. 
Le Grand takes the focus of the argument a little further, and 
argues that Tawney' s strategy for equality was unsuccessful. 
189 
Tawney's method of re- distribution was to pool the nations resources 
by means of taxation and through this provide 
'a social income available on equal terms', 
for all societies members. 
190 
Le Grand concludes, however, that 
this approach has failed; 
public" expendi ture on the social services has not achieved equali ty 
in any of its interpretations.' 191 
In health care, education, housing, and transport, public expenditure 
has systematically favoured the better off, leading to inequality 
192 
of final income and inequality of outcome or access. 
193 
In some cases, the inequality appears to have changed over time. 
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I Grand argues that the reason for this is because the forces 
which created inequalities in the first place, and which perpetuate 
them now, are simply too strong for indirect methods of distribution 
to resist. The implication for Tawney's view on equality is that 
he did not understand the mechanics of re- distribution which 
required: - 
a) direct methods of reducing income and wealth differentials, 
from reforms to the social security system, to proposals for a 
negative income tax or social dividend. 
194 
b) an attack upon the ideology of inequality 
the set of beliefs and values that underpins economic inequality 
and which is the major obstacle to any attempt to reduce 
i t.' 195 
Any such challenge to the ideology of inequality must challenge 
the many assumptions about equality and its effects. 
In the light of the studies which Le Grand refers to then, Tawney' s 
own assessment of the success of the strategy of equality would 
seem to be either misguided or begin to place him into a conservative 
understanding of equality and fellowship akin to Joseph and 
S um p ti on. 
196 
All of these cri ticisms in some way, comment upon Tawney' s limited 
perspective and inadequate practical approach. It is not simply 
that his moral framework makes it difficult for him to see how, for 
example, the free market can be positively used, it is also that his 
chosen means of achieving equality are inadequate. 
In addi tion to this, some see Tawney' s perception of inequalities 
in society as too fixed, further reducing any relevance to contemp- 
orary society. He seemed unaware of any racial inequali ties and 
'did not mention inequality of gender except in passim-g - as 
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something safely abolished in the past.' 
197 
At the base of this, it may be argued, was Tawney's acceptance of 
the pre -feminist view of women' s role. 
McIntyre' s criticisms of Tawney, are, in most respects, quite 
inadequate. Firstly, he reaches his judgements based upon the 
limited evidence of the ' Radical Tradition.' Secondly, even in 
that evidence, there is a great deal of space given over to policies 
and methods of achieving equality of power, such that the accusation 
of cliche-ridden high mindedness' is unfounded. 198 Thirdly, 
Tawney remained aware of the need to adapt to different empirical 
situations if his major principles were to truly engage society. 
199 
Fourthly, i t is difficult to evaluate McIntyre' s point about Tawney 
not grasping the adaptive qualities of modern capitalism. McIntyre 
assumes that all manifestations of capitalism are bad, and Tawney 
begins from a different view point, noting that there are different 
kinds of capi talism, and that in some forms, i t has had good 
effects. 200 ,ghat McIntyre may have inadvertently pointed to 
in fact, is the difficulty that Tawney would always have as a 
relative egalitarian. Given the acceptance of inequality as well 
as diversity, and given the role of function and ultimately of 
fraternity in defining acceptable inequality, Tawney' s equality does 
at least bear a prima facile resemblance to conservative view of 
equali ty with a graded hierarchy in which everyone should know their 
place and where a form of fellowship can be created. 201 
As shall be seen in chapter four, such a resemblance is only 
superficial. Nonetheless, if basic principles and aims are not made 
explicit, the two could easily be identified. To avoid such a 
confus ion, however, it is precisely basic principles and how they 
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are expressed in any policy, which needs to be stressed. 'Political 
imagination' for Tawney involved precisely that. 
Whilst McIntyre' s criticisms point to possible dangers in the 
applica tion of equality, these do not really affect Tawney` s basic 
view of equality. Reisman' s criticisms carry more weight. There 
is no doubt that Tawney does ignore many of the practical factors 
to which Reisman refers. However, like McIntyre, his evidence is 
limited, in this case to ' Aqui si ti ve Society.' In other works, as 
noted above, Tawney is prepared to see the usefulness of some form 
202 
of capitalism and thus of competition. Equally, Tawne y 
increasingly saw the importance of planning at a national level, 203 
so that decision making, especially with regard to egalitarian 
measures should not be exclusively at the level of industry. 
204 
Tawney' s view of scale and of traders does underline his concern 
with relationships above all. He argues that if the character of a 
particular initiative or institution is right, then problems of fine 
detail will take their place. The question of ownership did dominate 
his view of industry and the only guidelines with respect to scale 
in this context are in terms of his accepting worker ownership for 
small firms, and public ownership for large organizations. 
205 
However, the fact that Tawney did not work through to the fine 
details of industrial planning or that he characterized the 
trader unfairly does not of itself, affect his view of equality. 
From the basis of equality of respect, distribution of power and 
participatory equality were necessary for industry, whatever their 
results in fact. In this, he looks to an overall framework which 
will involve some overall control or planning in terms of investm- 
ents 
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or setting targets, with accoun.3bility to the public effectively 
organized. At the same time, he looks to local centres of industry 
to take responsibility for decision-making at their level, and 
developing democracy. To this extent, fine details would always 
be left to local groups to work through. :!here perhaps Tawney falls 
more seriously short, is not so much in the minutiae of industry, as 
in the guidelines of how central control and planning would relate 
to local experiments in democracy. There is no doubt that given his 
broad view, issues such as balancing of 
safety for miners and cheap food for pensioners' need not be left 
to local industry. To argue this, however, requires a more 
thoroughgoing examination of what decisions are ap ropria to to each 
level of industry or government. 
206 
Another good example of Tawney' s inattention to detail is the 
question of review. Assuming the framework which enables broad aims 
to be pursued and appropriate policies to develop, some form of 
monitoring of effects and regular review would be necessary. 
Bodies such as consumer councils would be able to achieve this to 
some degree. Lowever, effective reviews must be regular and take 
place at the level of decision making. 207 
In these criticisms, three elements can be distinguished. Firstly, 
as noted, the relationship between central government, in industry, 
politics or social services, and local self- determination does need 
more detailed guidelines to demonstrate how this balance can be 
_intainec. 208 s - econdly, these are detailed arguments which 
question how Tawney's method will replace, for example, the price 
fixing mechanism of the market, or oversee that consumers receive 
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what they want and not simply what they need. 209 These cri ticisms 
have less weight precisely because through equalizing power, industry 
would be accountable to consumers as well as producers. A third 
element in the criticisms is simply to the effect that Tawney's 
egalitarianism would not lead to greater efficiency. However, as Le 
Grand points out, there are no a priori arguments against the idea 
of equality leading to greater efficiency. 210 Sii mlarly, empirical 
evidence can be used to support either competition or co- operation 
as leading to greater efficiency. 211 
Turning to Le Grand's cri ticism of the strategy of equality, we 
see that he makes use of statistics about inequalities in the social 
services, which, by themselves are impressive. In the context of 
his overall argument, however, they are less so. 
a) Le Grand's argument assumes that equali ty was the major principle 
behind the development of the social services. 
212 
The 
evidence for this, however, is not as conclusive as Le Grand 
suggests. 
213 
Other commentators suggest that equality was 
only one of several important aims, which included the develop - 
ment of a rational and efficient form of provision. 
214 
In addition, Hindess suggests the negative argument tha t 
'If the social services were indeed established primarily 
to reduce inequality, it is somewhat surprising that they do 
so little to monitor their effectiveness in this respect.' 215 
It is thus difficult to ascribe failure to the social services 
i f equality was not the major aim in the first place. 
b) Even if equality was accepted as the major aim, there are 
important questions about the evidence adduced to test 
success. :firstly, such evidence is complex and is open to 
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several different interpretations. Le Grand suggests that 
the reason for lower uptake of the health service by lower 
socio- economic category groups depends upon their rational 
cost /benefit analysis of visits to the surgery, for example 
in terms of transport or wage cost, or, of lost time, if, 
due to lack of a phone, appointments are hard to make. This, 
however, assumes that 'health' is distributed within certain 
health service mechanisms, and takes no account of the 
responsibility of the individual in health, or the effect of 
life style upon health problems. Clearly, the indications 
of inequali ties in health are disturbing, but such figures 
cannot, of themselves act as the basis for re- distribution, 
but rather open a debate into much broader areas. Secondly, 
even if egalitarian considerations are restricted to 
destributional equality in terms of the social services, it 
must be noted that Le Grand does not include the effects of the 
personal social services and cash benefits. Davis and 
Piachaud argue that where these are taken into account, the 
216 
broad effects of all social spending are generally pro -poor. 
c) In turning specifically to Tawney' s view of equality, i t 
must be said that Le Grand fails to characterize this 
adequately. He includes Tawney amongst the 'dreamers' and 
217 
then gives every to an aspect of his strategy. He  
indication that he views Tawney's equality as lot regarding. 
He argues that equality has not been achieved, in any sense, 
through social service re- distribution. He defines the 
senses of equality here in terms of: 
enua li ty of public expenditure 
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- equality of final income 
- equality of use 
- equality of cost, which is basically of access 
- equality of outcome. 
218 
All of these are, in some sense, lot- regarding as distinct 
from person -regarding. This is confirmed by Le Grand' s 
frequent use of distributional terms which quantify goods. 
Thus, for equality of use in education, Le Grand refers to 
similar amounts of education' , whilst equality of outcome in 
education involves the ' bundle of skills learned.' 
219 
It is not clear what is the use of measuring the 'amount of 
education received' without consideration of the aims or 
quality of the education. Nor is it clear that the concept 
of skill can be quantified in the way that Le Grand suggests. 
It is, however, clear that Tawney emphasized person -regarding 
equality and that as a result, equality of distribution was 
not an end in itself, but rather a means to enabling freedom 
and fellowship. Inevitably, then, attempting to measure the 
success of Tawney' s equality involves these two cri teria and 
not just statistics on inequalities. This, in turn, provides 
real problems for assessment, and necessarily challenges the 
aims of any institution. Thus, for example, Tawney challenges 
the centres of education to move away from 'occupational 
utility', or even simple educational excellence and to aim 
for an education for the whole person. 
220 
As a consequence of this approach, Tawney does not restrict 
his strategy of equality to the social services, nor does he 
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restrict equality to distribution, but includes participatory 
equality. As noted above, a major element of this was the 
distribution of power in various ways. Le Grand, in focussing 
only on the social services, ignores this element in Tawney, 
and even the question of whether it was necessary. There is, 
in fact, a good argument to say that the equalizing of power 
is the crucial part of any strategy of equality, and that this 
would affect the statistics of inequality far more than Le 
Grand' s advocacy of a sustained attack upon the ideology of 
i nequa li ty. 
221 
In all of this, Tawney himself agreed that much more was to be 
done. He could take some pride in the 
'advances towards the conversion of a class- ridden society into 
a communi ty in fact, as well as in name.' 222 
Yet, he equally realized the importance of attacking inequalities 
in inheritance and education, and looked to developments in 
democracy that would guard against 'top -heavy bureaucracy and 
remo to control.' 
223 
It must be accepted that Le Grand's criticism of Tawney' s 
position is by no means aggressive. They both share a concern for 
ensuring that unjustified inequalities, and the ideology of 
inequality, are attacked. This requires developing new strategies 
to combat new inequalities. Le Grand's focus, however, is limited 
and, as a result, he does not grasp the definition or extent of 
Tawney' s view of equality. 
A final point must be made here, about those who see Tawney' s 
own egalitarianism as limited, for example, with respect to 
Feminism. There is no doubt that Tawney did not see all the 
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areas of injustice that abounded even in his own time. None of 
this, though, radically affects his theory of equality. On the 
contrary, his view depends upon analysis of areas of society 
precisely to bring unjusified inequalities to light. The fact 
that he was not aware of some inequalities, or that some 
inequalities have only since Tawney been highlighted, does not 
invalidate his position. 
Conclusion 
I t is tempting to see Tawney' s views of equality as simply a 
random collection of ideas, put down in response to the social 
injustices of the age, the writings of a prophet, not a 
philosopher with a clear theory of equality. As has been noted, 
his views on equality have to be extracted from several sources, and 
are not all systematically presented. Also, the different 
parts of his views are not systematically developed. Thus, 
Tawney does not develop the theological base of equality, nor 
does he, at the other end, work through some of the practical 
implications. 
Nuch of this can be accounted for, as Atherton suggests, by 
Tawney's view of theology as a 'way of life' and his difficulty 
with theology as a discipline. However, despite all this, there 
remains in Tawney, clear outlines of a theory of equality which 
are held consistently. This involves a view of the foundations 
or equality and its importance, not just for theory, but for 
practice; a clear presentation of equality of respect and its 
relationship to other principles; a clear presentation of relative 
equality in terms of distribution and participation and how 
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this connects to freedom and fellowship; an understanding of the 
process of equality and how it might be applied in response to 
perceived needs in society; an underlying moral psychology to 
account for the effects of inequality and a criticism of inadequate 
criteria for inegi'ality; and a justification of equality in- 
volving all these elements. 
Tawney's view has been tested by many criticisms to see if it has 
any coherence and validity. After examination, the conclusion 
is that his theory remains coherent and valid. There are no 
internal contradictions, for example, between participatory 
equality and distributional equality, or person regarding and lot 
regarding. There are no major problems in his relation of 
equality to other principles. Tawney' s justification remains 
coherent given his Christian foundation and his stated moral 
psychology. ;:any criticisms have simply not addressed any of this, 
making false assumptions about Tawney' s work and the effect of 
equality. Other cri ticisms have centred upon the un- developed 
areas in Tawney' s theory. However, such criticisms do not, in 
any way, affect the overall coherence and validity of the theory, 
though Tawney' s theory would be improved if these areas were 
developed. The areas which require development and more detailed 
work are in the balance of central planning, purpose, and distri- 
bution with local self -determination; the question of consensus; 
and the details of mechanisms for social change. As befits an 
holistic approach, all of these are connected and take in 
individual areas of potential difficulty such as subordination, 
hierarchy and the development of democracy. 
139. 
In many respects, central to all these issues and their resolution 
and development is the question of paternalism. 
224 
If paternalism 
means taking away responsibility from the individual and creating 
dependence, then Tawney cannot be convicted of that. On the 
contrary, he is concerned to spread responsibility, along with 
power, and to encourage the growth of independent thought. 
225 
His equalizing measures aim 
a) to enable this, and 
b) set this in a context of man as a whole being - psychological 
social, moral and spiritual. 
In all this, Tawney's morality enriches and adds to the framework 
within which man operates, it does not dictate to man precisely 
how he should operate. In this sense, Tawney's theory of equality 
is set in what he would have regarded as the most realistic 
framework, recognizing the broad nature of man, including his 
propensity to sin. 
The very scope of such a view and the integration of so many 
elements is impressive. In defending it, however, two issues 
remain unresolved. Firstly, it is not clear what criteria 
could judge between the realism of Tawney and the realism which 
underlines the marginal view of equality - the realism of 
individualism and survival. Secondly, it is not clear that the 
issues noted above, can be resolved in the abstract. -ny 
experiments' in democracy require the testing of particular 
methods and its modifica tion based upon empirical evidence. 
This would demand a quite different attitude and approach towards 
problem solving in industry and government. Both of these issues 
will be taken up in the final chapters. 
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Chapter 4 The Distinctiveness of Tawney' s Equali ty 
It has already been noted that equality is a term with many 
different possible meanings. 1 Thus, many different wri ters would 
claim that equality is a basic principle in their philosophy, each 
in fact having a distinctive view of equality. 2 The task then 
for any writer who would seriously espouse equality is not simply 
to convince his or her readers of some general principle known to 
all, but rather to convince them of the validity and importance 
of their particular view of equality. In the first three chapters, 
I have attempted to demonstrate that Tawneÿ s writings do contain 
a theory of equality which is coherent and which withstands most 
criticisms. In this chapter, I intend to examine the 
distinctiveness of Tawney' s theory of equality. The first part 
of the chapter will consider how far Tawney' s equality was 
distinctively Christian and in particular examine how Tawney 
related to the Christian Socialists. The second part of the 
chapter will compare Tawney' s view of equality with that of 
contemporary Socialists, and in particular the Fabians, with whom 
Tawney is often associated. Mention will also be made of 
Tawney' s equality in relation to Idealist philosophy. I will 
conclude that Tawney' s equality is distinctively Christian and 
that whilst it shows the influence of humanist socialism and of 
Idealism, it remains distinctive in comparison to their view of 
equality. At points throughout the chapter, I will also contrast 
Tawney with other major viewsof equali ty. 
A Christian View of Equality 
In arguing that Tawney's view of equality is distinctively 
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Christian, I would not wish to argue that there is one distinctive 
Christian view. Doubtless, the Christian gospel is egalitarian in 
some sense. Lakoff asserts that 
the Christian message is a doctrine of equality' symbolized by 
the ' love feast' , the injunction to love others as ourselves, and 
the 'promise of victory over mortal limitations.' 
3 
Nonetheless, the Bible and Christian tradition reveal no developed 
theory or doctrine of equality. Indeed, several different 
substantive approaches to equality are evident. Lakoff refers 
to the two major ones as antipathetic and anticipatory. The first 
of these views all individuals as equal in the sight of God. 
4 
This is a spiritual equality which has no relevance to social 
organization. The second view argued that equality did have some 
relevance to society, possibly even challenging the status quo. 
Any development towards equality was viewed as anticipating the 
Kingdom of God. 5 Lakoff identifies a third Christian view of 
equality as the ' proto-proLtarian' , a forerunner of liberation 
theology, which was 
virtually from the start, a doctrine of mass emancipation.' 
6 
The fact that, as Lakoff argues, these different views form the 
basis of what was to become the Conservative, Liberal and 
Socialist views of equality, tends to suggest that there is as 
much diversity in Christian views of equality as there is in 
secular views. 8 Moreover, like the different possible 
philosophical views of equality, Christian writers often combine 
elements of the different views. A good example of the latter is 
S t. Ambrose. 
9 
On the one hand, he stresses that all men are equal 
10 
sharing a common nature, and that the earth belongs to all. 
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The outcome of this is that he urges the wealthy to return to the 
11 
On the other hand, Ambrose does poor what is theirs by right. ,
not contend that the inequalities of his age were unjust as such, 
but rather, like Augustine, saw them as the consequences of the 
fall. 12 As a result, whilst he urges the rich to share, he does 
not demand a radical change in the status quo of social 
organization. The case of Ambrose adds a further complication to 
the attempt to find a distinctively Christian view of equality, 
in that his view relies heavily upon the Stoics. 13 Indeed, 
Lakoff argues that 
'he merely offered a Christian gloss on the Stoic idea of a 
golden age.' 14 
However, despite all this, it is possible to note certain elements 
which characterize a Christian view of equality. 
The Justification and Type of Equality 
It is here that the Christian view of equality is most distinc- 
tive. Yet even here, there are several different justifying 
doctrines. Two of these are shared with the Jewish faith - God' s 
creation of man in His image, and His creation of the world for 
all humanity. i5 Two others are more specifically Christian, with 
the doctrine of sin, asserting man' s common shortfall, and the 
doctrine of the Incarnation proclaiming Christ's reconciling work 
for all. 16 The creationist and Incarnational strands both see 
these great events as evidence of God's purpose for humanity and 
that He loves and values all. 
Emerging from these doctrines are three strands which not only act 
as justification, but also radically affect the character of any 
view of equality. Equality is based upon 
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- God's ac ti vi ty 
- The concept of agape 
- The Christian view of human nature 
As has been noted above, Tawney makes reference to all of these 
strands in some way. 
17 
The implications for the character of equality are several:- 
a) Equality is necessarily inclusive, or in Rae' s terms involving 
a global domain.' 
18 
This firmly distinguishes the 
Christian view from the Stoic conception of equality. whilst 
the Stoics accepted a global equality, this was based upon a 
view of all persons sharing in the divine Logos or reason. 
Their justification was therefore based upon the evidence of 
a specific attribute in man i e. reason. Thus, given the 
absence of reason in such as the mentally handicapped, equality 
becomes an exclusive concept. Because Christian equality 
depends upon God's activity and not human attributes, it 
remains inclusive and global. 
19 
b) Christian equality is not based upon either an argument from 
self -interest or rights or merit. God' s activity is not in 
response to any of these things, but totally unconditional. 
This provides an egalitarian perspective from outside 
humanity as such. From such a perspective, Tawney often 
notes how human differences appear trivial. The implication 
of this for the character of equality is that equality is 
not viewed in the light of the individual or group simply 
gaining what is due to them. This is underlined by the second 
commandment which from the perspective of the individual, 
seeks a balance of concern, and fulfillment of obligation, to 
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the self and others. 20 Such a view of equality is very 
distinctive. It is not simply person- regarding, 21 but 
about the person in moral relationships. In many respects, 
Tawney here is articulating and developing the Idealist view 
of equality with a strong emphasis upon self -realization 
through relationships. He echoes many Hegelian themes, not 
least the division of ethical life into family, civil society 
(work and economic life) and the state with their consequent 
duties. 22 Underlying all this, is for Tawney, the basic 
morality necessary for such duties to be performed and for 
trust to develop in the relationships, such as promise keeping 
or avoiding decei t. 
23 
However, Tawney' s position differs from the Idealists in 
two major ways. Firstly, for Tawney, equality does not 
depend for its justification upon the idea of self -realization 
alone. 
24 
Self- realization is seen rather as part of the 
second element of Tawney' s justification. First, comes 
equality of respect with its deontological founda tion. Then 
the consequentialist arguments are brought into play. 25 
Secondly, whilst Tawney accepts that the task of the state 
is to further self -realization, and with the Idealists 
accepts the need for a common purpose, this does not require 
the emphasis upon serving the state that is found in Green 
or Bradley. For Green, citizenship is elevated to a form of 
26 
Bradley is aware of a variety of duties, religion, , 
but tends to concentrate eventually on obligations to the 
state to the extent that 




Tawney on the contrary maintains emphasis upon a wide range 
of duties, emphasizing the importance of the individual 
discovering for themselves the content of these duties. 
28 
This respect for the autonomy of the individual and thus for 
the process whereby the individual can discover truth for 
themselves constantly weighs against any prescriptive view 
of right relationships. Tawney also had a far greater 
structural concern than Green. In order to gain the global 
equality he so desired, it was necessary that citizenship and 
service have a political framework which grasped the social 
system as a whole, and was able to balance central and local 
activity and relate them. 
29 
The uncondi tional character of Tawney' s equality also 
distinguishes it from the Aristotelian concept of proportional 
equality. Aristotle rejected the idea of natural equality, 
but argued for equality in social organization. Rights and 
privileges in the polis would be distributed according to 
individual merit, and those who are equal in terms of reason, 
birth or wealth would receive equal treatment. 
30 
Aristotle 
accepted a form of democracy, and was against extreme 
inequalities in property and power. However, his equality 
was ultimately conditional 
31 
Tawney's concept of equal value also distinguishes it from 
any notion of mathematical equality or identical treatment. 
As noted in chapter one, his concern for the individual 
demanded rather diversity of treatment. 
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At this point it may also be noted how Tawney' s relational 
equality differs from the view of equality as distributional 
fairness. A philosopher such as Rawls builds up such a view 
based upon a rational calculus of interest. 32 Whilst this 
leads Rawls to attack the same inequalities as Tawney, it is 
ultimately quite distinct from his view. This is because 
distribution for Tawney is in effect a means of demonstrating 
respect, ie. in its concern for liberty and fellowship, and 
thus is to be judged by its effects upon relationships and 
not in a calculation of interests. 
33 
c) The third distinctively Christian strand in Tawney' s view of 
equality is his perception of human nature and in particular, 
sin. Here once more, Tawney differed from the Idealist 
school. Green, for instance, wrote that 
' the sense of sin is very much an illusion,' 
34 
holding a firm belief in rationality as a principle of 
progress. Tawney' s awareness of man' s sinful nature allowed 
him no such optimism. 
35 
This led him to be realistic about 
progress and about the effect of great concentrations of 
power, not only upon the poor but on the wealthy. 36 If the 
Incarnation meant that equality' s application was to be 
global, human nature meant that such global application had 
to be realistic, not only giving more power to individuals, 
but providing the democratic framework for the responsible 
use of great concentrations of power. 
37 
The three strands in Tawney point to an unconditional equality 
of value which is person- centred and which requires a global 
domain, wi thout demanding absolute equali ty. It remains to be 
147. 
seen from this broad base, how Tawney relates to Christian 
egalitarian tradition with respect to fellowship, hierarchy 
and equality of participation, and distribution and property. 
These three aspects will now be considered. 
a) Equality and Fellowship 
Bowlby in his search for a theology of equality argues that 
equality by itself is 
'an insufficient value.' 38 
New Testament evidence certainly points to some radical demands 
for justice which might form the base of an extreme egalitarian 
fion, 
39 
osi Nonetheless, as ilealand demonstrates, the 
evidence points to three phases in the early churches 
attitude towards distribution. The second and third phases 
in particular - the church of the resurrection and a time of 
routinization - see a softening of any extreme egalitarian 
demands and a view of equality from the context of the 
y 
40 
Christian commun t . This is confirmed by the work of 
Theissen who points to the mutual equality of Pauline 
Christianity expressed within the context of the koinonia. 
41 
In this context everyone had a genuine sense of status without 
questioning the political or social status quo. Alongside this 
evidence Bowlby points to that of Jesus himself, his teaching 
and action, 
' constantly emphasizing the dignity and value of those he 
met,' 
42 
In addition to this, the ' covenant community' 
tradition of the Old Testament must be noted with its respect 




Bowlby concludes that equality in a Christian view must always 
be seen in the light of community or fellowship. Further, 
he no tes that Tawney' s stress on common human ty 
'can be seen as a secular version of the New Testament 
emphasis on koinonia.' 44 
Clearly, as noted above, Tawney points to important links 
between equality and fellowship. However, it is not clear 
how well he fits into a koinonia tradition of equality, 
expecially one with the character of ' love patrialhalism.' 
Certainly, he emphasizes the importance of subordination and 
order, and at times points to almost a sectarian view of the 
Christian community. 
45 
He also stresses the importance of 
intermediate associations either setting examples to society 
or being aware of duties beyond the fulfillment of the 
members' desires. 
46 However, Tawney also stresses the 
importance of freedom and such freedom is not found exclusively 
either in the activity of service or in the context of 
fellowship. 
47 
He stresses the importance of self- 
determination and control, and of critical independent thought. 
The result of this is that the status quo is always open to 
question and therefore the possibility of change. This 
differs greatly from Theissen' s view of the conservative 
love patriachalism' of the early church. 
48 
Such an ethos 
takes social differences for granted but ameliorates them 
through an obligation of respect and love, an obligation 
imposed on those who are socially stronger. From the weaker 
are required fidelity, subordination and esteem.' 49 
Far from relating to such a model where equal value is a 
50 product of fellowship, Tawney works from equal worth to 
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fellowship and is, in this sense, more at home with the Stoic 
categories used by the Early Church Fathers, pointing to a 
common humanity. 51 Nonetheless, Tawney' s concern for order 
requires that hierarchy and participation be examined. 
b) Hierarchy and Participatory Equality 
As Terrill notes, Tawney has a strong sense of order, which he 
52 
Certainly, as attributes to his Christian background. 
seen above, there is a tradition which demands an acceptance 
of inequalities and order. 
53 
Such a tradition has developed 
into the secular conservative view of equality which argues 
that inequality is necessary and that a form of fellowship is 
possible even with wide differences in distribution. 
54 
Such 
a view can argue for equality of respect whilst arguing for 
a marginal application of equalizing measures. 
55 
Several strands need to be noted in these views. Firstly, 
the Christian conservative view of equality saw hierarchy 
either as a consequence of sin (ie. post fall), or as to do 
wi th God' s posi dye ordering of creation. 
56 
In addition, a 
strong view of the state gives this the responsibility for 
retaining order. For Tawney, the starting point of the 
Incarnation gave him a view not pointing to some Golden 
Age before the fall, but arguing for present relational 
equality. 
57 
Thus, he had no need to explain inequalities, 
only to argue against unacceptable inequali ties ie. those which 
obscured relational equality. Also, Tawney' s view of the 
state was a primarily moral one. dith the Idealists he saw 
the states function as not simply survival, but helping 
individuals achieve self- realization. 
58 
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Secondly, with respect to the secular conservative view of 
equality, justification shifts to the necessity of inequalities 
for the creation of wealth, and dangers of coercion in any 
change of the status quo. 
59 
Tawney is aware of both of these arguments. He accepts the 
need for inequalities in distribution to provide incentives 
in fulfilling functions, and the moral requirement to respect 
the autonomy of the individual. 60 However, he stands out 
against the conservative view of equality on three points:- 
- he argues that there can be efficient public enterprise 
based upon planning and co- operation around a common 
purpose. 
- he argues for a redistribution of resources and 
opportunities to enable individuals to develop. 
- he argues for greater control for the individual relevant 
to their situation. 
61 
In this, Tawney is not simply arguing that the status, income 
wealth etc.Should not determine worth, but also that they 
should not determine the distribution of the resources 
necessary for the individual to develop. In addition, he 
demands that the individual' s autonomy be respected. 
Subordination for Tawney in this context was functional 
subordination ie. the recognition of anthers function in 
relation to a common purpose. To avoid the danger of pater- 
nalism and subordination to a narrow definition of rai 
purpose, he looks to the individual or group working out 
their own purposes in context, and to a social structure that 
will enable this. Ultimately, this balance of self- 
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determination and a moral framework is what distinguishes 
Tawney' s view of function from a straightforward functional 
62 
y argues la tter sim 1   that theory of stratification. p 
some form of hierarchy is necessary for the continuation of 
social life. For Tawney, it is not simply a matter of the 
administration of society, but rather the development and 
maintenance of a ' civilized' society, which was defined in 
terms of its moral relationships, and depended upon the 
acceptance and crea ti vi ty of the ci ti zens. 
63 
Tawney' s idea of subordination bears some resemblance to the 
free subjection' of Nicholas of Cusa. Nicholas accepts the 
idea of subjection to leadership, but given the natural equality 
of all men, argues that such subjection requires consent. 
The idea of consent involves freedom and democracy. 
64 
Nicholas of Cusa' s position, however, does differ from 
Tawney' s. Firstly, Tawney' s argument for participatory 
equality has much broader applica tion than to political 
democracy. Secondly, Tawney' s argument is based ultimately 
upon equal worth and upon context. Thus he argues for 
unconditional equality and for participation in decision 
making in situations where the individual is affected or where 
he or she are involved in some way. 65 In such a context 
will the individual gain relevant control and address 
du ties. 
In contrast, the argument from na tural equality has two 
stages: 
a) that every individual has the capaci ty to make political 
or moral choices, and 
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b) that this capacity is the basis for the right to its 
exercise. 
66 
Capacity to take part in decisions is, of course, important, 
but it cannot take the full weight of the justification of 
participatory equality, not least because capacity itself is 
not defined and, depending upon its definition, could form the 
basis of exclusion. 67 In any case, Tawney' s emphasis is on 
the development of whatever capacity the individual has in 
relation to themselves and society. Moreover, Tawney sees 
the individual as being more involved in the shaping of group 
aims and fulfillment of objectives. 68 
Terrill notes that Tawney' s argument for the dispersion of 
power is similar to Niebuhr's for democracy. He paraphrases 
the argument as, 
'Every man has enough quality to be given some responsibility, 
none so much that he should be given absolute dominion over 
his fellows.' 69 
However, though Tawney certainly argues for safeguards in 
terms of the responsible use of power, acknowledging man' s 
sinful nature, he also has far more positive arguments for 
participatory equality. These arguments centre alnettuld the 
other aim of equality of respect, freedom; freedom from 
economic oppression; ' freedom to control ones situation; 
freedom to develop, which requires responsibility and risk. 70 
Participatory equality involves the development of such 
freedoms, and is a direct expression of equality of respect. 
c) Property and Distribution 
For Tawney, property played no crucial part in the argument 
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71 
This is largely for equali ty.  because he did not stress 
the creationist doctrine of man as steward of God' s creation. 
72 
Working with a view of person- centred equality, Tawney was 
far more concerned about the effect that property had upon 
the individual and upon community. In this respect, property 
was much like power, and indeed, can be seen as a form of 
power. 
73 
It can be used to enable freedom and fellowship, 
or it can block these in various ways. Thus, for Tawney, the 
question of ownership, private or public, was not of itself 
important. The crucial question was the use or function of 
the property and how far it fulfilled the social purposes. 
74 
In this then, Tawney develops the position of such as 
Ambrose, 
75 
but stops short of the proto- proletarian view 
of equali ty. 76 He shared the latter' s concern for equal 
liberty but could not accept the coercion involved, or the 
belief that the Kingdom of God could be established on 
earth. 
77 
Brief consideration of these areas demonstrates that Tawney 
is located in the anticipatory strain of Christian equality 
le. that he saw equality as having direct relevance to 
society. He does share some of the characteristics of the 
conservative or proto- proletarian views, but integrates them 
into his view of equality as an operative principle. 78 
The question then, is how Tawney's view of operative equality 
compares to other such views. To determine this, and thus 
Tawney' s particular distinctiveness, the next section will 
compare his views with major Christian Socialists up to 
Temple. 
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The Christian Socialists 
The early Christian Socialists such as Maurice and Kingsley saw 
equality as having moral and educative implications but not 
political. They were convinced of the equal value of all human 
beings, and saw equality as an operative value in the sense that 
outrages against individual dignity were to be attacked. All 
this, however, was in the context of rigid views of society and 
property, which saw the two major forms of operative equality, 
distributional and participatory, as destructive to the social 
fabric. It is therefore ironical that Tawney' s views should be 
seen by some writers as in a direct line from these, as, for 
instance, Ruskin. 
79 
There is little doubt that Ruskin was a 
passionate moralist who hit out at the evils of industry and 
political economy. A strong belief in respect for persons as ends 
in themselves underlines his concern with industry' s 
'degradation of the operative into a machine.' 80 
He attacked the laissez -faire principle and the whole basis of 
the materialist society, arguing that a social system which 
ignored the 'will or spirit' of men, and the 'affections' which 
bound them tog ether was evil. 
81 
He also showed more concerns 
than some early Christian Socialists with distributional equality. 
Thus, he wrote that the work of 'Political Economy' was 
to determine what are in reality useful or life giving things 
and by what degrees and kinds of labour they are attainable and 
distributable,' 82 
Despite this, Ruskin clung to the old order, with ranks clearly 
defined. Any change in this order would radically affect the 
whole balance and existence of society as such. Thus, social 
deference and a knowledge of ones place were essential to the 
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coherence of society. 83 It was neces'ary in this social order 
that superior persons should be appointed to 
'guide, to lead, or on occasion even to compel or subdue their 
inferiors.' 84 
In all this, equality of participation had no part. Thus, whilst 
he accepted that the lower classes might be consulted democrati- 
cally, he argued for plural franchises to protect the superior 
persons. 85 Education for Ruskin, thus became a matter of social 
control with the idea of liberty reduced to finding the happiness 
in ones proper station. In all classes, 
'it matters not the least how much or how little they know, 
provided they know just what will fit them to do their work and 
be happy in it.' 86 
For Tawney, as noted above, social, family and individual relation- 
ships were not 'set down' , but a matter of exploration, and 
democracy was a crucial part of the ' tissue of society.' 87 
Turning to Maurice, Kingsley, Ludlow, Neale and Hughes, we see a 
further mixture of egalitarian strands. As with Ruskin, the 
mixture is not one of simply equality as ultimate and operative, 
88 
but rather what is the acceptable or appropriate expression of 
equality as an operative principle. All were concerned about the 
value of the individual and the evils of competition. 89 
However, none saw the necessity of giving expression to equality 
through political means. Thus, their energies were put into 
co- operative enterprises, education, moral education, and moral 
exhortation of the capitalists, not even evincing Ruskin' s 
interest in distributional equality. 90 There is a strong emphasis 
upon liberty and the emancipation of the 'white slaves.' 
91 
However, such liberation involves to a great extent negative 
liberty ie. doing away with the economic oppression. 
156. 
Tawney argued that a true respect for the individual demanded 
more, ie. the creation of conditions for a positive liberty. 
92 
The result of this was a lack of moral interest in equality of 
participation and in particular, democracy. For Maurice, this 
was also partly due to a fear of organization and planning, a 
rigid view of rank in society and property, 
93 
and a belief 
that the Kingdom of God was a present reality and thus great 
social change was not required. The other Christian Socialists 
revealed a greater appetite for social change, and their view of 
small co- operative enterprises was as an educative preliminary to 
increased political power. 
94 
Nonetheless, their view of equality 
was still in fact removed from the political sphere. Thus, 
Kingsley stresses social equality as an ultimate value and one 
tied to a relationship with Christ: 
' True socialism, true liberty, brotherhood, and true equality 
(not the carpel dead level equality of the Communist, but the 
spiritual equality of the Church idea, which gives every man an 
equal chance of developing and using God's gifts, and rewards 
every man according to his work, without respect of persons) is 
only found in loyalty and obedience to Christ.' 95 
Such a spirit of relational equality might exist in a paternalistic 
way between classes and this ultimately was Kingsley's view of 
democracy, and equality of participation, stressing fellowship 
between classes and not the voice or the control of the voter. Even 
Ludlow who saw socialism in terms of making men partners, stressing 
the moral worth of the individual, envisaged severe limits to any 
political action. He, like Kingsley, saw the achievement of 
universal suffrage as being dependent upon the poorer classes 
being educated. Like `:aurice, he was fearful of the tyranny of 
96 
the masses. Tawney' s emphasis upon participatory and 
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distributional equality reflects a radical difference between 
his writings and the Christian Socailists. Not only did this 
involve their view of society, 
97 
i t also involved a much more 
vigourous working out of the relationships between equality of 
respect, liberty and fellowship, resulting in a very different 
view of social change, so that equality of participation and 
distribution were seen as essential for the development of the 
individual, a pre- requisite for the relational equality which 
the early Christian Socialist so firmly believed in. 
Wi th the later Christian Socialists, there is found a pronounced 
movement towards an operative view of equality and one not simply 
involving an operative egalitarian concern within the status 
quo. The influences behind this development include the late 
thought of Mill, the idealist philosophy of Green, and the 
proposals of George. 
98 
These views led to a climate in which an operative view of equality 
was increasingly being accepted by groups both in and outside the 
church. 
99 
Two Christian writers epitomize this development, Headlam and 
Gore. Headlam in fact, saw his views as the development of 
Maurice' s. Certainly, Maurice' s vision of the Kingdom of God 
as already present echoes Headlam' s view that 
the head of every man is Christ,' and, 
'mankind is constituted in Christ.' 
loo 
Headlam' s stress upon the Incarnation, however, took him into the 
realm of moralism, viewing Christ, 'the social and political 
Emancipator' , and acknowledging that the Secularists have, in fact, 
absorbed some of the best Christian truths which the Churches have 
153. 
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been ignoring. Viewin g human life as the most sacred and 
interesting thing possible, Headlam' s equality was both person 
regarding and global in his application. A self -proclaimed 
Liberal as well as Socialist, he saw individual positive liberty 
as being the aim of 
some tremendous social re- organization. ' 
102 
To this end, he broke away from Maurice and his horror of the 
collective or political and argued for support for 
'any means by which a just distribution of the wealth of the 
country may be effected.' 103 
The theme of individual liberation continued for Headlam, through 
to education, the purpose of which was to generate 'divine 
discontent.' This involved developing political awareness in the 
individual, and also eroding class deference. 
104 
Headlam, however, had several significant differences compared 
to Tawney. Firstly, he argued that the Kingdom of God on earth 
was the aim of Christian Socialism. 
105 
Secondly, along with 
the Incarnational justification of equality, he relied upon an 
Cld Testament view of land as created for all men. God had 
given man land on the basis of equality, 
'and it is a blasphemy on their part if they allow that most 
important and valuable of all material gifts to be lightly 
filched away from them by the Duke of Westminster or the Duke of 
Northumberland.' 106 
This emphasizes justice in terms of rights and just distribution 
rather than in the context of relational equality with its 
balance of rights and duties. This difference is seen especially 
in education, where Tawney does not simply seek to break down 
barriers of deference, but to help individuals discover the moral 
107 
base of relationships and so enrich and develop relationships. 
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Thirdly, in addition to the emphasis on rights more than duties, 
Headlam tended not to emphasize fellowship in the same way as 
Tawney. He accepted the brotherhood of all mankind, but was 
wary of referring to this in any social re- organization. It was, 
he argued, the duty of the Church to persuade men to be brothers, 
and thus wrong 
to compel people by law to live as brothers.' 108 
Fourthly, Headlam stressed distributional equality at the expense 
of participatory equality. He accepted the idea of democracy, 
and yet betrayed the influence of Maurice in believing that the 
working people were not ready for real democracy. 
109 
Finally, though Headlam was the first Christian Socialist to 
actually use real socialist ideas, he differed from Tawney, not 
only in his view of the general principles of operative equality, 
but also in terms of its application. Headlam supported the 
development of trades union rights, re- distribution of wealth by 
fit 
the state (including the Single Tax of/George), and state education 
for all. Rarely, however, did he translate his egalitarian 
principles into policy objectives, or actual policy proposals. 
He was prepared to warn against the practices which prevented such 
principles being carried out. However, he saw his duty to 
advocate principles not to 
' suggest any definite action on social and poli tical problems.' 
110 
For Tawney, as was noted above, the very definition of equality as 
an operative principle demanded that clear egalitarian policies 
be set out. ',:ithout such policies the real meaning and implications 
111 
of equality could never actually be discovered. 
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All commentators agree that Gore was a major influence upon 
112 
Ta wne y. For Gore , the Christian faith 
'is not first a philosophy or system of ideas. It is first a 
life.' 113 
Equality is central to this 'Way' . The principle of justice or 
equal consideration for all 
'is the principle of all Christian social conduct. ' 
114 
This leads Gore to advocate liberty and fraternity as the aims of 
g 
115 
Indeed, the social or anization. 
'ideas associated with democracy - the ideas of liberty, equality 
and fraternity - we must believe to be, at their best, of divine 
origin - real expressions of the divine purpose and the divine 
wisdom for today.' 116 
It is not surprising that from this basis, many of the elements of 
Tawney' s equali ty can be seen, from the idea of equal opportunity 
for self -relization, to the argument that the right to property 
should depend upon its use. ,;hat Gore does not do is to bring 
these elements of an operative view of equality together, and 
demonstrate their meaning in society. There are two major 
reasons for this. Firstly, as Ramsey suggests, Gore did not have a 
clear doctrine of the State. 
117 As a result, Gore stressed the 
idea of the Church as exemplar of ' the brotherhood' , denounced 
the evils of laissez -faire and put forward general principles. 
He did not demonstrate how the principle of equality might become 
operative in society. Hence, at the end of 'Christ and Society' , 
the chapter on ' Practical Measures' has few references to equality 
i nso ci e ty. 
118 
The second reason for Gore's reluctance to spell out the elements 
of participatory and distributional equality was his fear of 
democracy: 
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the vox populi can so easily lend itself to the purposes of the 
evi 1 one.' 119 
Thus, Gore, like Maurice, remained suspicious of the motives for 
social re- generation, and afraid of 'man's rule.' Tawney was 
equally aware of the dangers of putting 
the restoration of booty first.' 
However, as noted above, he was confident to clearly demonstrate 
distributional and participatory democracy, and to project these 
in the context of what can only be termed 'moral democracy' . 
Equalizing measures were to take place not just for the common 
good as perceived by Tawney or Gore, but in the light of common 
purposes as perceived by society. Hence, we see Tawney' s need 
for a social philosophy, something which Gore never really 
a ttempted. 
120 
Finally, Gore ultimately was concerned not with social reforms. 
In a sermon in 1928, he argued that whilst social reforms should 
not be undervalued, what was required was a change of character 
based upon Christian belief about God and man. He writes 
' The possibility of a rational hope lies in what we believe 
about ultimate reality.' 121 
For Tawney, with his interactionaist view of society, social 
reform was equally important in egalitarian development to 
belief or to social philosophy. 
Comparisons thus far have served to illuminate the differences 
which exist in terms of equality, between Tawney and other 
Christians, even those deemed to be highly influential to his 
overall thought. They also serve to give notice that 
Lakoff's categories of antipathetic and anticipatory, viewing 
162. 
f r 
equality as /an ultimate or operative principle, are not entirely 
adequate. Few Christian writers would see equality as being 
exclusively 'ultimate' . There are, moreover, several different 
possible views of equality as 'operative' 
equality as operative within the Christian community; 
equality as operative in the koinonia, which exemplifies the 
principle to society; 
equality as attitudinally relevant to society ie. person 
centred equality which accepts the status quo; 
equality as operative in action, as the basis of social 
o rgani za ti on. 
However, even this last view can conceal many areas of complexity. 
Is the principle of equality, even as the basis of social organiz- 
ation to be general or substantive ? By this I mean a general 
principle such as equal consideration, or equal treatment for 
similar individuals. Such a principle is not open to contra- 
diction, but tells us little of the meaning of equality. If the 
principle is to be substantive, does this require a greater 
concern by the Church for planning particular policies ? 
Indeed, it may be asked if detailed policies are necessary in 
order to make any view of equality substantive, or if derivative 
principles such as equality of participation are all that is 
required. 122 
Any substantive Christian view of equality, will, as noted, in 
time, depend upon stated doctrines of state, society, human 
nature, and property. The combination of these and an analysis 
of society wi 11 then determine how the subs tanti ve defini tion is 
arri ved a t. 
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Such considerations come to a head in the final comparison of 
this section, between Tawney' s and Temple's view of equality 
In examining Temple's view of equality, it must be noted that 
Temple was not a theoretical egalitarian at all. 123 He rarely, 
uses the term, and most often when he does, it is to argue 
against particular forms of equality. Absolute or mathematical 
equality is seen as simply unattainable. 124 Striving for 
equality, 
'making Tom, Dick or Harry equals of the kings' was an 
example of ' self -assertion' from which ' little good could come.' 125 
Finally, and most importantly, he saw the attempt to gain such 
equality as destroying fraternity and freedom. 126 
However, whilst Temple's view of one kind of equality led him to 
avoid use of the concept, he nonetheless is clearly egalitarian. 
Firstly, he affirmed equality of respect as the basis of Christian 
morality; 
the primary principle of Christian Ethics and Christian25oli tics 
must be respect for every person simply as a person.' 
Such equal worth was quite independent of usefulness to society 
and attained its full meaning only in the context of the Christian 
faith. 128 Secondly, Temple* emphasizes the importance of freedom, 
in the extension of personal responsibility and control, and the 
importance of fellowship as the context of individual growth. 129 
Alongside the principles of freedom and fellowship, Temple has a 
separate principle of service to the community. In this, both 
refer to the concept of social purpose 130 yet Tawney' s reference 
in terms of duty or service is wider than Temple' s. Both argue 
for equality of opportunity to realize the self, and see the 
131 state as having the purpose of enabling such development. 
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For Temple, like Tawney, this involved distributional and 
participatory equality. Thus he could write that 
' political freedom is of little value without economic freedom,' 
132 
and, 
'if liberty is to be obtained in industry, the worker must have 
his voice in determining the conditions under which he works 
as a permanent right.' 133 
Both accept a degree of provisionality in any egalitarian programme 
- Temple because it may be changed by the detailed criticism 
of experts, Tawney because social conditions do change, demanding 
a modification of programmes. 
134 
Both stressed the crucial relationship between secondary principles 
and root principles. Thus Temple argued that democracy had to 
be viewed in the light of the root principle of 
' respect for personality.' 
135 
',4i thout this, the secondary principles were in danger of becoming 
ends in themselves with democracy realizing the fears of Maurice. 
Both saw egalitarian measures, properly carried out, as liberating 
individuals. Thus, Temple, like Tawney (and distinct from the 
Christian Socialists) saw the development of education not as 
instrumental, either for work or democracy, but to help 
'men both to think for themselves and to appreciate the truth 
in any opinions from which they dissent.' 136 
It is at this point, however, that a comparison becomes 
problematic. Even at the time of declaring what are at the least 
policy objectives, Temple was declaring that the Church could not 
commit itself to any particular programme nor align itself with a 
particular party. 137 He did not argue here against a concern 
with economics, but emphasised rather 
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that the Church has a great concern with the spirit in men 
which shapes the economic system.' 138 
The result was, that in this period Temple paid little attention 
to the detailed economic or political implications of Christian 
principles. 
139 However, with the publication of' Christianity and 
Social Order' , (1942), a radical change occured in Temple' s 
approach. It is here that Temple first 
' indicates the right of the Church to interfere in the social 
order.' 140 
The radical element is found largely in the appendix, which sets 
down a proposed programme developing the implications of Christian 
principles for the social order. In this programmme he sets down 
particular proposals for distributive equality, dealing with 
housing and environment, education, and income (largely through 
assured state employmnet opportunities), and for participatory 
equality, especially in industry. The evidence of this development 
does not point to a clear conclusion. One theory is that Temple 
was actually influenced by Tawney' s approach to equality. The two 
were close friends and both shared a background of Oxford 
Idealism, so that cross fertilization of ideas must have been 
inevi table. Temple acknowledged the influence of Tawney' s 
formulation of the idea of function. 
141 
Tawney acknowledges 
his debt to Temple in Tawney' s ' Christian ty and the Social 
Order.' 
142 
The precise nature of that influence is not clear, 
though it may be assumed to involve the theological underpinning 
of the article. 
143 
It must be noted, however, that Tawney' s 
view of equality had not changed since the Commonplace nook. 
With respect to Temple' s Christiani ty and the Social Order, 
Temple did in fact consult Tawney as to the advisability of 
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9'f including a practical programme. Tawney' s advice was that it 
' adds a note of realism.' 
144 
As noted above, for Tawney,not to set out an example of how a 
principle might be applied in practice was irresponsible,145 
a point that Temple seems to address in-writing, 
'it seems fair to ask the proclaimer of principles if he has any 
proposals for bringing life into conformity with them.' 146 
It would seem plausible to conclude that Tawney did influence 
Temple to make his principles more clearly operative ie. to 
exemplify how such principles might be put into practice. However, 
a second view suggests that despite any influence from Tawney, 
Temple's ' change' in 'Christianity and Social Order' was not as 
dramatic as may be supposed, and that whilst the two may have 
very similar egalitarian views at a general level, they differ 
markedly over the extent to which such views should be operative 
in society. The following considerations lead to this conclusion: 
The proposals for reform in Temple's appendix to 'Christianity and 
Social Order' add very little of substance to the broad outline 
and objectives set out in the final chapter. The two final 
objectives, concerning the provision of leisure and freedom of 
worship, speech and assembly, are, in any case clear enough not 
to require specific examples of how they might be put into 
practice. The first four involving participatory and distrib ut- 
ional equality 147 pick up elements of Tawney' s equali ty, 
including social function, 
148 
but there is no concerted develop- 
ment of these and certainly no attempt to see these ' suggestions' 
as part of an overall strategy of re- distribution of resources 
149 
or of power. On particular issues, it is instructive to 
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compare, for example, Temple' s treatment of education. Firstly, he 
actually writes more of substance about equalizing measures in 
education in the final chapter of 'Christianity and Social Order' , 
than he does in the so- called practical programme. 
150 
Secondly, 
this set of suggestions pale into insignificance when placed 
against the writings on education of Tawney, which include 
research and an extensively set out policy proposal. 
151 
As 
Sugga to remarks, 
'It i s perhaps surprising that Temple did not aquire a stronger 
sense of the importance of patient research and analysis from his 
great friend R.H. Tawney.' 152 
Such a lack of an empirical foundation to his social ethics 
resulted not only in a minimal setting out of policies, but also 
occasional mistakes, for example with respect to banking. 
It may, of course, be that any apparent differences between the 
two wri ters reflect their personali ties, posi tions and perception. 
Temple as an Archbishop would be concerned not only to propound 
a Christian concept of justice, but also to ensure that the 
Church was not divided on issues. Tawney, as an academic, 
socialist, and lay Christian, addressed a wider audience. Thus, 
it could be argued that each dealt with different views of the 
same equality. 
The differences over the application of principles, however, are 
deeper than simply a difference of position or perspective. As 
noted above, 
153 
Temple' s major concern was wi th the enunciating 
of middle -level principles: 
'The Church must announce Christian principles and point out 
where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with 
them.' 154 
It is then the task of Christian citizens to re -shape 
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' the existing social order In closer conformity to those 
prircipis.' 155 
Also, in 'Christianity and :>ocial Order' Temple refers to en 
argument for the Church' s rt s;ht to 'Interfere' in poiticse ht;it. 
upon the principle of equ '1 worth. 156 does note however, 
endorse this approach, indeed his description of it larders on 
the c. ricature. 1' To go beyond middle-level principles for 
Temple ri !LS the danger of obscuring roles, or being identified 
witdt. political parties, or of producing policies which fail, 154 
Hence, such olicies are best left to the experts. Behind this 
is pleriraps the gore profound fear that if the Church turns its 
attrar=ttic= to, the details of social policy, 
"ñtt mom iIecorre i=fected with the prevailing diseases.' 159 
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essi :-Dm=_ ., Identify itself with palliatives of sés? r cwt._ _ _ 'ß really based upon the denial of its ®Wfi 
Tale tmtllttïmste sere i g precisely that the ghuh hoffis 
ü.,enttrfilie$ tixÌï= objectives whose major of áMi-tisivo êi.n.. i& 
üm tu£u:ns orf nisttesiali.s+to and lot-regarding equality, th 
,:asazlail: must meeaittra IA on the sphere of vs loes .nsoi fi§ 
tscive ,:unzthan>erntiE11 wau:ìAt§ of lstt ,4tid 3ttFtf ififeriffi a.44. F4giit4t4 
akurrrlcuiliarlx« - i.§ th@§@ 6-44fie@fi 44 4g gt '4§4 
- 1- 'u:r' ®;.sptt e @oli ty, a44 Árhy 
7ßn1rÜi3 gwoodi% of # gtisCig4py sfthR §8Ei41t 
atctl} u' t Itaxtluce a3cla *%vistra 1111 E t fAi g1Y ® 4qi44 ti ity i 
Talmu,y:dimw on Oe§* er,ftw@fn§ vi# f@wpt@, @R4 @&&@pt§ Ree4 
lz ceti-1zctrt to) 1ke iiftwsd_Yeigi in poiiff 6,§kini '1161%4@f@>, f®>F 
1lïwsttt the oolytmvttikve 60N6W of eF,ty0:2 tt ti#sgqs,41,ti 
169. 
detailing specific egalitarian policies. On one level, this is a 
necessary function of meaning ie. the equality put forward by the 
Church can never be seen in its real distinctiveness without clear 
examples of how the ends can be achieved. 
163 
On another 
level, it is also a matter of faith and responsibility: 
'Christians have no right to demand complete certainty before they 
act. Men aquire light on issues which are still dark, not by 
waiting helplessly for light to be given them, but by acting 
fearlessly on such light as they already possess.' 164 
Given this, the Church could not avoid dialogue with the experts 
on detail. Indeed, without that, the critical stance of Temple 
outlined in 'Christianity and Social Order' could never be 
achieved. Hence, for Tawney, empirical research and addressing 
policies was a necessary part of developing a substantive concept 
of equality. 
165 
To detail egalitarian policies did not of 
necessity, mean that the high view of equality would be lost, so 
long as the foundation principles were constantly referred to. 
::oreover, Tawney' s acceptance of the provisionali ty of all 
policies worked against the danger of accepting egalitarian 
measures as ends in themselves. 
All of this points then to a clear difference between Tawney and 
Temple in their view of equality as an operative principle. 
Two final points must be made with regard to this difference. 
Firstly, Wright notes the difference between Tawney's view of 
equality and 'equality of consideration', which has no implications 
for policy. By implication, he sees this as the form of equality 
espoused by Temple before' Christianity and Social Order.' 
166 
Such would not have been the view of Temple. In advocating 
distribution and participation, he was advocating policy objectives 
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which necessarily do have implications for policy. The 
differences rather hang on whether a derivative principle such as 
distributional equality can really be substantive without a clear 
policy programme. The latter would seem to be necessary even in 
Temple' s own logic. The only way of testing democracy, for 
example, against its root principle is to give an example of how 
such democracy would work in practice. 
The second point concerns the nature of the difference. It may 
be argued that there is no substantive difference between Temple 
and Tawney in terms of meaning, only in terms of application, or 
the means of applying principles. In one sense this is true. 
However, Tawney's method is so open and dynamic that it does in 
one sense affect the meaning of equality. The relationship of the 
principle of equality of respect to the changing situations in 
society means that the operative definition of equality is 
continually developing. 
167 
This in turn points to hints of 
another aspect of the difference between Tawney' s and Temple' s 
egalitarian stance. Both argue for the distinctive nature of a 
Christian view of equality. However, Temple emphasizes the 
importance of the spiritual in this conception whilst Tawney 
emphasizes the importance of the moral. This comes out in their 
views on education. Both emphasize the aim of education to help 
students to become 
' zealous for individuality.' 
168 
For Temple, however, such an education would find 
'its strength in spi ri tua 1 power. ' 
169 
Hence, alongside the proposal that every child should have 
the opportuni ty o f an educa tion ti 11 years o f ma turi tv, so 
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planned as to allow for his peculiar aptitudes and make possible 
their full development,' 
Temple adds the following: 
' this education should throughout, be inspired by faith in God 
and find its focus in worship.' 170 
Here, Christianity not only provides a distinctive view of 
equality, as for democracy, 
171 
it actually provides the best 
possible focus wi thin a school communi ty for ensuring a corporate 
life which stressed both individuality and fellowship. 
172 
Tawney was equally aware of the spiritual dimension in humanity, but 
his concentration on the Christian faith in terms of morality 
led him to describe the educational exercise in moral terms, 
duties to the individual and to others. Moreover, an awareness 
of the diminishing influence of the Church, his emphasis upon 
respect for individual autonomy, and his concern about precise 
defining of ends and means would have led Tawney to be unsure of 
using Christianity for this purpose. 
173 With education as a 
process of Socratic discovery, the Christian faith would more 
likely be involved in discussions rather than acting as a focus for 
the whole educational or community concern. By taking the 
agapaic view of equality of respect seriously, and pressing it 
to its conclusion, Tawney thus arrives at a view of equality 
which is Christian but not dependent upon an acceptance of any 
specific institutional expression of Christianity. It would be 
wrong to refer to this as a ' secularizing' of the Christian view 
of equality, for Tawney' s view of human nature and moral psychology 
locates the spiritual in the world. 
174 However, as equality 
for Tawney always transcends any particular expression of it, 
it is perfectly appropriate to see it as applying to all of 
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society and thus for the Church to support its implementation in 
society. From society' s point of view, this is not an exclusive 
principle which a particular group wishes to force on society, 
but rather an inclusive principle which a particular group 
attempts, often badly, to live out. Tawney attempts to sustain 
such a view by reminding us of the pervasive influence of 
Christian principles on society, and of the general recognition 
that certain basic elements of moral behaviour are essential to 
the fulfillment of moral relationships and thus relational 
equality, 
175 and by attempting to work through a social 
philosophy which would emphasize transcendant ideals rather than 
sectional interests. 
The difference that this points to is perhaps less one of spiritual 
against moral perspectives, as theological against holistic 
perspectives. Tawney' s holistic and interactionist view of 
society demands that equality take in both matters of value and 
principle and details of social organization and development. 
Ensuring that the two are kept in balance demands a process which 
will enable this. This process must inevitably involve learning 
and development, and the flexibility to respond to changes in 
society. 
176 
In this perspective the process becomes the focus 
of egalitarian development. 
177 
For Temple, it is rather the 
Christian faith which becomes the focus of such development, 
178 
the content not the process. 
179 
At the very least it must be concluded that questions of application 
do affect any Christian definition of equality and in this, 
Temple and Tawney do differ. 
173. 
In conclusion of this section, three points may be made. Firstly, 
Tawney' s equality is distinctively Christian. It is based upon 
Christian doctrine and differs from the major philosophical 
views of equali ty. It contains elements of all the Christian 
schools of thought, emphasizing both fellowship and order as well 
as liberty. The influence of philosophies such as Idealism are 
also evident. Secondly, in the end, Tawney's equality is distinc- 
tive from all these elements with a particular expression of 
operative equality which demands that equality of respect be 
expressed ultimately through framing policies as well as in 
developing social philosophies. Finally, the very inclusive 
nature of Tawney' s view of equality is bound to lead to overlaps 
with humanist views of equality with a common concern for, for 
example, democracy. It is therefore necessary now to compare 
Tawney' s equality with that of humanist Socialist thinkers who 
have been associated with him, to examine what, if any , are the 
substantive differences between them. 
Socialist Equali ty 
In this section, I intend to compare Tawney' s equali ty wi th 
socialist views of equality. As the contemporary debate about 
Socialism and its values neatly underlines, there is, of course, 
no one socialist view of equali ty and its applica tion. 
180 
To fully appreciate Tawney's egalitarian contribution, examina- 
tion of the political debate will be necessary, alongside a 
comparison with such socialist thinkers as Williams, Lukes or 
Crick. This, however, will be examined in later chapters. At 
this stare, it is necessary simply to note the distinctiveness 
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of Tawney' s view compared to socialism as it existed in his time. 
In this respect, I will concentrate upon a comparison with 
Fabianist thought, considered by many to be the most influential 
socialist group in England at that time. 181 
Fabian Equality 
Tawney has often been associated with Fabian thought. 182 Tawney 
in fact, joined the Fabian Society in 1906 and retained a lasting 
admiration for, and friendship with its outstanding figures, the 
Webbs. They were the dedica tees of 'Equality' , and the subjects 
of Tawney' s Webb Memorial Lecture in 1952, and Tawney had plans 
at one point to write their biography. 183 
Equali ty was already a dominant principle in the ' basis' of the 
Fabian Society in 1887- (Webb joined in 1885). In the basis there 
was a concern for 
'practical equality of opportunity', and for 
the establishment of equal citizenship for men and women.' 184 
All the Fabians were united in their abhorrence of poverty and 
the effects of distributional inequalities on the dignity of 
the individual. From such an implicit basis of equal worth, 
Sidney Webb, in particular, began to outline an argument for 
equality. The roots of the debb' s view of equali ty were in 
classical utilitarianism. However, they modified and developed 
g 
185 Thus, they argued that the latter' s argument on distribution. 
adequate shel ter and sus tainance are universal pre -recui si tes for 
happiness. Given that each person's happiness counts equally, then 
some re- distribution of wealth was necessary to provide the pre- 
186 requi si tes, Webb defined such happiness in terms of the 
175. 
possibility o a dignified existence. 
187 
Thus, Webb built 
into the idea of happiness one of equal worth and equal rights to 
the necessary pre -requisites of a dignified existence. This same 
argument has since been frequently used to justify a minimum 
welfare state. 
188 
In the light of this, Webb argued against 
Spencerian individualism and laissez -faire capitalism for a 
guaranteed national minimum. 
189 
In arguing for such a minimum, Webb was aware of the relationship 
of equality and freedom and of the need to re- distribute power. 
On the one hand, this would lead to a diminution of the landlord' s 
and employer' s power ' over the lives of others.' 
190 
On the 
other hand, such a 'National Minimum' would lead the wage earner to 
'an enormous growth in practical freedom of action, a liberty 
positively encouraged by law, increased leisure, better health, 
greater amenity of life, further opportunities of advancement 
for his children.' 191 
In addition to distributional equality, the Webbs were also aware 
of the heed for participatory equality, especially in terms of 
democracy. Democracy was a crucial element in society, not least 
because it provided the training ground for a culture based upon 
service. 
192 
Thus, like Tawney, Webb saw distribution and 
participation as assisting freedom and fellowship. 
193 
Indications 
that Webb' s collectivism was also influenced by Idealism give 
further substance to the argument that Tawney and Webb shared a 
view of equality that was very close. 
194 
However, several points militate against such a view: - 
a) Tawney was fundamentally a moralist. This meant that he spent 
time in discussing principles, their justification and their 
application. For Webb, the importance of the concept of equal 
176. 
worth or of instrumental equality was simply assumed. 
Significantly in the 1920 edition of the Fabian Essays, Webb 
himself betrays unease at the lack of detailed thought about 
basic principles in the first edition - 
'And whilst we were strong on liberty and fraternity, as 
essentials of democracy, we were apt to forget equality.' 195 
For Tawney too, ideas and principles were crucial with respect 
to social change. A ' firm body of conviction' is necessary 
to guide and sustain social change. 
196 
This contrasts 
starkly with the Webbian view of change, not fixed by ideas, 
but as something which was gradual and inevitable. Tawney 
certainly saw signs of improvements in society, but did not 
interpret them as being determined. Thus he directly criticizes 
the Fabians: 
'What we have to do first of all is to change these assumptions 
or principles. This is where the Fabians are inclined to 
go wrong.' 197 
b) Though both wri ters showed a dis taste for poverty and forms 
of inequality, Tawney' s Christian view of man's sinful 
nature differed greatly from the optimistic view of Webb. 
19e 
Such a view of human nature fits in well with the inevita- 
bi li ty of gradualism. Man is so able to respond to democracy 
that this becomes 
'one long training in enlightened altruism,' 
199 
Democracy, they continue, 
'is always taking the mind of the individual off his own 
narrow interests forcing him to give his thought and 
leisure not to satisfying his own desires, but to considering 
the needs and desires of other people.' 200 
Behind much of Webb' s thinking was the Positivist view of 
Comte. Claiming to view society scientifically, he noted a 
177. 
law of moral/ social development which was inevi table and 
pointed to an organic view of society in which each individual 
had a part to play. 201 It is the last element which 
influences Webb' s collectivism, for in arguing against 
individualism, he argued for subjection to the greater good 
of society: 
'We must take even more care to improve the Social Organism of 
which we form a part than to improve our own individual 
developments For the perfect development of each 
individual (is)....in filling, in the best possible way, his 
humble function in the great social machine We must 
abandon the self conceit of imagining that we are independent 
uni is and bend our proud minds, absorbed in thir own cultivation 
to this subjection to the higher end, the Common Weal.' 202 
For Tawney, whilst the state had the task of helping the 
individual touch 'perfection' , this was not to be found in 
the collective, but through responding to the various moral 
relationships including that of the individual to his or her 
self. 
203 Equally, society itself is defined by Tawney as 
'a community of wills which are often discordant, but which 
are capable of being inspired by devotion to common ends.' 204 
Tawney's interactionist view of society with the individual 
as part of a network of moral relationships and with ideas 
and structures capable of influencing and being influenced 
differed greatly from the Webbian organic view of society. 
Alongside this was Tawney' s concern for individual freedom 
and development. 
An example which vividly illustrates the differences of Webb 
and Tawney is that of education. Webb argued for equality of 
opportuni ty in education. Education, however, was ultimately 
instrumental. That is to say he wished to provide a 'ladder of 
opportunity' that would take the best talent and enable it 
178. 
to be developed for its purpose in society. Webb went as far 
as to tell Wallas that he considered it an advantage for the 
ordinary man not to be educated above his station. 
205 
For Tawney, education was also instrumental but not in the 
sense of using or fitting an individual for a system. 
Equality of provision was, in one sense, an end in itself, 
a proper expression of equality of respect. In another sense 
equality of education was aimed at helping individuals both 
in relation to their talents and to their situation. Thus, 
he argues for 
'not merely la carriere ouverte aux talents, indispensible 
though that is, but egalite de fait, not merely equality of 
opportunity but universality of provision.' 206 
For Tawney, rather than education being used for sustaining 
the oppression of society, it was valuable to help the 
individual grow in spiritual independence. Only through 
the development of 'reasoned conviction' would any real 
social :hange occur, for 
'no class is good enough to do its thinking for another; and, 
if the workers of the country are to be effective in action, 
they must first be independent in mind.' 207 
c) In the same way, whilst Tawney agreed with Webb in seeing 
democracy as essential for the development of a common 
culture, his stress is not on democracy as conditioning men 
to altruism. 208 Rather does he see participatory equality in 
all its forms as liberating the individual, giving him power 
over his situation. The difference in emphasis is crucial, 
for Webb's view of freedom is ultimately notsimply freedom from 
capitalist oppression, but freedom found in subjection to the 
209 greater good. Hall suggests that another reason which 
179. 
accounts for this difference is simply the backgrounds of the 
two wri ters. `,,/ebb may be seen as an 
I. isolated intellectual' , 
one who never really related to the working classes and who, 
despite the initial emphasis on principles and values in 
the Fabian Movement, 210 wished to view society 
dispassionately, and, as noted above, scientifically. Tawney, 
on the other hand was a ' political intellectual' who took the 
side of Henry Dubb, not only against superior persons, but 
against any statism, hence his emphasis upon the individual 
and the necessary control of their lives. 211 
Given such a difference, Tawney could only accept a ' satisfying 
social system' as one found upon a ' firm body of convictions' 
reached freely. Hence, he encouraged educational and industrial 
democracy experiments in which individuals could learn to 
develop their freedom. For the Webbs, such democracy was a 
means to social change which increased the 'subordination' 
of the person who cannot, to the person who can. 
212 
As such, it was tactically necessary in the growth of the 
organic state. For Tawney, such a 'science of means' could 
never achieve the effect of real social change, which involved 
opening windows 'in the soul.' 
213 
In the light of all this, it becomes clear that much of the weight 
for Webb' s justification of equality, rests not on the idea of 
equal worth, but on the part equalizing measures play, in the 
development of society. Also, just as Webb' s idea of freedom 
differs from Tawney' s, so does the view of fellowship. As noted 
above, Tawney' s fellowship was a broad concept balancing the 
individual and social responsibilities. He stresses the need to 
180. 
serve in the context of the individual' s total si tuation, but 
draws back from specifying how they should serve or recommending 
an overall loyalty to the state. Hence, any social organization 
was designed to put people 'within reach' of eqch other. 
214 
All of this inevitably affected the Webbian view of distributional 
and participatory equality. As was seen above, distributional 
equality involved re- distribution of resources through taxation 
to social services. This would lead to an increase in government 
authority over economic life: 
215 
' The best government is that which can safely and successfully 
administer most.' 216 
However, whilst this bureaucracy would provide the material pre- 
requisites for 'happiness', 217 it did not itself include every- 
one in the process. In Winter' s words, the Webb' s paternalistic 
belief in 
'government from above, is demonstrated in their treatment of 
workers as spectators in the process of building the socialist 
s to te.' 218 
The important work was to be done by 
'a selfless, professional, intellectual elite, much akin to the 
Webbs themselves.' 219 
Given this, there was little in Webb' s view of equali ty to 
encourage participatory equality, for example, .in industrial 
democracy. Any re- distribution of power was not to give individuals 
grea ter control, but rather to increase the powers of government. 
Such a view would tend to replace one form of 'instrumentalism' 
with another. 
220 
Tawney himself, despite his positive evaluation 
of the Webbs 
221 
was quick to see this, and wrote of the Fabians 
' who appear to conceive the best life for most men as one in 
181. 
Which they are regimented by experts.' 222 
Such paternalism would even border on the sinister when, in the 
stages of social transition, inevitable though they be, the 
Webbs suggest that censorship of certain newspapers may be 
necessary, at least those whose profit motive would make them 
' dangerous to the community.' 223 
In conclusion, Webb' s view of equality bears a striking surface 
resemblance to Tawney' s, but ultimately is very different. 
Webb' s concern with freedom, fellowship and equality are ultimately 
within a particular conception of society and personal develop- 
ment which is qui to distinct from Tawney' s. 
Perhaps the ultimate proof of this is in their views of democracy, 
with Tawney seeking an extension of the individual's control, and 
hence suggesting far more ways of increasing participatory 
democracy. 
224 At the root of these differences lies Tawney' s 
Christian moralist position, emphasizing equal worth, respect for 
individual autonomy, a view of human nature and society which 
precluded any simple evolutionary or organic concept, and a far 
more rigorous analysis of the relationship between equality of 
respect and any derivative values. 
225 
Ultimately, this results in practical measures put forward by 
Tawney which demand not simply universal distribution of resources, 
but re- distribution of power. 
Webb' s view or equality was not the only Fabian view, though i t 
was highly influential. Other Fabians emphasized aspects which 
Webb did not cover. Oliver, for instance, in arguing for the 
moral basis of socialism stressed the basic p rinciple of respect 
182, 
for persons and, having noted the effects of capitalism on the 
character, sought increased education and industrial co- operation. 
However, he rarely provided a detailed exposition of this, and 
still held a Webbian view of elitism. Thus, on education, he 
could wri to 
'only when those schools are free and accessible to all, will 
the reproach of proletarian coarseness be done away with.' 226 
Another writer who began as a Fabian, however, but who developed 
along the lines of Guild Socialism and emphasized the importance 
of participatory equality was G.D.H. Cole. Tawney at one point 
described himself as 'an unorthodox guild socialist' and welcomed 
the movement in general, in particular for' its attack on the 
theory of functionless property.' 
227 
At the base of Cole's position was a revolt against the collecti- 
vism of the debbs. 
228 Echoing Tawney' s thoughts on the ultimate 
value of the individual, Cole wrote, 
' There is an individualism, as assertion that the individual 
is after all ultimate And there is a claim, on behalf of 
the individual, for a greater measure of effective self -government 
than can be given by the ballot -box and the local constituency.' 229 
In stressing the freedom of the individual and the importance of 
self -development as an ideal, Cole, like Tawney, emphasized that 
in nationalizing industry, little could be achieved unless the 
230 
workers had some control. Thus, as Gutmann notes, over 
against the Webbs, he stressed that equality had to be ' two eyed', 
ie. balancing both distributionary equality and participatory 
equality. 
231 
Alongside this, he argued for more power for the 
Trades Unions and a broadly democratic federated Trades Union 
movement, to give workers more control. 
232 
The democracy which Cole advocated, involved, as nor Tawney, a 
183, 
way of life which involved also the idea of function: 
'Democracy is only real when it is conceived in terms of function 
and purpose.' 233 
However, although Cole supported a strong view of person -regarding 
equality, one which was inclusive and valued fellowship along with 
freedom, the means of achieving this reveal a view of equality 
quite distinct from Tawney' s. 
To begin with, whilst both used the idea of function, it was in 
234 
quite different ways. For Cole, the idea of function was 
sectional ie. it referred to function within the guilds or 
associations advocated by him. Such guilds were the basis of a 
pluralist society in which the function and power of the state 
became greatly curtailed, all to give greater participatory 
eauali ty to individuals in their local situation. 
235 
Ironically, 
in terms of democratic representation, this leads to what amounts 
to proportional equality. People, Cole argued, could not be 
represented merely as an aggregate of individuals, nor could 
their will be represented simply by the will of an elected 
representative. The only fair representation would be functional 
ie. reflecting the function or functions of individuals in the 
organization they belonged to. This would truly represent 
precisely what individuals had to contribute, and thus meant, in 
practice, plural voting. 
236 
Tawney' s unconditional equal worth of the individual was quite 
distinct from such a view of equality. He accepted the need for 
local organizations to discover how to implement particular 
values in their situation. 237 However, he could not accept the 
pluralist conclusion of Cole and insisted that certain values be 
184, 
the controlling ones within society. 
238 
In consequence he saw 
the need for a much stronger state which was able to plan for the 
necessary equality and maintain a framework within which relational 
equality could develop. In this context Tawney' s concept of 
function was deeply rooted in an overall society ethic. 
239 
Cole then, attempted to balance participatory and distributional 
equality, but ultimately failed. The key to Tawney' s balancing 
of the two was his holistic and interactionist view of man and 
society. This meant that the state not only was important in 
terms of distributing resources and power, but was also important 
as a focus for moral meaning. Without the states clear adherence 
to the basic egalitarian principles, which involve a dialectical 
relationship between intermediary groups and the centre, 
240 
there could be no shared moral meaning and thus local democratic 
groups could drift into exclusive pluralism. The state therefore 
had an important part to play in the matter of enabling social 
change, something which Cole could not accept. 
241 
In conclusion to this section then, i t is argued that Tawney' s 
view of equality stands out against the Fabians and Guild Social- 
ists, especially in terms of his Christian view of man and society, 
and of his complex and balanced view of equality of respect and 
related principles. 
242 
This in turn, affects the view of 
participatory equality and distributional equality, and the whole 
method of egali tarian social change. 
Before concluding the chapter as a whole, it is necessary to 
briefly make two final comparisons, with Marx and with !.!ii 1. 
185. 
Tawney felt some affinity with Marx. 
243 
This is hardly surprising 
that this should be so given Marx' s high moral tone and his desire 
for the liberation of man to develop his creative capacities, 
for 
the return of man to himself as social, ie. human man, complete, 
conscious and ma tured wi thin.' 244 
Tawney' s social interactionism, however, differs profoundly from 
Marx's historical determinism. The latter assumes that values do 
not play an autonomous role in history, but are a reflection of 
different stages in the organization of production. With respect 
to the problem of equality, therefore, Marx does not see this in 
terms of an ethical ideal. He locates inequality in the existence 
of classes. Classes themselves are, in the last analysis, the 
result of the division of labour. "When the division of labour 
is made obsolete, inequality will disappear. Hence, for Marx, the 
conception of equality is not a normative principle, but a theory 
which asserts that equality will characterize human relations at 
a certain period in the history of production. Such a view of 
equality stands against the element of self- determination and 
group determination which is at the centre of Tawney's ecuality 
of respect. 
245 
Turning to Mill, Gutmann associates his view of ecuality and 
freedom quite closely with Tawney' s at points. Thus she claims 
that Tawney' s argument for regulation or ownership by goves,.ii.uent 
is couched in terms consistent with the exceptions to laissez- 
Faire policy that Mill recognized. 
246 
Gutmann's analysis is 
partially true. Tawney was concerned with a positive view of 
freedom connected to individual development and with govern-ent 
186. 
action which would enable this and not coerce the individual. 
Like Mill too, Tawney was concerned to balance the equal passion 
and equal rationality postulates ie. allowing the individual 
to fulfill their desires and rational capacities. 247 
However, several points require to be made to balance Gutmann' s 
observa tions. 
Firstly, Tawney himself argued against the utilitarian stance, 
arguing that the unique worth of the individual was the crucial 
g point. moral startin í Tawney ne was not simply 
concerned with the fulfillment of 'passions' or 'rational 
capacities.' He was also concerned for the individual to fulfill 
their moral capacities, which in turn was the basis for his view 
249 fellowship. el_ i . Thirdly, it cannot be said that Tawney' s 
equali ty fi is at all into a laissez -faire approach. He argued for 
the necessity of posi tive planning on the part of the government250 
Moreover, though he did not advocate nationalization for its own 
sake, his criteria for nationalization ie. government 
interference, was not simply the Millean exception of improving 
efficiency, 251 but also about giving both consumer and producers 
more power and control, and about the responsible use of that 
power. Once again then, Tawney' s equali ty involves an overall 
moral imperative which is concerned about relationships and the 
provision of conditions in which they might thrive. 
A final point of note is that Mill's view of democracy though 
positive, involved a paternalistic attitude to the working 
classes, who, he argued, should be educated before they could use 
democracy, Tawney' s perspective was qui to different, not only 
trusting the individual but also viewing participatory ecuality 
18 7. 
as itself a means of the individual developing and learning to 
use their power. 
Tawney and Mill thus have different views of equality, with Tawney 
requiring a moral background which both gives meaning to the 
freedom of the individual and common purposes which the individual 
could work through both for themselves and in serving others. 
Conclusion 
As commentators have noted, Tawney shows the influence of many 
socialist and Christian thinkers from Arnold and Ruskin, to 
252 
Ra l Morris, Webb and Gore. ym and liams can thus refer to 
him as, 
the last important voice in that tradition which has sought to 
humanize the modern system of society on its own terms.' 253 
In this chapter, nonetheless, I have argued that with respect to 
equality, his view remains distinctive. It is distinctively 
Christian, containing elements of all the major Christian traditions 
yet i t extends the concept of equali ty as operative to detailed 
poli tical programmes including the distribution of power. It 
is distinctively socialist, and yet stands out against the 
socialism of his contemporaries, with a complex view of equality 
which includes an emphasis upon social and moral purpose, and a 
balancing of distributional and participatory equality. 
In the next two chapters, I will attempt to examine what influence 
this view of equality has had in Christian and non Christian 
circles. This will be followed by an assessment of Tawney' s 
distinctively Christian contribution to modern egalitarian debate. 
Chapter 5 
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The Influence of Tawney's Equality 1. 
This chapter and the following one will examine the influence of 
Tawnèy' s equality both amongst writers on social policy and 
Christian writers. The first writers to be examined will be 
R.M. Titmuss and P. Townsend. Both are generally accepted as being 
heavily influenced by Tawney, and as in some way carrying on the 
Tawney tradition. 1 
Terrill writes of the work of Richard Titmuss that, 
' i t finely expresses Tawney' s spirit today.' 2 
There is no doubt that the two men felt a significant bond. They 
were friends from the 1940s until Tawney' s death. Both worked at 
the London School of Economics and had a strong commitment to 
socialism. 3 Both espoused a deeply felt humanism which marked 
them out as 'secular saints.' 
4 
Titmuss himself acknowledges his 
debt to Tawney in the introduction to the 1964 edition of 'Equality'. 
In that, he demonstrates a strong determination 
to search more intensively and more widely for greater equality 
in all spheres of our national life.' 5 
In turn, Tawney thought more highly of Titmuss 
than anyone else at the L.S.E. at the time that he left it.' 
6 
However, whilst the closeness of Tawney and Titmuss is not in 
doubt, this does not of itself establish clear influence, 
especially in the area of a particular concept such as equality. 
This will require closer analysis noting both differences and 
developments. I will precede this with a brief examination of 
the ideas and pre -supposi tions underlying their views of equali ty. 
To begin with, Titmuss, like Tawney, was a moralist. On the 
189, 
one hand, social policy could not be value free, necessarily 
expressing underlying values in its aims and purposes. 'Social 
policy' therefore 
'is all about social purposes and choices between them.' 
7 
On the other hand, this placed any government in a position of 
moral leadership. In this respect, Titmuss can even talk in terms 
of 'moral progress' in society. 8 Such language brings to mind 
the Tawney view of progress with government enabling the develop- 
ment of the individual, including moral development. 
9 
However, for Titmuss, 'moral progress' is measured in terms of 
social growth and does not involve teaching about obligation. This 
social growth' is defined specifically in terms of re- distribution 
through the social services: 
'When our societies are spending proportionately more on the 
educationally deprived than on the educationally normal; when the 
re- housing of the poor is proceeding at a greater rate than the 
re- housing of the middle classes; when proportionately more 
medical care is being devoted to the needs of the long -term 
chronically sick than to those of the average sick.' 10 
Progress such as this would provide ' quantifiable indicators' 
of social growth. Alongside these, however, are indicators of 
social growth which 
cannot be quantified, but relate to the texture of relationships 
between human beings.' 11 
Here, social growth is seen very much in terms of Tawney' s 
civilization with its stress on 
'human loyalties, affections, pious bonds between man and man which 
express a man's personali ty.' 12 
However, for Titmuss, education had little part to play in the 
developing of such relationships in any moral sense. He could 
certainly advocate education for citizenship, informing individuals 
190. 
oì their rights, helping them to take up benefits. 13 Yet, 
education as such remained a matter of fulfilling personal 
differences 14 and did not involve helping students (of whatever 
age) to become aware of social responsibilities or duties. 
15 
Thus, whilst Tawney and Titmuss are both moralists who strive for 
the 'high moral ground' in social policy, a real difference 
emerges, one which may best be accounted for by Tawney' s Christian 
humanism. Titmuss, according to his daughter, disliked religious 
ceremony and described himself as an agnostic. 16 At first sight, 
this does not point to great differences between the two. As 
Atherton argues, Tawney' s own position was shot through with a 
straightforward moral humanism. 17 Significantly, when referring 
to important humanist principles, Titmuss quotes the Christian 
wri ter Daniel Jenkins about the discovery of the need to love our 
neighbours as ourselves. 18 Along with his writings on the gift 
relationship, this ties Titmuss's position firmly to the concept 
of agape. Furthermore, Reisman argues, both writers 
stressed the extent to which welfarism springs from altruistic 
19 
attitudes which each was proud to share with his fellow citizens.' 
However, Tawney' s Christian view of man as sinful, as well as 
capable of compassion, and of altruism having its springs 
ultimately in God, demands that altruism requires nurture and 
encouragement, not simply opportunities. 20 Hence, he stresses the 
need to develop ideology (in spite of its dangers) and to re -state 
the fundamental transcendánt principles, and to re- distribute 
power. Titmuss' s view of humanity is far more optimistic than 
Tawney. Hence, his moralism emphasizes the duties of the state to 
the individual and not the obligations of the individual. Given 
191. 
this, Titmuss ^annot accept the idea of individuals being educated 
21 
This does not simply in morali ty.  reflect a Fabian belief in 
the perfect4bility of man. For the Fabians, the means of social 
change would gradually condi tion the individual. For Ti tmuss, 
man had a natural or social base to altruism, which required 
22 
, social expression. Hence, organization would not so much  
condition as provide the opportunity for development. 23 
Titmuss and Tawney did share a similar moral psychology in respect 
of self -realization. Both argued that 'giving' or 'serving' was 
necessary for the individual to grow and develop in the fullest 
sense. Also, both argued for some form of value consensus in 
society. Tawney saw the roots of this consensus as in the 
Christian tradition, and did not see it as a static phenomenon. 24 
Ti tmuss, however, with the aid of anthropology saw a broader 
provenance for consensus and more in terms of the need referred 
above. 25 Both accepted the importance of consensus in social 
change. Titmuss, in fact, sought justification for e u Lity 
'in the will of society to move towards a more e=uaL society.' 
Consensus was necessary to both writers given their esshasis upon 
the necessary connection between values and policies, Zxami 
blood donorship patterns as an index of social belief sst4 va.Lues, 
Ti tmuss draws the unambiguous conclusio that the causes of 
different patterns in various countries are to be found p-recf.seLy 
in the history, values and political ideas of society, 27 Meir 
shared moralism also led both men to the belie` that among 
principles or bad motives could not lead to good results, that 
'no amount of cleverness will get figs of t.stles,' 2< 
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Ti tmuss can thus quote Solzheni tsyn wi th approval: 
'We have to show the world a society in which all relationships, 
fundamental principles and laws flow directly from moral ethics 
and from them alone.' 29 
This perspective leads Titmuss, like Tawney at times to polarize 
- the values of socialist humanism and free -market ideologies. 
Titmuss writes of a value free ' vacuum', over against the values 
30 
of social humanism, likely to be filled with conflict and hostility. 
His attacks upon the free market system are remarkably similar to 
Tawney' s: 
a) The market system emphasizes individualism and destroys 
communi ty. 
31 
b) It leads to a limitation or deprivation of freedom of choice. 
32 
c) It results in inefficiency and shortage of provision and is 
costly. 
33 
Given the strong links between values and social policy, it is not 
surprising that as teachers, both Tawney and Titmuss advocated 
greater integration of academic disciplines and did not themselves 
remain in any neat category of academic discipline. 
34 
Tawney 
criticized economists and sociologists for an a -moral and limited 
approach to their disciplines, 
35 
whilst Titmuss encouraged the 
teaching of 
the imaginative exci tements of unifying perspectives and 
principles.' 36 
Alongside the importance of principles both stressed the importance 
of understanding society and framing policies in the light of 
the materials to be handled.' 
37 
Thus, both argued for the 
importance of reacting to the changing si tuations and perceived 
needs in society. 38 However, whilst Tawney was open to changes 
in the social situation and stressed the need for a systematic 
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collection of data, Titmuss more clearly identified the challenges 
of the technological process which would lead to major social 
'dis -welfares' requiring compensation and calling for 'a major 
shift in values.' 
39 
Finally, in this brief initial discussion, note must be taken of 
the very different perspectives of the two writers. Titmuss wrote 
for the most part, about social policy, arguing, for instance, 
against the use of the free market in the social services. 
40 
Tawney, on the other hand, saw all policy as social policy, and 
thus argued for action on a wider front. 41 Some have criticized 
Titmuss for his narrower focus, arguing that he does not go far 
enough and that the social services of themselves, could not effect 
the necessary changes in society. 42 However, Titmuss does not 
claim that the social services are the only instrument of change, 
only a very important one. They are a part of society, reflecting 
important values and as such, are also in danger from the 
atavistic market values. 
43 
Furthermore, when writing from a 
broader perspective, Titmuss revealed that he was not unaware of 
the need to examine, for example, 'industrial citizenship' or the 
role of public schools. 
44 
Thus far, it is cleat that Tawney and Titmuss were remarkably close 
in their approaches and views, though with major differences 
emerging over their view of humanity, and social change. At this 
point we must address Titmuss's view of equality and related 
principles. 
a) Equality and Its Justification 
The principles which Titmuss sees as being behind social growth 
194. 
are 'equality, freedom and social integration.' 
45 
The social change involved was to be expressed in the 
'language of equali ty.' 
46 
Such equality, is, for Titmuss, 
as with Tawney, person centred and rooted in the belief in the 
equal value and uniqueness of all persons. Thus, for instance, 
in talking of the caring professions, Titmuss warns of the 
dangers of scientism, 
'which may diminish the value and uniqueness of the individual 
human being.' 47 
Titmuss does not provide any deontological or ontological 
justification for this equality of respect, but does ground it 
in the concept of agape. Equality for Titmuss, then becomes a 
relational concept and is justified as being necessary for 
self -realization. Titmuss can thus write of discovering 
equality 'in our neighbours' , and he quotes with approval, 
Daniel Jenkins: 
'The discovery of equality might be defined as the discovery 
that we have indeed to love our neighbours as ourselves.' 48 
Titmuss' s justification of equality therefore emphasizes far 
more the consequential arguments, both for the individual and 
for society. Like Tawney, he argues that equaliziñg measures 
are instrumental in leading to greater individual freedom and 
social integration. Indeed, 
'history suggests that human nature is not strong enough to 
maintain itself in true community where great disparities of 
income and wealth preside.' 50 
Like Tawney, Titmuss does not see equality of condition as 
absolute. Indeed, because he argues for need as the relevant 
reason for receipt of services, he is necessarily a relative 
51 egali tarian. Precisely because of Titmuss' s narrower 
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perspective his view of equality does not have to come to 
terms with the problems of distribution of income, and thus, he 
has no concept such as Tawney' s function. 52 However, like 
Tawney, he recognizes that equalizing measures are, of 
themselves necessary, but not sufficient for the social and 
value change at which he aims. 
53 
In addition to these arguments, Titmuss has two justifications 
which differ from Tawney. The first is the argument that the 
provision of universal social services is necessary to avoid 
stigma. For Tawney, universal provision was certainly part 
of working through equality of respect, and like Titmuss, he 
did not believe in 'ambulance work' or 'charity' in the social 
services. However, Titmuss gave greater emphasis to the effect 
that means testing would have on the dignity of the individual, 
and lead to further perceived divisions. 
54 
The second 
argument might lead to the term compensatory equality. In 
a rapidly changing society where individuals suffer dis- 
welfares, such as unemployment, and where the train of cause 
and effect is often so complex that the responsibility for 
the dis-welfare is not clear, the state must compensate the 
individual. 
55 
This is the closest that Titmuss gets to 
56 
allowing a critericnof desert into his egalitarian distribution. 
It is these arguments which take the place of the deontological 
arguments in Tawney, as shall be noted below. 
57 
Having examined the background to Titmuss' s egalitarian views 
and how equality arises from that and is justified, I will now 
examine in more detail the aims of Ti tmuss' s equality, social 
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integration and freed -m, and the strategy of distribution. 
b) Social Integration 
Ti tmuss specifically refers to the sense of communi ty which an 
egalitarian social policy should facilitate as ' fellowship', 
which, 
' Tawney conceived of as a matter of right relationships 
which are institutionally based.' 58 
In effect, Ti muss argues that fellowship, in the sense of 
recogni zing responsibili ties within society, is necessary to 
real commun ty. This shared recogni tion, arising from a 
shared morality and awareness of purpose, provides the 
necessary meaning for cohesiveness in society. In Tanganyika, 
he warned of the dangers of the breakdown of local commun ties, 
and the substitution of amorphous groups, 
' where members admit responsibility to no one.' 59 
In contrast to this, Britain in the Second World War, 
exhibited the kind of cohesion and integration which Ti tmuss 
searched for. 60 Tawney' s own concern wi th conserving ' human 
associations' and his own use of the example of the Second 
World War, led him to wri to approvingly of Ti tmuss' s work: 
The book of Dr. Ti tmuss on the social consequences of the war 
is no t wi thout lessons for peace.' 61 
Behind this is a sociology very close to Tawney' s which asserts 
that institutional arrangements and their guiding purposes 
do actually affect the development of individuals and their 
62 This causal relationship is central 
to Ti tmuss' s book ' The Gift Relationship' where he argues 
that the use of market principles in blood donarship would 
lead to a diminution of altruism and thus of community: 
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'One of the functions of the atavistic private market system is 
to ' free' men from any sense of obligation to, or for, other 
men regardless of the consequences to others who cannot 
reciprocate, and to release some men(who are eligible to give) 
from a sense of inclusion in society at a cost of excluding 
other men(who are not eligible to give).' 63 
Not only can community be affected in this way, but also the 
very basis of any moral relationship, truth. Thus, a donor 
in the market system could be strongly tempted not to reveal 
problematic details of his or her medical history, precisely 
because the first motive would be to gain money and not to 
affirm 'a sense of belonging,' 
64 
Tawney writes in a similar 
vein of personal morality being affected. 65 However, 
Tawney' s connection is more direct. On the one hand, it is 
poverty which can produce a moral breakdown, on the other, it 
is privileges which may lead to 'wickedness.' b6 One aspect 
of this will be examined under Titmuss's concept of freedom. 
At this point it may be noted that the different focus that 
the two wri ters have, concerning moral breakdown, points to 
another important difference between them, one often seen more 
in terms of a development than a difference. 
To see this clearly it is necessary to examine firstly, what 
Titmuss sees as the altruistic 'bonds' of community. These 
are 'ultra-obligations' (a term originally use by G.P. Grice)67 
and the following must be noted about them: 
a) Ultra -obligations cannot be viewed as purely altruistic. 
Ti tmuss accepts that giving to others or for others, is 
not devoid of community pressure of self- interest. 68 
b) An ultra -obligation does not involve a strict duty. Thus, 
if the individual has not fulfilled the obligation, there 
is no question of censure. There is, 
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no remorse, shame or guilt attached to the failure to 
give blood.' 69 
c) Nonetheless, the individual who give blood does clearly 
see some obligation they wish to fulfill. This is 
supported by Ti tmuss' s empirical evidence in the appendix 
where three times more people gave blood for altruistic 
or obligatory reasons than those who saw it as a reciprocal 
activity. 
d) Given the above two points, the receipt of any gift can 
have not strict right to the fulfillmnet of such an 
ultra- obligation. To do so would assume some form of 
contract, legal or moral, whereas ultra -obligations 
'derive from our own characters and are not contractual 
in nature.' 70 
e) Ultra- obligations involve recognition of and response to 
need. 
71 
f) Titmuss specifically sets ultra -obligations outside the 
realm of 
'reciprocal rights and obligations of family and kinship 
in modern society.' 72 
Focusing on social policy, Ti tmuss is concerned 'with 
stranger' relationships, with processes, institutions and 
structures which encourage or discourage the intensity and 
extensiveness of anonymous helpfulness in society.' 73 
Anonymity is crucially important for Ti tmuss in the gift 
relationship because the care offered by the social 
services is precisely not dependent upon ' personal bonds' 
but upon need. 
74 
Thus, the individual, in giving 
anonymously can show no discrimination, and in so doing, 
identi fies his or herself wi th the values of the service. 
7f 
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Against this view of ultra -obligations, Tawney is quite 
distinctive. Firstly, the concept of altruism is rarely 
mentioned in Tawney' s writings. In the 'Commonplace Book' , he 
connects altruism firmly to belief in God 76 and also sees it 
as part of self- interest properly understood. 
77 
However, 
Tawney' s view of man' s sinful nature precludes any simple 
78 
Indeed Tawney' s appeal to, or reliance upon altruism. ,  y 
stress on the need to develop moral codes and the dispersion 
of power, demonstrates the need to develop accountability 
and curb exclusive self- interest. 
79 
Secondly, Tawney does not have any concept such as ultra- 
obligation. He certainly argues for the collective provision 
of the basic services. 
80 
Also, he refers to the basic moral 
stance of equality of respect - the obligation owed to man 
qua man, 81 and it may be thought that this basic Kantian 
respect is precisely what Titmuss develops into the concept 
of ultra -obligations. However, equality of respect sets up 
a framework of obligations which, in Tawney' s view cannot be 
avoided. 82 Equal value sets up an initial obligation to 
respect others, though, of course, the means of fulfilling this 
are not precisely stated. Nonetheless, such an obligation is 
not one that can be wi thdrawn from, like ul tra-obliga tions. 
Moreover, this equality of respect is connected to, indeed 
informs, relationships which involve a clear sense of duty. 
Such relationships involve duties to family, community and 
fellow members of industry, and thus involve kinship and a 
implici t 
form of contract. 
83 
For Tawney, universal provision of 
services was precisely to enable individuals to fulfill such 
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duties. 84 Obligations then, for Tawney are tied to relation- 
ships in context, and it is precisely these that give shared 
moral meaning, along with equali ty of respect. 85 Ti tmuss' s 
'ultra -obligations' however, are separated from relationships 
and derived ' from our own characters.' It is hard to see how 
these could form the 'bonds of community', without community 
context, and without clear expectations about duties and 
expectations of their fulfillment. 86 For Tawney then, the 
basis of social integration or fellowship is far more complex 
and realistic, building upon a network of existlánt relationships. 
In his search to isolate altruism, Titmuss ironically turned 
1 it into an anaemic concept which in the end could not provide 
the basis for any welfare system. Ultra -obligations lack the 
necessary commitment and framework of rights which are 
necessary to any such system. 87 Tawney, on the other hand, 
argues for specific rights which require fulfillment. 88 
Ultra -obligations as deriving from 'our characters' do, of 
course, reflect Titmuss's over -optimistic view of human nature, 
and this will be considered further below. His difficulties 
with the concept are also seen in the use of blood- donorship 
as the major example. Ti tmuss himself finds i t hard to 
generalize from this, offering only fostering and the use of 
patients in teaching situations as other examples. 89 Even these 
examples do not fit easily or necessarily into the gift 
relationship model. It is not, for instance, clear that the 
patient's participation in teaching situations can always be 
described as voluntary. Much again, depends upon the relation- 
ship between doctor and patient and how it is interpreted. 
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c) Freedom 
Titmuss, like Tawney, had a strong sense of positive freedom. 
The individual required freedom in order to exercise crucial 
elements of the personality and so to grow. The essential 
elements in this freedom for Titmuss, were freedom to choose 
and freedom to give. Freedom to choose involved to some 
degree control of the individual's situation , though, as shall 
be seen below, in an examination of participatory equality, 
this was not stressed as much as Tawney did. Like Tawney, with 
his concept of freedom to serve, Titmuss' s freedom to give 
directly linked freedom to fellowship. Being free to give, is 
being free to affirm the individual' s sense of belonging and of 
' identi ty, participation and commun ty.' 90 
The basis of this freedom is twofold. Firstly, as with Tawney, 
Titmuss argues that the self is only truly realized through 
giving, noting of the blood donors that to 
love themselves they recognized the need to love strangers.' 
91 
Secondly, and arising from this, Titmuss argues for the human 
need to give, both biological and social, and thus for the 
importance of discovering means for expressing this need. 
92 
However, whilst Tawney tied the freedom to serve explicitly 
in to the individual situation and his or her moral relation- 
ships, Titmuss sees the gift relationship primarily in terms 
of strangers. 
93 
The fact that this is then viewed as a basic 
human right has important consequences, for Ti tmuss argues 
that any system which denies this right is necessarily 
coercive. This forms the second part of Ti tmuss' s argument 
against market forces in the social services and his case 
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contains several elements: - 
a) Having established in his own mind, the need to give and 
the importance of freedom to do so, Titmuss bluntly argues 
that 'compulsion, coercion, bribery and payment' will 
involve a denial of the freedom to give or not to give. 
94 
Thus he argues that market conditions of themselves 
involve coercion. In contrast to this, Tawney sees 
coercion of market forces as that which denies the power of 
the individual in his or her situation. 
95 
b) Application of the market principle would also lead to a 
diminution of choice for those who had not sufficient 
resources to make a choice, ' the young, the old, the 
excluded.' 
96 
Titmuss ' s evidence for this is taken from 
the United States where this is not simply a matter of the 
individual having to pay for health care, but of bearing the 
extra costs caused by a market system which is inherently 
inefficient and costly (as witnessed by the increase in 
defensive medicine). 
97 
c) The freedom of the professional to make judgements about the 
acceptability of available resources could also be curtailed 
by the use of the market system in the National Health 
Service. Such judgements could, for example, be challenged 
as restraint of trade. 98 
Titmuss, then, whilst emphasizing the freedom of the donor, also 
emphasizes that of the recipient and the professional in this 
gift relationship. The effect of this coercion is not only to 
deny freedom, but also to risk the necessary bond of truth 
99 
(as noted above) and even life itself. At its base, the 
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effect of the assertion of the individual right, is to 
separate the individuals 
freedom from other peoples freedom.' 
100 
By ignoring others rights, then the whole sense of community is 
destroyed. 
101 
As has been noted, Titmuss' s concept of freedom to give is very 
similar to Tawney' s freedom to serve. 
102 
However, Ti tmuss' s 
freedom depends greatly upon the acceptance of the existence of 
103 
Once giving is accepted as a a 'biological need to' give. '  
need, then, it is argued, the means of expression should be 
provided. The problem is that it is not clear what is meant by 
a biological or social need to give. Most of Titmuss's 
examples of giving are taken from writers such as Mauss, 
Levi- Strauss or Homans, 
104 
and refer to very different 
cultures. In any case, what Titmuss refers to is less a 
biological need to give and more the product of social condition- 
ing. Thus he can refer to 
the immense pervasiveness of the social obligation' , and 
the strength of the supporting sanctions; dishonour, shame 
and gui 1 t.' 105 
In addition, Titmuss does not provide convincing empirical 
evidence for the need to give. This is restricted to an 
analysis of blood donor motives, 
106 
which does not attempt 
107 
even to specify what is meant by altruism. It is, in fact, 
hard to determine what would constitute evidence for a need 
to give, or for that matter what would differentiate that from 




Tawney' s justification of the freedom to serve is more 
convincing because he views service as a means to psychological 
and spiritual fulfillment on the one hand, and on the other, 
locates service in the total web of moral relationships and 
their demands upon the individual. 109 
In all this, Titmuss moves from a perceived basic need to an 
argument based upon natural rights. As noted above, the notion 
of a natural right is, in itself, difficult. 
110 However, 
even if this could be overcome, Titmuss then finds himself 
arguing for a position using the same method as his opponents - 
111 
they asserting the right of the individual to sell, or to give. 
Tawney avoids the possibility of a simple counter- assertion of 
rights by basing his argument partially upon obligation. 
112 
He also leaves a greater room for choosing precisely how the 
individual might fulfill his or her obligations. 
113 For 
Ti tmuss, ironically, i t may be argued that choice is actually 
diminished. One may give or not give, but the gift must be 
anonymous if the bonds of community are to be maintained. 
114 
From the above argument, it is not clear that Titmuss's right 
to give is a real development of Tawney' s freedom to serve. 
At first sight, it appears to be a development.of Tawney' s 
concept in the context of obligation to the community as 
expressed in the National Health Service. However, the idea has 
been seen to rest on quite different grounds in Tawney, and to 
have application on a far wider scale. 
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Participatory Equality 
As noted above, participatory equality was an essential element in 
Tawney' s views. In one sense, this was his version of equality of 
opportunity, for, along with other measures this was to give 
greater power to the individual in the organization and control of 
his or her life. His concern for this equality was seen in 
industry, education and political democracy itself. 
One view of Titmuss, is that he was less concerned with partici- 
patory equality and democracy. Reisman, for example, writes that 
Titmuss thought the 'active component in democracy' less important 
than Tawney. 
115 However, participatory equality did play an 
important part in Titmuss' s thought. Firstly, the very concept of 
the gift relationship was aimed at allowing the individual to 
participate more fully in the work of the National Health Service. 
Thus, he refers to the importance of 
'processes, transactions and institutions which promote an 
116 
individual' s sense of identity, participation and community.' 
Secondly, Titmuss was very aware of the importance of the sense 
of control in individual or political situations. This related 
directly to the need for clearly set out ideologies which would 
enable real choice to take place. :'ithoutthis, 
'political democracy becomes a device for choosing between different 
leaders but not between different social objectives.' 117 
ldí thou t that choice, the 
' notion of purposive control over man' s secular affairs' 
would be diminished. 118 Thirdly, Titmuss was concerned for the 
consumer's voice to be heard, for instance in the National Health 
Service. Indeed, he took the view that the articulate middle - 
class had been instrumental - 
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'in a general rise in standards of service particularly in 
hospi tal care. 119 
Thus, in recommmendations to Tanganyika, he is able to recommend 
that Area Hospital Advisory Committees provide, 
local democratic representatives with opportuni ties to partici- 
pate in the responsibilities of hospital management.' 120 
In some respects, Titmuss once more may be viewed as a developer 
of ideas or at least as applying ideas to different contexts. 
Thus Titmuss takes participation into the realm of the National 
Health Service at several levels, 
121 
something that Tawney never 
clearly did. 
However, even here, differences emerge. Firstly, Titmuss stresses 
participation in decision making more in terms of maintaining 
standards than in respecting the autonomy of the consumer, 
122 
or providing opportunities for growth or control in the individual' s 
life. 
123 
Tawney was not simply concerned with standards but the 
right of individuals, 
to be consulted in regard to their occupation' , or situation. 
124 
Secondly, Ti tmuss did not share Tawney' s belief in the ordinary 
man' s need or desire to spend several hours per week participating 
ublic or shared issues. 
125 
in Ti tmuss wrote of Tawney, that his 
love for working -class commonsense has sometimes seemed to approach 
naivté.' 126 
In addition, Titmuss' s civil-service background made him question 
the effectiveness of participation of individuals on consumer or 
planning groups. 
'Most lay members,' Titmuss wrote, 'newly appointed are useless 
during the first year of office,' 127 
hence the need for a prolonged period of learning. This is perhaps 
one reason why even when Titmuss does recommend participation in 
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decision making he does not enthusiastically espouse the idea of 
experimenting in participatory equality. 128 Thirdly, as was noted 
above, Titmuss does not extend his participatory ideas to the 
economic sphere, whereas Tawney was concerned to establish industrial 
democracy and consumer councils. 
129 
It was noted above, that 
Titmuss concentrated upon the narrower field of social policy, 
though he was aware of the broader relationship between the services 
and the values of society. 130 However, this does not entirely 
account for the lack of reference to participatory equality 
outside the social services. In fact, Titmuss did actually 
divide the realms of social policy and the economic world quite 
clearly. Thus he argues for the 
fundamental distinguishing marks of social policy' which , because 
it has to continually ask the question 'who is my stranger', must 
'inevitably be concerned with the unquantifiable and unmethodical 
aspects of man as well as with those aspects which can be identified 
and counted.' 131 
Implicit in this is the notion that the economic /industrial field 
is not a focus for participatory equality. For Tawney, quite the 
opposite was the case. The heart of economic matters involved 
moral relationships. 
132 
In turn this meant that 
' either democracy will extend its authority from the political 
to the economic, and be established more firmly because on broader 
foundations; or it will cease to exist, save in form, as a 
political institution. 133 
Ironically, whilst Tawney did not advocate consumer groups and the 
like in the welfare services, this difference is very apparent in 
the approach of the two to education. For both, education was about 
making individuals 
'more capable of freedom and more capable of fulfilling their 
personal differences.' 134 
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However, for Tawney, this very process involved not just equality 
of provision, but greater participation from the students in 
taking responsibility for the learning. 
135 
It was precisely in 
such a context that initiative and autonomy could develop alongside 
the awareness of social responsibilities. 
136 
Tawney' s holistic view of participatory equality rests firmly on 
his Christian foundations, and in particular, the Incarnation. 
137 
Christ's concern was for all humanity and excluded no area of that 
world. Some Christians may limit their liabilities but , 
the devil does not. They may throw him the world of politics 
and business to devour at his leisure, in the hope that, while 
gnawing them, he will leave such minor morsals as private lives 
alone. He is not unfortunately, so easily appeased, nor can 
human affairs be thus departmentalized.' 138 
Tawney then, with his emphasis upon the global relevance of 
participatory equali ty and with a view of the individual as a 
partner in progress, 139 reveals a view of participatory equality 
quite distinct from that of Titmuss, who overall limits the 
application of this equality. 
Two additional points may be noted here. Firstly, if Titmuss 
really did see the gift -relationship with its ultra- obligations as 
involving increased participation by insisting upon the anonymity 
of giving, he actually excludes many different ways in which 
individuals can voluntarily participate and contribute to the 
sense of community. 
140 
Secondly, having argued for the non- 
contractual right to give, Titmuss's view of participatory equality 
really takes on a form of equality of opportunity le. equality 
141 
of opportuni ty to give. 
209. 
Equality of Distribution 
Like Tawney, Ti tmuss was a relative egalitarian, setting himself 
against 
' great disparities of income and wealth.' 
142 
Thus Titmuss did not argue against inequality as such, but rather 
inequality which led to a division in community and which denied 
freedom Neither writer, argues Reisman, was very clear about 
precisely how much planned re- distribution of life chances and 
incomes is required to ensure social integration.' 143 
While such a comment may be true, it is hardly justified as a 
criticism of the two thinkers. Neither of them saw re- distribution 
of life chances as sufficient of itself to ensure social inte- 
gra tion. 
144 
Both concentrated more on the distribution of life 
chances than on the re- distribution of income per se. In this 
situation, the provision of basic services has clear relevance to 
the freedom of the individual. In this respect both saw the 
welfare services as an important means of re- distribution. 
145 
However, even in respect of the distribution of life chances, both 
accepted the need to review the effects of any planned re- distribut- 
ion in order to respond to the new challenges or any problems in 
application. 
146 
With Tawney' s concern for the industrial world as much for the 
welfare services, his criteria for distribution were two; need and 
function. 147 Ti tmuss had no references to function, relying on 
need as the major cri terion. Nonetheless, as noted above, this was 
supplemented by the argument from dis- welfare ie. that the effects 
of technological progress were to produce dis- welfare such as 
unemployment. Such di s -wel fares tended to occur to the least 
advantaged in society and responsibility was often very hard to 
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assess or even discover. Thus it was necessarily the 'handmaiden' 
role of the government to provide compensation. 
148 
However, far stronger than the idea of compensatory equali ty in 
Titmuss, is that of equality of access, which he emphasizes much 
more than Tawney. Whilst Tawney in general, accepted that the 
universal welfare services would provide an acceptable level of 
service for all, 
149 
Titmuss produced more detailed investigation 
of uptake to discover inequalities within welfare. 150 Titmuss 
divides the unequal distribution into three areas, fiscal welfare, 
social welfare and occupational welfare: 
a) Fiscal welfare refers to the tax benefits gained by the rich 
such as tax allowances or covenants. 
151 
b) In the social welfare field, Titmuss notes for example, the 
dramatic higher take up of university places by children of 
g 
152 
higher income families. This, in itself, affects inequality 
of income at a later stage. Equally in the 'rational Health 
Service, figures revealed that it was middle and higher class 
families who were best able to take advantage of the services 
provided. 
153 
c) Occupational welfare refers to the benefits enjoyed by the 
higher income groups, related to occupation. These range from 
assistance with school fees to company cars. 
154 
Thus T_tnuss argued that not only were the practices in these 
various areas preventing greater equali ty, they were in fact, 
simultaneously enlarging and consolidating the areas of social 
ine 7::a1í tv.' 155 
The social division of welfare was thus a complex phenomenon, one 
which involved many of the elements which Tawney had noted in his 
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interactionist analysis of society. 
156 
Not only are there 
striking differences, both in quantity and quality, between, for 
example, occupational and social welfare, but such inequalities 
tend to be legitimized by those in power. This legitimization 
involves making judgements on the inadequacy of those who depend 
upon the social welfare, which will, in turn, affect the self- 
image of those who are in receipt of social welfare. 
157 
Giventhis 
' something akin to a stereotype or image of an all -pervasive 
Welfare State for the Working Classes.... may, paradoxically, 
widen rather than narrow class relationships.' 158 
In analysing the social division of welfare, Titmuss sees this as 
part of the 'irresponsible society' in which 
the play of powerful economic and political forces, the strength 
and tenacity of privilege' 
lay behind the 'new division of equity.' 160 
Ti muss was thus very aware of the control which power structures 
had over the systems of welfare from large economic forces, to 
the professional in the Health Services. 
161 
His -work in the social 
division of welfare is far more detailed than Tawney' s analysis of 
inequalities, and in Sinfield's view justifies his reputation as 
'a seminal thinker in social policy.' 162 
The result of highlighting such inequities is that Titmuss moves 
more into ' bloc' and even ' lot' regarding egalitarian measures. 
16 
Thus, Titmuss, seeing the failure of straightforward universalist 
provision, argued for more targeting of groups as a means of 
achieving equality. 
164 Hence, his definition of social growth can 
have quantifiable social indicators le. the proportionately greater 
amount spent upon the socially disadvantaged. 
165 
In all this, Titmuss, like Tawney, urged that disadvantage be 
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attacked from several angles, noting how, for example, disadvantage 
in environment was connected to disadvantage in education. 
166 
Also, he was determined to achieve this without the stigma involved 
in means testing. Titmuss' s recommendations may be noted in the 
following areas: - 
a) In tax and contributions, he argued for a reduction in tax 
allowances for children and old people in order to prevent 
' excessive benefits being paid to those who do not really need 
them.' 167 
He also argued for higher contributions from the wealthy for 
health and education. 
b) In education, Titmuss accepted the concept of educational 
priority areas and advocated social planning as part of 
university admissions. 168 He argued for the need to develop 
systems of quotas designed to widen higher educational 
opportunities. 
169 
A further proposal was to attract more 
working class children by offering more ' specialized, vocational 
career courses.' 
170 
c) Titmuss was aware of the importance of relationships in the 
re- distribution. The professions, in this context 
'are increasingly becoming the arbiters of our welfare fate; 
171 
they are the key -holders to equality of outcome; they help 
to determine the pattern of re- distribution in social policy.' 
Titmuss thus advocated education which would enable the 
professions not to be blinkered by class interest or special- 
ization but to respond to the needs of their clients or 
pa tients. 
172 
d) In the field of social security, Titmuss advocated that full 
pensions be paid within twenty years rather than forty seven. 
This involved subsidising all workers over the age of forty, 
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and was particularly relevant to married women re- entering 
the labour market. 
173 
Pensions were to be adequate enough 
to guarantee a reasonable standard of living to those not on 
occupational welfare, and contributions were to be earnings 
rela ted. 
174 
Several points must be noted about Titmuss' s measures. Firstly, 
in stressing access, Titmuss tends to concentrate more upon 
distributional equality. Secondly, as Reisman no tes, Titmuss' s 
egalitarian proposals do not go far compared to Tawney' s. 
175 
There are several possible reasons behind this. Reisman suggests 
that Titmuss was simply more cautious than Tawney. 
176 
Aware of 
the need for broader reform, he only occasionally proposes elements 
of it such as the suppression of public schools. 
177 
Alternatively, 
it may be argued that Titmuss himself was blinkered and given his 
division between economic and social policy, that he was unsure how 
to extend equality beyond the welfare services. Titmuss, of 
course, may simply have wanted to concentrate upon a different 
aspect of equality from Tawney' s . 'Whatever the reason, there is 
a significant difference. The difference is not simply in the 
extent to which the two writers articulate egalitarian programmes, 
as Reisman would suggest, but in the absence in Titmuss of any real 
policy for the distribution of power. As noted above, this is 
central to Tawney' s equality, ranging from the power of ideas, 
to the power of the individual to control his or her situation, to 
the power of the community, consumer, or producer to curb the 
irresponsible use of power. From Titmuss, then, there is no 
reference to details for nationalization, industrial 
democracy, planning etc., something all the more remarkable when 
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he identified the effect of powerful groups on the welfare 
services, highlighting irresponsible use of power. 
This section then must come to some significant and perhaps 
surprising conclusions. There is little doubt that Titmuss was the 
spiri tual heir' of Tawney. 
178 However, in terms of equality 
there are significant differences. Both acknowledge some basis of 
equal worth, though with Titmuss at times more explicit about the 
179 Both see the aims of fellowship base to this. p and 
freedom as arising from this with equality of distribution as 
necessary but not sufficient means of achieving these aims. Their 
perception, however, of freedom and fellowship differs, with Tawney 
stressing both a moral framework in fellowship, one requiring 
that principles be stressed and duties addressed, and a broader 
view of liberty to serve, along with freedom to control ones 
situation. Despi te a stress on agape, Titmuss's justification of 
equality is more consequential than Tawney's, and is also based 
upon a concept of rights which itself is based upon a social 
anthropology quite distinct from Tourney' moral psychology. 
180 
w 
Tawney's Christian deontological base and his view of sinful human 
nature leads him to stress responsibilities and duties rather than 
rights, and the need to help individuals develop in the light of 
these responsibilities. For Titmuss, a more optimistic view of 
human nature sees no need for such 'intervention'. The consequence 
of all this is that Tawney stresses participatory equality far 
more than Titmuss, and the need to disperse power both to give the 
individual control and to provide safeguards against irresponsible 
use of power. Tawney's perfectionism and his awareness of man' s 
215. 
sinful nature provide a far more compelling link between distrib- 
utional and participatory equality. 
Both wri ters acknowledge the importance of distributional equality, 
but Titmuss genuinely develops Tawney' s rather simple view of re- 
distribution, based upon a more accute analysis of inequalities in 
society. In all this, it is clear that Tawney' s perfectionism 
and grounds for equality does lead to a very different approach 
to equality in practice, both in the extent of equalizing measures 
(ie. beyond the social services) and in the kinds of equality, 
with a broad view of participatory equality as essential in the 
development of a welfare society. 
A final note must be made of Reisman's tentative criticism of 
Ti tmuss over against Tawney. Unlike Tawney, argues Reisman, 
Titmuss can be accused 
'of designing a welfare society which might possibly succeed in 
ensuring equality of opportunity but which could not adequately 
guarentee lifetime equality of relationship.' 181 
This comment seems unfair since it is not at all clear that 
Titmuss intended to 'design' a welfare society as such. Moreover, 
he clearly was concerned with relational equality as his references 
to agape, his work on the gift relationship and the postscript to 
' Social Policy' demonstrate. 
182 
Moreover, the approach outlined 
in the' Gift Relationship' was precisely to ensure that choices 
which confirmed a particular form of relational equality could be 
made. The crucial difference is rather in terms of the projected 
programmes, the underlying moral emphasis in Tawney upon relational 
obligations, and the broader perspective of Tawney which takes in 
participatory and distributional equality and dispersion of power. 
216. 
Peter Townsend 
A second wri ter thought to be influenced by Tawney' s view of 
equality is Peter Townsend. 183 However, as with Titmuss, whilst 
the writings of Townsend and Tawney are similar in many ways, their 
views about equality are distinctively different. 
Like Tawney and Titmuss, Townsend is unhappy with confining academic 
disciplines to a narrow focus and in particular argues against the 
concept of a value -free sociology. 184 In this respect he views 
himself as something of a moralist. He criticizes the Labour 
government for not exerting moral authority 185 and asserts that 
'what counts in the end is the morality of government.' 186 
The sociologist is thus perceived as servant of society, 
' but also....its judge.' 187 
The sociologist's task with respect to social policy is seen as 
analysing political pronouncements and policies to discover the 
aims and objectives held explicitly or implicitly, and how they 
are carried through in actual decisions. He quotes Titmuss 
approvingly to the effect that social services should take their 
stand on aims not methods. 188 He also refers to Tawney' s comments 
on the failings of the English and their unwillingness 
' to test the quality of that activity by reference to principle.' 189 
In the light of this, Townsend frequently attacks individualist 
philosophy, especially if applied to the welfare state. 190 
However, like Tawney his view of social policy is not restricted to 
the welfare state. Thus Townsend asserts that the aim of social 
democracy is to 
' enlarge the individual's freedom of choice.' 191 
He continues, 
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'In social policy it can be achieved only bef devising principles 
which apply to all institutionalized method's of meeting need - 
to industrial, voluntary and private associations as well as 
central, regional and local government services - and therefore 
to all members of society.' 192 
At the base of this is a view of equal worth which Townsend never 
really begins to articulate. He stresses the dignity of man, and 
an equality of respect which like Tawney, emphasizes relationships, 
where 
' everything turns on the way people behave to each other.' 
193 
He does not attempt to justify this equal worth per se and certainly 
draws no Christian link, though nonetheless acknowledging that such 
a tti tudes 
'are generally recognized as Christian virtues.' 
194 
Thus, much of Townsend' s justification for equality relies either 
on a principle of distributive justice for all (where validity is 
simply assumed) or on consequential arguments stressing the 
effectiveness of equalizing measures in achieving social cohesion 
or productivity. 
195 
Thus, for Townsend the consistent emphasis is less on equal worth 
and more on distribution and the effects in terms of fellowship or 
freedom. Freedom in particular is seen as the major aim of social 
democracy. 
196 
Such freedom is defined by Townsend as freedom of 
choice, the individual' s 
freedom to choose what kind of life he shall lead.' 
197 
It is thus, not simply a matter of enlarging the choice of available 
resources, but enabling the individual to pursue the aims they have 
in life. Thus, like Tawney, the emphasis is upon the individual's 
control over his or her life. 198 Also, like Tawney, Townsend 
sees equality as instrumental in achieving this major aim, so that 
218. 
to pursue individual freedom is to pursue equality.' 
199 
Townsend, however, has nothing of the concept of freedom to serve 
or of the individual being enabled by equal distribution to do his 
or her duty as perceived, either to state or to smaller groups. 
200 
Also, like Titmuss, Townsend has an optimistic view of human nature, 
which does not take into account man' s sinful nature. 201 Thus, 
for Townsend there is no hint of moralising or attempting to point 
to choice in moral relationships. 202 Equally, there is no sense 
in which Townsend feels obliged to 'persuade' people to be free. 
203 
Thus, Townsend tends to emphasize a rights -based philosophy. The 
social services aim, for instance, is 
to protect and substantiate individual rights' leading to an 
204 
the growth of rights would be a extension of rights.' With  
corresponding growth in responsibilities. These, however, are with 
reference to the local community and there is no consideration of 
what they might broadly involve or how they might be learned. 
This same line moves into Townsend' s view of fellowship. Like 
Titmuss, he is concerned that the social services should further 
g 
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social irate ra tion. Indeed, services based upon rights and 
accessible to all would be more likely to lead to integration of 
minority groups. 206 Community integration is listed by Townsend 
as one of the four objectives of the 'New Social Services.' 
207 
Once again, however, this does not examine the duties or 
responsibili ties of members of the communi ty. This aim of integra- 
tion involves three aspects: - 
a) care for individuals in the community 
b) improvement of the quality of family and community life. Here 
Townsend is not specific, merely noting that a 
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'deliberate reduction in `_nequalities of resources and of 
social isolation' 
would result in such improved quality. 
c) the promotion of citizen's rights and 
'of certain kinds of group activities.' 208 
The latter certainly involves some sense, albeit implicit, in 
which individuals or groups can develop social responsibility 
by linking in to local democracy. 209 However, unlike Tawney 
he gives no consideration of the common purpose necessary 
for communi ty, or of the individual' s obligation to the 
community, quite apart from obligations to self, family or 
industry. 
Thus, unlike Tawney, Townsend spends no time on the question of 
moral consensus, shared moral meaning, or even an underlying moral 
psychology. He is certainly aware of the effects of poverty and 
of the interaction between the social organization of power and 
those in poverty. 
210 However, he sees none of this in terms of 
spiritual or moral effects. In all of this, Townsend has failed to 
work through the moral base of his egalitarian stance. This is 
demonstrated specifically in his definition of poverty as 
' the lack of resources necessary to permit participation in the 
activities, customs and diets commonly approved by society.' 211 
Such a definition is open to the charge of moral relativism, with 
mores dependent upon general approval and none of the perfectionism 
of Tawney. 212 From such an ambiguous moral base, the tendency 
is to move from person -regarding equality to lot- regarding equality, 
and from an emphasis upon service to one of rights. This necessarily 
affects distributional and participatory equality. 
220. 
Townsend notes three possible principles underlying any approach 
to poverty; conditional welfare for the few, minimum rights for 
the many, 
213 
and distributional justice for all. It is the last 
of these which he argues strongly for. About this principle, 
three things may be said: 
a) Despite the references to relational equality above, distribu- 
tional justice tends to dominate Townsend' s approach. 
b) The principle is global in domain and thus refers to universal 
service, individuals receiving benefits purely in terms of 
need. 
214 
In all this he argues strongly against any form of 
selectivity with its resultant stigma. 
215 
c) Equal distribution does not simply involve distribution of 
resources but enlarging access to income and systems or 
structures of resources. 
216 
For Tawney, the criteria for distribution are need and function, 
the latter recognizing the centrality of common purpose. For 
Townsend the only acceptable criterion of distribution is need. 
217 
Two points may be noted here. 
a) Townsend views inequality of treatment as morally wrong. Thus, 
he argues strongly against selectivity as both diminishing the 
218 
poor, and strengthening the concept of a hierarchical society. 
b) Townsend argues strongly against a national minimum. Such a 
minimum may well in fact lead to greater inequalities, as those 
above the minimum achieve greater wealth. 
219 
In this respect, 
real distributional justice must take into account occupational 
and fiscal services as well as social services. Like Titmuss, 
Townsend goes beyond Tawney' s distributional equality here. 
220 
In any case, minimum income must not be estimated in isolation 
221. 
or with simple reference to subsistence but rather in relation 
to the individual' s context, 
221 
and in comparison to the 
standards of need fulfillment through society. Thus, Townsend 
can wri te that individuals: 
'have material, psychological and social needs which can only 
be measured or met by comparison with the full range of 
conditions found in society as a whole.' 222 
In this, Townsend advocates a much broader re- distribution than 
Tawney, and one which stresses far more the 'eveness' of distribu- 
tion. Thus he writes that 
'wealth, including land, property and other assets can and must be 
distributed more widely as well as evenly.' 223 
For Townsend this is not something simply to be achieved extending 
public ownership, but also 
' by the enlargement of the direct rights of the individual.' 224 
In housing he advocates, for instance, a common definition of the 
rights 
to succession and adaptation as well as space and ammeni ti es.' 
225 
In terms of income, Townsend looks to tackle, for example, 
equalities suffered by married women by having income paid 
'from a common public source....regulated by common principles.' 
226 
Thus the married woman would be paid for her work. 
Townsend seems to be moving from the person- centred equality of 
y 
227 In fact, Townsend, Tawney to a more lot -centred a roach. 
along with a more detailed examination of existing inequalities, 
is proposing much broader lot- regarding equality in order, as he 
sees i t, to properly fulfill person -regarding equali ty. 
This is a real development upon the straightforward re- distribution 
suggested by Tawney via the convention of social services. 
222. 
However, compared to this concern for and development of 
distributional equality, Townsend shows little interest in parti- 
cipatory equality. He sees this as important, but does not 
advocate any particular ways of extending it. 228 Lack of 
reference to industrial democracy or on educational democracy 
demonstrates this both in and outside Townsend' s major focus of 
the social services. 
229 
Once again this seems to stem from an 
emphasis upon consumer rights in terms of lots rather than upon 
the responsibilities of the citizen. It may also reflect some- 
thing of a Webbian bias towards the rights of the consumer and not 
the producer. 230 Where Townsend does develop the theme of 
participatory equality is in relation to the Seebohm Report's 
recommendation that there be more involvement from individuals in 
communi ties, 
'in determining and meeting their own needs.' 
231 
Significantly, however, when Townsend does refer to equal 
participation, it is with reference to lot -regarding equality, 
ie. equal participation in the resources of the social services. 
Significantly, also, Townsend does not explicitly connect the 
concept of freedom with participatory equality or systematically 
work out the idea of the individual gaining control of their 
situation through such participation. Changes in this area are 
rather seen as instrumental in enabling distributional equality to 
be extended: 
'A transformation of work organization and social relations would 
be required to legitimate such changes and secure public approval 
for them.' 232 
In conclusion then, there are many aspects of Tawney's equality 
found in Townsend. In interview, Townsend himself admits to the 
223. 
influence of Tawney, especially in 'Equality' 
233 
However 
Townsend was not clear as to the specific influence as regards 
the concept of equality, considering it was more the spirit of 
Tawney's writing which affected him. 
234 
Comparison of their 
views confirm that Townsend's view is very different. His 
justification of equality is based primarily on rights, and without 
a Christian moralist base, he tends to emphasize rights and lot - 
regarding equality rather than person- regarding equality, which 
balances rights and responsibilities. As a result, distributional 
equality receives far more emphasis than participatory equality, 
a distributional equality based upon an expanded concept of need 
and without reference to function. 
235 
There is thus in Townsend 
none of Tawney' s perfectionism or reference to duties or the need 
to educate for a balance the and and as 
a result, there is a different view of equality in practice. 
Socialist Stiri ters 
If the egalitarian links in the Tawney, Titmuss, Townsend chain 
are not as secure as some have imagined, the links which form any 
socialist chain of equality might seem even less secure. As some 
commentators suggest, socialism has never really determined how 
p equality is. 
236 
important   In turn, of course, this is not helped 
by the many possible meanings of the term equality, and the 
assumption on some writers part that there is a common meaning. 
Plant, in an important Fabian pamphlet , for instance, spends 
twenty four pages working through egalitarian policies and 
viewpoints, before, in the final page providing a definition, 
237 which itself has space for only a sketchy justification. 
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In the midst of this uncertainty, there .re socialist politicians 
and wri ters who have been associa ted wi th Tawney' s equali ty such 
as Crosland, 238 Hattersley and Crick. Writers such as Crosland 
and Hattersley have a clear view of equality as central to 
socialism. Crosland' s view is similar to Tawney' s in several 
respects. Firstly, he argued for equality as a central principle, 
' the strongest ethical inspiration of virtually every socialist 
doctrine.' 239 
Secondly, Crosland emphasized the importance of democracy and 
participatory equality, and freedom to control the individual' s 
si tua tion. 240 Thirdly, Crosland argued that extremes of inequality 
led to abuse of power, 241 a waste of individual talent, 242 social 
disharmony and a threat to the 'exceedingly important values' 
of democracy and freedom, 243 Fourthly, Crosland did not argue for 
absolute equality in distribution and saw a definite limit to the 
244 degree of equality which was desirable. Finally, Crosland 
states that his ideal is a classless society, echoing Tawney' s 
aim. 245 
However, whilst Crosland shares with Tawney a concern for equality 
based upon its effects upon society and the individual, he does 
not share the same emphasis upon fraternity and ultimately upon 
equality of worth and of relationships. He acknowledges that 
brotherhood is an important socialist aspiration but does not see 
any g 
246 Indeed, Crosland this as a test of  e a 1i tarian measures. 
argues that the concept of brotherhood applied to society is too 
247 
gg simplistic. He su ests that a constant amount of frustration 
or discontent might be endemic in society, and that this will be 
impervious to social reform. 248 Thus, any attempt to foster 
brotherhood must be utopian. Crosland' s target here is the utopian 
225. 
fellowship of such as Robert Owen. 
249 
Tawney on the other hand, 
could argue for fraternity precisely as a realist, noting the 
importance of fraternity to efficiency and health, and ecouraging 
the individual to work through the ' bonds of affection' which can 
be discovered in the moral understanding of man, whilst yet never 
defining fellowship too precisely and thus avoiding any idea of 
forced fellowship. 250 
Crosland and his fellow Fabians recognised the importance of 
equality of respect, noting for instance, that equality of 
opportunity was not sufficient of itself. 
251 
However, as Drucker argues the connection was not followed through 
by Crosland, and equality of income and opportunity became ends in 
themselves. 
'The virtue of equality of income can be seen only when the notion 
is tied to a further notion of the equal dignity of all men - 
and this the revisionists did not think out.' 252 
Precisely because equal worth is not fully explored by Crosland, 
the actual grounds for Crosland; attack upon inequality, sometimes 
begin to resemble the position of the emotivists. 253 He accepts 
that the arguments against inequality are often based upon the 
envious feelings of the disadvantaged. However, such feelings are 
'neither unnatural nor deplorable, but based upon a simple view of 
what is just and fair.' 254 
However, as with the emotivists, Crosland fails to provide explicit 
criteria for what is just and fair. Thus, as Gutmann notes, 
Crosland' s 
'theory served as a solution not for inequality as socialists had 
previously understood i t, but for class resentment.' 255 
The search for criteria of fairness in Crosland is answered in the 
principle of equality of opportunity, which he viewed as widening 
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the competition for different positions. Thus, 
the essential thing is that every citizen should have an equal 
chance' and 
provided the start is fair, let there be maximum scope for 
individual self advancement.' 256 
Crosland was concerned that individual merit should achieve the 
essential positions, yet was equally concerned that every individual 
should have the opportunity and resources to develop capacities.257 
However, whilst some achieve merit, others fail and some experience 
poverty. For Crosland, the latter, was often due to 
'ignorant or imprudent spending of earnings,' 258 a phenomenon 
referred to as secondary poverty. To accept that poverty was not 
always caused by the organization of society raises accute problems 
for any argument for distributional equality based upon need. 
Crosland along with Margaret Cole saw the solution in education. 
Education was not simply the key element in ensuring equality of 
opportunity, it was also necessary as a means of attaining a 
'democratic quality of leadership' , and in democratic values, 
including recognition of the individual's social debt. 
259 However, 
even these democratic values did not fully involve participatory 
equality. In industry, for instance, Crosland totally dismissed 
the relevance and application of this principle. 
Crosland' s view of equality is therefore quite distinct from that 
of Tawney. His concern centres upon equality of opportuni ty 
supported by distributional equality. This has led some commenta- 
tors to characterize his view of society as a meritocracy. 260 
Despi to Field's argument to the contrary, Crosland is concerned 
with freedom and sees equality as a means to this. 261 However, 
such freedom is not in the context of service or fulfillment of 
227. 
duties, and equality of distribution takes on for Crosland, the 
major political aim. With no reference to service, there is no 
part for fellowship in Crosland's equality, and so no emphasis 
upon moral relationships. The overall result is that Crosland' s 
major point of justification is found in the social effects of 
equality and has no reference to equal worth and its implications. 
Indeed, the three basic arguments for equality found in 'The 
Future of Socialism' are relief of primary poverty, reduction of 
class antagonisms and a more equitable distribution of 
262 
This leads to what Hattersley and privileges.' y
refers to, a 
'minimalist argument for equality.' 
Quite apart from these important differences, Crosland gives 
attention to the creation of wealth in a way not found in Tawney.263 
Indeed, he argues that the achievement of greater equality 
' depends heavily on economic growth.' 
264 
Not only would egalitarian measures require this growth, but 
also to propose such measures with zero growth, leading to necessary 
265 sacriices would lead to electoral defeat. Once again, this 
contrasts with Tawney' s concentration upon common purposes and the 
developing of an ethos of service. Moreover, despite Crosland' s 
supposed greater realism he demonstrates an inadequate grasp of 
the policy instruments designed to increase growth. 266 
If Crosland' s is a markedly different view of equality to Tawney' s, 
267 
Hattersley would claim to be very much part of the Tawney tradition. 
Like Tawney, Hattersley emphasizes the importance of a clearly 
stated ideology and with that, a realistic approach to social 
228. 
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Like Tawrey, he cannot accept the doctrine of appli ca tion. y  
equali ty of opportuni ty wi thout distributional equality. 
269 
Also, 
Hattersley constantly returns to the theme that equality and 
liberty are inextricably linked, 
to choose equality is to choose freedom as well.' 270 
This focus on freedom leads Hattersley to criticize the neo- 
liberal view of freedom and in particular, the way in which 
271 
interests affect an understanding of such a concept. Hattersley 
is also aware of the effect of greed from all interest groups on 
any attempt to re- distribute incomes and argues for more planning 
in terms of incomes. 
272 
In stressing freedom as the major outcome of re- distribution, 
Hattersley does not see this as confined to material choice, on the 
contrary, 
'New opportunities would open up before (individuals) - material, 
aesthetic even spiritual.' 273 
However, such freedom to choose is ultimately that of the consumer, 
emphasizing the consumer' s rights. He betrays none of Tawney' s 
concern for the freedom to relate and to fulfill moral obligations. 
Nor does he give any time to the distribution of power necessary 
for some control in industry. Hence, the principle of fraternity 
has no place in Hattersley's view either. 
Hattersley's aim is to regain the ideological initiative from the 
neo- liberals with a coalition of principles ie. freedom and 
equality. The justification for this is largely utilitarian and 
he does not work from any explicit basis of unconditional human 
worth. These basic aims and justification are stated quite 
explicitly early in the book. 
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'A socialist society is judged by the extent it suc "eeds in 
providing for the largest possible number of its citizens, the 
power to exercise rights, which, under other forms of organization, 
are either denied or made available only in theory.' 274 
'It is a commitment to organize society in a way which ensures the 
greatest sum of freedom, the highest total amount of real choice 
and, in consequence the most human happiness.' 275 
Equality may well have consequences for society also in leading to 
more efficient performance not only in industry but also in 
schools. 
276 
However, the purpose and aims of the industry or education are 
never examined by Hattersley, perhaps because in his concern to 
respect the 'new individualism' , he does not wish to give any 
impression of moral coercion. p 
277 
-iha tever the reason, it leads 
to an equality which is person- centred, but not relational - 
concerned for the individual but not for his or her moral context, 
and so duties and responsibilities. 
Finally, note must be taken of a socialist writer whose view of 
equality seems clearly influenced by Tawney, Bernard Crick. Crick 
argues for equality as the only ' specifically socialist' value. 
Liberty and fraternity only ' take on a distinctively socialist form' 
q . 
278 
when related to equality. True equality involves a relative 
equality which removes all unjustifiable inecuali ties. 
279 
Relative equality will be acceptable and accepted if fraternity 
prevails. Fraternity is defined as 'right relationships', which 
develop through shared experiences and it involves 
'support, care, practicality, grace, sensi ti vi ty and sympa thy.' 
284 
281 Freedom is seen in the context of this fraternity, and involves 
the development of equality of participation in particular. 
282 
Equality itself will 
230. 
lead to more co- operation than competition' , and this will 
, 283 
in turn enhance fra terni ty. 
284 
Such fraterni ty involves people working together for common ends.' 
Clearly, Crick picks up several of the important Tawney themes in 
his attempt to place equality in socialism, from the balancing of 
the three major principles, to the need for common purposes and 
participatory equality and the need for gradual attitude change. 
However, as so stated, Crick' s posi tion lacks some crucial 
elements of Tawney' s view. Firstly, he does not examine the 
concept of equality in any depth andin particular, the relation- 
ship between equality of respect and participatory equality. 
Secondly, there is no overtly moral base to his presentation, such 
that either acts as justification for equality, or informs or acts 
as the motivation for fraternity. Nor does he suggest a moral 
or social psychology that would provide the basis for change. 
Precisely because of this, he points to an almost autofratic 
relationship between equality and fra terni ty ie. that wi th 
increased equali ty, then fra terni ty will necessarily increase, 
285 
without any real evidence for i t. Thus, for Crick, the equali ties 
of distribution and participation have little in terms of principles 
or empirical evidence to connect them. 
This raises the important question as to whether to have a similar 
framework to Tawney' s equality is sufficient. How far such a 
framework depends on the undergirding of equality of respect 
and ultimately of Christian doctrine, will be considered in greater 
detail in chapter seven. 
Nany Socialist writers or politicians have claimed to be following 
231. 
or developing Tawney' s view of equality, 236 and some such as 
Crosland and Crick demonstrate important resemblances. However, 
this section has noted that ultimately the views of equality are 
very different, and indeed, are inadequate compared to Tawney' 
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the case of Ti tmuss. In the case of socialist wri ters, ei ther 
politicians or academics, there are a great deal of surface 
resonances wi th Tawney' s equality but ultimately, a reluctance 
to pursue the concept in its complexi ty, or to provide a 
significant moral base for it. Nonetheless, some writers have 
referred directly to Tawney' s influence and in the case of Titmuss 
and Townsend in particular, this has also involved development - 
in particular of Tawney' s view of distributional equality. 
A further provisional hypothesis then which begins to emerge from 
this chapter is that any view of equali ty of trea tment, condi tion 
or outcome, will depend upon how these are related to the principles 
of liberty and fellowship and ultimately equality of respect. 
[dith this in mind, the relevance of Tawney' s Christian view to 
contemporary discussion will be examined in the final chapters. 
233. 
Chapter 6 The Influence of Taw -ley' s Equality 2 
In this chapter, I intend to examine the influence of Tawney' s 
view of equality on Christian writers. Tawney' s influence in this 
5¡her 
area might be thought to be more clear than in the secular sh -ere 
with respect to equality. The major theological writers which I 
have chosen to examine are Daniel Jenkins, Ronald Preston, and 
John Atherton. The last two form a personal link with Tawney. 
In addition, I shall note two lay Christians, Holman and Schumacher 
who demonstrate the extent of Tawney' s influence. I will end with 
a consideration of Tawney' s influence as exerted in other ways. 
Daniel Jenkins 
Perhaps the best example of the influence of Tawney' s equality is 
to be found in Daniel Jenkin' s 'Equality and Excellence.' 
Published in 1961, this was at a time Crosland' s ' The Future of 
Socialism' was advocating one view of equality as the primary 
principle of socialism. 1 Jenkins makes several references to 
Tawney and the general influence of 'Equality' and also to Titmuss 
and Townsend. 2 Like Tawney, Jenkins does not set out to write a 
book of theology but he does see equality and the Christian faith 
as intimately connected. Indeed, 
the New Testament gives us more direct help in understanding 
(equality) than i t does wi th manyof the other issues of our 
day.' 3 
The book in fact, is the product of study undertaken by staff 
members of the Christian Frontier Council, a body set up to 
contribute to the public discussion of major issues in Britain 
from a Christian standpoint. 4 It was to be of use to 
people engaged in practical affairs', enabling them to see 
fresh aspects of the Christian interpretation of reality.' 5 
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The best way of doing that in the context of equality is 
' through seeing more clearly what equality today should mean and 
how it illuminates our understanding of our duty in society.' 6 
In all this, Jenkins sees himself clearly as leading the second 
stage of the battle for equality, the first of which was led by 
Tawney. Tawney' s writing helped awake Britain to the need for 
'a measure of basic equality of social conditions and opportunity.' 
7 
This stage, argues Jenkins, had largely been achieved by 1961.8 
However, in a world where the forces of large scale industry and 
centralized communication dominate, the extent to which individuals 
can 'realize their equality is curtailed.' 
9 
Here, Jenkins is 
referring both to the dehumanizing effects of technological 
progress and also to the particular distributional pattern which 
has accompanied it. 10 This i s the si tua ti on that Jenkins wrote 
for, the second stage of equality. 
Jenkins begins his discussion of equality by distinguishing two 
levels. Firstly, there is 'a level of fundamental insight' where 
the equal status of human beings is intuitively understood - 
fundamental equality. 11 This corresponds to Tawney's equal worth. 
12 
The second level is that of 'day to day experience.' Here 
equality is defined in terms of specific inequalities between 
individuals or groups. 13 It is not clear that the precise 
distinction drawn by Jenkins is all that helpful. In one sense, it 
corresponds to the two equalities detailed by Tawney, equality of 
respect and equalizing measures (distribution and participation). 
14 
However, the second level is not as such defined in terms of 
inequalities. It is rather substantive equality, defined in terms 
of egalitarian policies. 
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Jenkins, like Tawney is concerned about the relationship between 
fundamental equality and the principles of liberty and fraternity. 
He does not spend as much time as Tawney examining the concept of 
liberty or how it mught be nurtured in and through social 
organization. However, like Tawney, he views freedom in a 
positive sense, of allowing the development of the individual. 
15 
For Jenkins, the concept of fraternity is not adequate. More 
'rich and more appropriate' is the concept of love. 16 Thus, 
Jenkins begins to make more explicit the agapaic elements of 
Tawney. 17 Equality, in relation to this deep view of fraternity 
'does not come alive unless it realizes itself in the reciprocity 
of the communion of love, which is the mature human relationship.' 18 
On the one hand, equality describes the external side of the 
relationship of love, which, from the inside is self -giving.' 
19 
On the other hand: 
'Following the way of love means that men recognize that the whole 
cannot be truly served unless each individual is respected in his 
uniqueness and encouraged to give to the whole the best that is 
in him.' 20 
Two things are of note here. Firstly, Jenkins is concerned to 
give to the whole, (the paradigm of this being the community of the 
Body of Christ) whilst respecting the right of each part of the 
community. Secondly, Jenkins brings out more fully than Tawney, 
the way in which fundamental equality based upon agape has an 
attitude of concern which demands action, a commitment to seek the 
best for the other. This contrasts sharply with the formal 
principle of equality, which, without the agapaic base, is precisely 
g becoming 
21 
Like Tawney, this concern in dan er of  otiose, 
centres upon 
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the unique value of the individual' , 
and a concern for the 
true well being of the one who is loved.' 
22 
Equally, Jenkins emphasizes the obligation on the individual to 
develop their capacities and the obligations involved in relation- 
ships. 
23 
As noted above, though Jenkins does not see his role as a theolo- 
gian, he is more explicit and thorough -going than Tawney in 
tying in fundamental equality to love and the Christian faith. 
Like Tawney, he sees the Incarnation as not simply justifying 
fundamental human equality, 24 but as making it clear and coherent. 
25 
He takes this a stage further, by noting that Christians would 
argue tha t 
this equality is experienced most vividly in the reception of 
God' s loving forgiveness.' 26 
It is precisely this experience which forms the links 
' between equality and liberty and equality and love.' 27 
He argues that if the principles of liberty equality and fraternity 
are not balanced by love, then the idea of equality can become 
'corrupt and misleading.' 
28 
The ultimate danger is of equality 
as becoming a weapon in ideological warfare, creating new patterns 
of inequality and new outbursts of social unrest. 
29 
In effect, Jenkins is noting the danger of equality becoming an 
aim in itself, excluding other principles, and encouraging resent - 
fulnessand envy. 
30 
Jenkins was writing at a time when he thought it necessary to 
rehabilitate the concept of equality, 31 and given the oft expressed 
fears about equality leading to uniformi ty, he sharpens Tawney' s 
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argument that equality demands diversity. In fact, 
'equality demands the pursuit of excellence for its full 
realization.' 32 
Like Tawney then, Jenkins is actively concerned to promote certain 
inequalities, ones which would best be promoted and accepted in an 
environment of love. The inequalities which are not acceptable 
are those of ' social and economic environment.' 
33 
Jenkins can accept inequalities of income which take account of 
positions of responsibility and respond to self- interest. 
34 
However, again like Tawney, he is concerned that great extremes in 
income will lead to divisions in society: 
'History in general, including that of the domestic history of the 
churches, proves that human nature is not strong enough to 
maintain itslf in true community when there are too great dis- 
parities of income.' 35 
Thus, Jenkins adds the further consequentialist argument to his 
initial deontological justification of equality. This is further 
re- inforced, when, again like Tawney, he argues that the 
'co-operative spiri t' is the condi tion of 
every kind of social success, including economic.' 36 Thus, 
'Closely knit modern industrial society cannot function effectively 
without a large measure of economic, as of social, equality.' 37 
Yet, despite those arguments, Jenkins accepts with Tawney, the 
intrinsic worth of fundamental equality and social institutions 
which are based on it, regardless of the results in terms of 
efficiency. 
38 
Jenkins does not stress as much as Tawney the idea 
of respnsibilities and duties. 
39 
Nor does he emphasize the 
importance of codes of service or honour as Tawney does with the 
40 
professional. However , he is aware of the importance of duty 
and service, concentrating in particular upon the duty of the 
238. 
individual to cultivate their excellence not onl'r for their own 
sake but for the sake of the community. The gifted must, 
' cultivate their gifts not for private satisfaction, gain or 
glory, but with a clear idea of their relation to the common 
good.' 41 
In this, Jenkins once more sharpens Tawney's position, for the very 
excellence of the individual is what is to be at the service of 
society. 42 :Moreover, the Church has a crucial part to play in 
getting across this attitude, for, 
'It is our conviction that it is only a revived Christian radicalism, 
born of a fresh vision of what a 'godly commonwealth' should be, 
that can give our nation the conviction and the energy to subdue 
and control our enormous technological and industrial power to 
worth-while human purposes.' 43 
Such purposes include freeing social life from class consciousness, 
an imaginative response to the environment and the arts, 
preparing individuals for politics and public service, and above 
all, enabling 
'us to fulfill our great responsibilities to the poorer peoples 
of the world.' 44 
This radicalism is neither class nor culture based, but is relevant 
45 
to all societies and all groups within society. Much of this, 
of course, could be said of Tawney. 46 However, the means of this 
radicalism shows Jenkins moving away from Tawney' s basic posi tion. 
Jenkins does not specifically write that the Churches should be 
involved in forming policies, and certainly does not provide as 
detailed policy suggestions as Tawney. 47 rather does he stress 
the role of the Church, 48 and the individual as examples to 
society. There is something in this of an egalitarian revolution 
from above, in which the educated, like the gifted, provide a clear 




This seems to compare well with some of Tawney's 
writings, not least where he argues for the recognition of superi- 
ority as essential to progress, 50 but also where he focuses on 
the professional. 51 The qualities and duties of the educated 
person which Jenkins refers to are quite daunting, and include 
cultivation of distinctive gifts, zealousness in parenthood, 
thought in public service, and action in voluntary services. 
52 
Ultimately however, in all this, Jenkins may be thought to be 
closer to Temple (with his emphasis upon influencing individuals 
who will influence society.), 
53 
or to the Fabians (with their 
eli tism). 
54 
For Tawney, revolution, social change, had to come 
also from below, from the ordinary man, and was based upon desires 
and virtues common to all humanity. 
55 
Though he accepts the need 
for examples to be given, and standards set, he nonetheless 
demands that individuals take responsibility for their own 
si tua tion and are allowed self -determination. 
56 
Thus he sees the 
need for decisions to be arrived at democratically including 
agreement on and development of social purposes. 
Thus, whilst Jenkins sticks closely to the Tawney view of equality 
with respect to excellence, he first of all develops Tawney' s 
idea of diversity so that the individual' s gifts are to be used in 
service, and secondly, he adds a dimension to this in arguing for 
the duty of the ' educated' to provide an example for society. 
It is this second level which begins to move away from Tawney. 
This movement and the lack of political substance in Jenkins may 
well be accounted for by his perception that he has entered the 
second stage of egalitarianism, the first stage having been 
57 
may completed by Tawney. This  be characterized as the end of 
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the political phase. However, for Tawney, the notion of a political 
phase as coming to an end was not thought of. His stress on the 
importance of social organization, and the need to respond to the 
changes in society, points to an element of 'semper reformandQ,' 
58 
Given Jenkins' s basic stance, it is not surprising that he argues 
for both distributional and participatory equality. The first 
of these, like Tawney, involves relative equality, without extremes 
of distribution. 
59 
He has four criteria for distribution of 
income:- 
enough income to enable the individual and dependants to survive 
and cope with contingencies. 
enough to enable the individual to 
take his place as a responsible and civilized member of the 
commun ty.' 60 
enough resources for the individual to share in the same basic 
level of comfort as all citizens. 
61 
reward for different degrees of responsibility. 
62 
In all this, a minimum income by itself is not sufficient for 
Jenkins. Not only is it hard to estimate minimum income, but if 
income above that line is left to itself, it tends to move to 
extremes, which, as noted above, adversely affects community and 
efficiency. 63 These criteria are broadly the same as Tawney' s, 
though with respect to reward for responsibility, Tawney stresses 
far more the role of function and thus responsibility for ful- 
filling social purposes. 
In suggesting ways of applying distributional equality, Jenkins gives 
some policy objectives. These include: - 
with reference to families, the priority of increasing family 
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allowances. 
with reference to wages, an attempt to equalize man and women. 
with respect to age, the increased rewards for younger profess- 
ionals. 
with respect to young manual workers, a compulsory saving 
scheme comparable to the post -war credit scheme. 
64 
Jenkins is also aware of the problems of take up in the Welfare 
65 
State and the inequalities generated by the ' expense account system,' 
and advocates a tightening up of regualtions about taxation and 
exemption. 
At this stage, two things may be noted. Firstly, Jenkins does not 
grasp the nettle of framing particular policy programmes, clai?nimg 
that this is beyond the remit of the report. 66 Secondly, it is 
not clear how some of his aims could be achieved, at least without 
a very paternalistic approach. Thus, for example, he wants to 
limit the effects of a society which in fact, is becoming a 
gerontocracy, and to achieve this he advocates the paternalistic, 
if not coercive, compulsory saving scheme for young manual workers67 
For Tawney, the attempts to value young workers or youth are 
clearly to be focused in education at school and work, and by 
enabling them to take more responsibility in their situation. 
68 
Significantly, Jenkins places a great emphasis upon the power of 
example, even in distribution:- 
- the educated individual should aim to pay his debts. 69 
- the individual high flyer can give an example of service by 
cutting down the reward received. 70 
- the individual who receives a lower income can do his part by 
71 living with the resources gi ven. 
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Here, Jenkins focuses upon 
the importance of a personal attitude of responsibility in relation 
to expenditure.' 72 
This picks up the theme of personal stewardship which Tawney never 
examines explicitly, 
73 
and extends the application of Tawney' s 
theme of responsibility which he tends to restrict to 
institutions or the wealthy. 
74 
In turning to participatory equality, Jenkins shows a similar 
concern to Tawney, in particular for industry. Fundamental 
equality is clearly at the base of this, and the aim is to 
give workers a 
'sense of human dignity and fellowship in relation to their 
work.' 75 
In the light of this Jenkins argues for greater shared respon- 
sibility. He does not suggest any particular means of achieving 
this and in this respect follows Tawney' s line that a means such as 
nationalization is secondary to the aim of industry achieving 
responsibility both to workers and society. 76 The result is that 
Jenkins focuses very much on the attitudes and the development of 
equal consideration in industry. 
77 
He advocates a 
' code of responsible conduct' with regard to staff relations and 
moves toward 'parity of esteem' in the work place. 78 
Like Tawney, Jenkins is concerned with development of a worthwhile 
purpose for industry in relation to society. Like Tawney he 
recognized the importance of this in terms of work relationships. 
79 
Jenkins' s ' worthwhile purpose' comes down to a sense of serving 
society, and of industry as a public trust. He argues that 
80 nationalization per se will not achieve this, but that some form 
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of social control is necessary over industry, sufficient to plan 
for priorities and to prevent industry, 
from wasting its substance upon creating and meeting frivolous 
or otherwise unworthy demands.' 81 
Any detailed policy suggestions are unfortunately beyond the 
scope of Jenkins' s enquiry once again. 82 Thus he does not 
investigate particular ways of equalizing power in terms of 
consumers, owners, and producers. 83 Nonetheless, he is aware of 
the imbalances in power, and of the importance of facing this 
issue. Hence, for instance, he argues for devising, 
fresh means by which the long term public interest in industry 
could be more effectively represented.' 84 
In education, distributional and participatory equality come 
together with the fundamental equa li ty which holds tha t 
' every child is a precious individual' , as foundation. 85 In this 
context, like Tawney, Jenkins points to the limitations of the 
concept of equality of opportunity, quoting Young's Chelsea 
:.!anifesto with approval - 
'Every human being would.... have equal opportunity, not to rise 
up in the world in the light of any mathematical measure, but to 
develop his own special capacities for leading a rich life.' 86 
Equality of opportunity is demanded by 'justice and enlightened 
self- interest' , but the fundamental equality of all men requires 
assertion, not only to help them develop their unique capacities 
and personalities, but also to 
'give people humility, patience and courage to face and make the 
best of the (natural) inequalities' 
which will emerge. 87 Here Jenkins develops the implicit holism 
88 
of Tawney' s view of education. The stress is upon individual 
development and mutual acceptance in community. The theological 
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foundation for this is the awareness that, 
' we are all alike in sin and in having the promise of redemption 
set before us.' 89 
Significantly, Jenkins reinforces his kinship to Tawney with a 
clear indication that the Christian attitude to education should 
involve less of an emphasis upon 'religious instruction' and more 
upon the style and way of life in the school, 
'infusing a Christian ' spirit' or 'atmosphere' throughout the whole 
curriculum and common life of the school.' 90 
The Christian view of equality is, for Jenkins, what provides the 
foundation for the emergence of a community such as this. 
91 
In stressing the development of such community, it must be said 
that Jenkins does move away from the liberal tendency in Tawney, 
ie. the role of education as helping the individual develop as an 
independant critical thinker. 92 Equally, he does not stress the 
importance of developing the individual's sense of duty to the 
self and to others, and in particular, society. 
93 
It is perhaps not surprising, given this emphasis in Jenkins, that 
he views the problems of education not so much in terms of equality 
or inequality of opportunity or resources as in terms of relational 
equality and thus of unacceptable attitudes within educational 
institutions, between such institutions, and between them and 
society. Jenkins thus seeks to change attitudes rather than to 
recommend egalitarian policies such as the abolition of public 
schools. For universities, this means not emphasizing their 
difference from neighbouring institutions, but rather, 
the service which they render through performing their own 
distinctive function well.' 94 
Of public schools he writes that they, 
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should accept more frankly their status as public trusts,' 
and aim, 
to enrich the life of the whole community of which they are a 
part.' 95 
What Jenkins once again does not do is to suggest how this kind of 
'attitude change' is to be achieved and maintained, for example, 
working out mechanisms of accountability and sharing. 96 Jenkins, 
however, does examine various areas in which the educational 
institutions might form partnerships, in particular with industry 
and with the home. The key element once again is a shared view of 
fundamental equality, with the implied emphasis in the home on the 
duty of the parents to provide a responsible and cultivated 
environment for the child. Parents who do not provide this 
environment should be helped, 
to have a true understanding of fundamental equality and its 
relation to service', 
enabling them to co- operate with schools in 
' cultivating the best gifts of the pupil.' 97 
A final brief note should be made of Jenkins's concern for equality 
and the 'Rest of the World'. His inquiry specifically targets 
Britain. Nonetheless, awareness of fundamental equality demands 
that Othernations be considered. 98 He proposes several possible 
options, from more direct aid to poorer nations, to export of skill 
and experience. 
99 
Significantly, he returns at the end of this 
chapter to the theme of example. Thus, he argues, that the 
wealthy nations of the West should not simply share their resources, 
but should also give the poorer nations an example which will 
demonstrate that, 
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' material benefits o,ly come when certain spiri tual quali ties 
are cultivated.' 100 
Jenkins's expression here is a little ambiguous but is really 
stressing that relationships with other countries should not be 
restricted to material deals and incentives. Tawney' s position 
on international relations and equality was never fully worked 
out. His concern for service and unconditional worth would 
logically lead him to a position such as Jenkins, at least in 
recognizing that Britain is part of an international network, where 
the same principles apply. Thus Tawney can write of the principles 
which are more crucial than the simple ending of warfare, within 
or between nations, and note the application of principles 
especially to Empire. 
101 
To sum up this section on 'Equality and Excellence' , the following 
points should be noted:- 
a) Jenkins follows the broad outline and many of the details of 
Tawney' s equality. He argues for an operative view of equali ty 
which involves not revolution but a continual development 
towards God' s purpose for mankind. Such a vision is person- 
centred, of global domain and is relevant to all societies and 
times. 
102 
b) Jenkins is concerned with a way of life, and whilst he does not 
count his view as straightforward theology, he does in fact, 
make more explicit the agapaic and creationist /stewardship base 
of a Christian view of equality than Tawney. This leads to a 
deeper understanding of liberty and fra tern ty, wi th the 
experience of forgiveness as a key element. 
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c) Jenkins gives more emphasis to the concept. of community than 
Tawney and less to the concept of liberty and associated ideas 
of the self -determination and equalizing power and control. 
Nonetheless, he develops Tawney' s focus upon the uniqueness 
of the individual, stressing not only the duty of self and 
communi ty to cultivate unique excellence, but also the 
communitarian context of excellence ie. that any gift should be 
used to serve. 
d) This moves Jenkins away from political or institutional change, 
to focus on attitudes and the important role of communities 
and individuals in providing examples to society. This develops 
one element in Tawney' s thought, especially the idea of en- 
couraging individuals to work through duties. However, it 
runs a great danger of shading into a paternalistic approach, 
which does not help the individual to make his own choice. 
It may well be that the report nature of 'Equality and 
Excellence' , and the fact that many people contributed towards 
i t, explains the lack of substantive policies and the 
occasional moralizing or paternalistic tone. However, the clear 
concentration upon attitudes rather than policy, without 
consideration of the mechanisms of attitude change, betrays an 
operative view of equality which is at times, close to Temple 
than Tawney. For Tawney, the development of equality demanded 
attitudes, principles and policies, policies which required 
articula tion. 
Jenkins then is clearly influenced by much of Tawney' s view of 
equality, also developing parts, either in areas of application or 
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in theological perspective, but also not entirely meeting Tawney 
with respect to self- determination or the question of substantive 
policies. He also at times questions Tawney. How, for instance, 
could Tawney' s view of equality cope with a modern situation with 
many different interest groups, including elements of the Church, 
where groups insist upon the perpetuation of division ? 
103 
In this, Jenkins reveals himself to be aware of the transitions in 
society and the need to respond to new situations in society. 
104 
And in this, he precisely echoes Tawney' s view that equality will 
remain radical whatever the situation. 105 
This radicalism is, therefore, no less relevant to a relatively 
just and prosperous society than it is to an unjust and impoveri- 
shed one. Indeed, in the Christian view, the more we succeed in 
transforming our earthly cities into the image of the eternal City 
of God, which is our home, the clearer our vision becomes of what 
our true life together should be 106 
R.H. Preston 
Perhaps the most direct and obvious influence of Tawney' s view of 
equality is found in the work of R.H.Preston. Preston was a 
student of Tawney, keeping in touch with him until his death. 
107 
Despite some criticism of Tawney, noted above, 108 he frequently 
refers to Tawney, and reveals a concern for developing the stance of 
Tawney and Temple. 109 Perhaps the most explicit recognition of 
influence is found in the 'Christian Action Journal' 
110 
where in 
an article on Christian Ethics and the New Right, Preston writes 
of his personal standpoint. 
'My main stance, very much influenced by R.H. Tawney, is in favour 
of a social order of greater equality - in material terms, but also 
equality of consideration.' 111 
In spi te of this declaration, Preston rarely offers an extended 
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analysis of equality per se. References to equality, do, however, 
pervade his writing in one form or another. 
112 As is to be 
expected for a theologian, the doctrinal foundation of Preston' s 
view of equality is more explicit than Tawney' s, arguing that it 
is not simply the Incarnation which provides the basis for inter- 
ference in the political/economic realm.113 However, Preston' s 
language has, at times, a very similar ring to Tawney' s: 
'Men and women as the crown of creation are given a supreme worth 
as being made in God's image, and this basic equality they have 
in common is far more significant than the differences between them 
in race, physique, intelligence, or skills.' 114 
Such a 'common humanity' 
115 
has to find expression in the structures 
of society, 
' so that men will feel at home with one another.' 116 
Thus, like Tawney, he sees equalizing measures as being for the 
sake of fellowship. 117 Supported in this by the Christian 
doctrine of the state, Preston thus argues that social institutions, 
structures and conventions which 
facilitate rather than hinder the living of the good life' 
should be created and encouraged. 
118 
The good life in this 
context is the development of the individual to full maturity. 
119 
This provides a clear perfectionist base for equality. 
120 
Assuming such a base, then firstly, fundamental equality demands 




such equal respect demands concern for the poor and underprivileged. 
This requires distributive equality. Thirdly, a commitment to 
participatory equality, for the worker and citizen 123 is required, 
124 
alongside checks against the abuse of power. This Preston sees 




It is explicitly agapaic, involving a balance 
of fellowship and freedom, and requiring a long term shift in 
attitudes alongside the distributional and participatory equality. 
This ' shift' involves in some way, 
the whole of social and economic life.' 126 
Like Tawney then, Preston's view of equality is person- centred, 
and of global domain and to do with relationships and a way of 
life. 
In examining the agapaic base of this equality, Preston notes its 
relationship with both equality and justice. Love is the principle 
of justice, which involves affirming 
'persons in their otherness and not merely because of their 
function.' 127 
Between love and justice is equality, a principle which embodies 
the creative righteousness of God, 
'who is concerned with the good of each as well as the good of 
all.' 128 
Justice also 
'restrains egoism and provides stabilities in society for the 
common good.' 129 
Justice therefore not only finds its base principle in love, it 
also prepares for it, 'and properly expresses it.' 
130 
Tawney does not examine justice and its relationship to equality 
and agape in this depth. Nonetheless, like Preston, he sees 
justice defined in terms of equal worth, and expressing equality 
of respect in society. 
131 
In Preston's analysis, the terms are not always precisely defined, 
which can lead to confus ion. In the first place he is not always 
clear as to whether justice is the overall concept of justice or 
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the institution of justice. 132 Secondly, in placing equality 
between agape and justice, it is not always clear if he is referring 
to equality of respect /consideration or equalizing measures. 133 
Perhaps the best interpretation is to see equality as equality of 
respect and to see justice in this context as the question of 
distribution. 134 This would fit in wi th Pres ton' s most recent 
tres tment. 135 
One additional factor may be noted at this point. Preston argues 
for the use of discernment in the expression of love and justice 
by which he means 
'an insight into institutions on a basis of thoughtful reflection 
arising out of the best knowledge of the facts which we have been 
able to aquire.' 136 
137 
This parallels Tawney' s concern for a thorough analysis of society, 
and thus for social organizations to be able to respond to changes 
in society. 138 
Preston also parallels Tawney in his view of the relationship of 
freedom and fellowship to equality. As noted above, equalizing 
measures are for the sake of fellowship. They are also necessary 
for the basic freedoms required for the individual to develop to 
y 
139 maturit , Freedom and fellowship are intimately connected for 
Preston, for individual freedom can only be realized in community 
and, in the Christian view, particularly, 
'as we grow together in the community of Christians to our full 
maturity in Christ.' 140 
Whilst Preston, like Tawney, accepted the balance between the 
principles, he notes that how they are balanced at any one time will 
vary. 141 Preston does not expand upon this and the best interpre- 
tation would seem to be that whichever principle is emphasized will 
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depend upon the situation in society at the time. 
142 
licwever, 
as noted of Tawney's model, the principles of liberty, fraternity 
and equality are ultimately controlled by equality of respect which 
requires the concepts maintain a balance and thus gives them a 
specific meaning in relation to any situation. 
143 
In this respect, 
none of the three principles can become an end in itself, indeed, 
none can find independent meaning apart from the others. 
Preston's stress on man in community over against the individua- 
list stance 
144 
is underlined, like Tawney, with a moral psychology, 
which has an understanding not simply of the claims, but also the 
obligations involved in being human. 
145 Preston, however, anchors 
this more firmly in theology and in particular the Reformation 
doctrine of the Orders of Creation. 
146 
The four Orders are:- 
- marriage and the family 
- the Economic Order - be it feudal, market place or planned 
- the Political Order 
- the Community of Culture. Less defined than the other Orders, 
this deals with the all pervasive quality of culture in any 
society. 
147 
Preston draws out more explicitly than Tawney the lessons to be 
learned from the Orders and the individual's relationship to them. 
Firstly, they exist before the individual and in many ways pro- 
foundly influence the individual as he or she grows. 
148 
Secondly, 
theyinvolve responsibili ties of the individual to the Orders which 
17,0, V 
the individual has to work out for t- hems -el . Importantly, these 
responsibilities exist prior to any decision to form a contract 
p 
149 
rela tionshi . Finally, Preston makes quite explicit the idea 
150 of the individual as vice -gerent in creation, the individual 
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as partner in change such that as the individual grows in maturity, 
he or she should use their influence to modify the structures so 
that they work in a more human way: 
Semper reformanda applies not only to the Church but to the 
Orders of Creation as well, just because they have such a profound 
influence on the person and on human flourishing.' 151 
Alongside thé vision of 'man in community' and of the constant 
refining of community structures lies the equally Tawney view of 
common purpose or a shared vision of the common good. 152 Preston 
argues the need for a basic social moral framework to maintain even 
a pluralist society. Such a perception of the common good is 
required even by the 'New Right' , for the operation of the market 
depends upon such a framework. 153 In all this, Preston stands out 
against McIntyre, 154 positing a moral framework based upon the 
' common moral tradition of promise- keeping, truth telling, bene- 
volence.' 155 
This coincides strikingly with Tawney's affirming of moral awareness 
and tradition in society. 156 Also, like Tawney, Preston sees the 
Christian faith as not simply affirming moral awareness, but also 
illuminating and extending it. 157 This is relevant even to a 
pluralist society, where ' family resemblances' can be discovered 
between the moral principles of different faiths. 158 
As noted above, Preston's justification of equality is both 
deontological and consequential (enabling the individual to 
develop). He does not stress so much as Tawney the consequences 
in terms of efficiency in industry, but does stress the consequences 
in terms of a healthy society. This is particularly so with 
regard to rapid technological change, and the need for greater 
159 participatory equality to adapt to it. Like Tawney, Preston 
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links participatory equality in with equality of respect. 
Without participation in decision making, 
the proper respect for each person as made in God' s image and 
re -made in Christ is not expressed in the structures of human 
life.' 160 
The importance of participatory equality as a means of respect is 
acknowledged by Preston, when he accepts that it can lead to great 
complications and does not necessarily entail greater efficiency. 
Nonetheless, efficiency must not be pursued at any price. 
161 
such 
participatory equality, moreover, involves need for both large 
and small units of decision making, avoiding the dangers of guild 
socialism on the one hand, and of centralism on the other. 
162 
With regard to distributional equality, some differences begin to 
emerge between Tawney and Preston. Both accept the importance of 
the distributional criterion of need. Indeed, Preston argues that 
this criterion which, 
' stresses altruistic and collaborative relationships between 
ci ti zens' 163 
is the best reflection of the ethics of the Kingdom of God. 
Nonetheless, he recognizes the existence of two other criteria, 
merit and existing rights - the most commonly held criteria in 
society. Preston argues that the Church must recognize the 
importance of all three criteria in the kingdoms of this world, but 
nonetheless attempt to foster the weakest of those, which reflects 
the altruistic stance of the church, need . 
164 
Tawney at this 
point is more 'involved' than Preston, and looks for a more 
holistic interpretation of these three criteria. Thus, for him, 
merit and rights come together in function. 
165 
In effect this 
means that reward is to be seen in terms of ones function for the 
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common purpose, and rights are linked to function. 166 Preston, in 
his critique of Tawney, recognizes the difficulties involved in the 
concept of function and clearly wishes to avoid being drawn down 
that road. 167 This may also reflect the differences between 
Preston thethealogian and Tawney the Christian moralist. Preston 
is constantly aware of speaking from the Church' s position, 168 
whilst Tawney is concerned less with what the Church has to contri- 
bute and more with framing a social philosophy and erecting social 
structures which will implement the basic Christian principles. 
Significantly, whilst Preston argues that policies which involve 
the basic principles put forward should be supported, he does not 
follow Tawney down the road of detailing policy proposals. 
The reasoning behind this seems to be twofold: - 
a) Preston is very of the importance of experts in any 
decision making process and therefore in the formulation of 
any policy. The trained mind is better able, 
to perceive the secondary consequences of possible courses 
of action, and thus provide a better basis for decision 
making.' 169 
This does not avoid the democratic process but emphasizes the 
importance of a group approach, in which the expert would enable 
the group to make appropriate choices. 170 Tawney did not 
dispute the importance of experts, 171 but clearly argued for 
the importance of the Church stating policy content. 172 
b) Preston is aware of the danger of the Church becoming identified 
wi th one particular poli ti cal party or advoca ting a blue print 
for society in some way. Hence, he argues strongly that the 
Church should provide a critique of all forms of social 




Preston is certainly aware of unjustified inequali- 
ties, 
174 
but in this context he contents himself with policy 
objectives rather than detailed plans. 
175 
Preston is there- 
fore more concerned to provide the right base for a critique 
of social organization and a process whereby that critique 
can be taken account of in any decision -making about social 
organization. In this respect he argues that equality is 
rightly seen as a middle -axiom in the process of policy 
formula ti on. 
176 
Two points should be noted here. Firstly, Tawney was aware of 
middle -axioms but it is hard to see that his use of equality 
falls into this category. 
177 
Secondly, Preston himself is 
aware of a specific Christian contribution to the debate about 
distributional criteria. 
178 
He claims that this can contribute 
to a total view of distributional equality without actually 
producing a uniquely Christian view of distribution (ie. one 
separate from the basic three criteria). Nonetheless, against 
this, the Christian emphasis upon need and unconditional worth 
does radically affect any meaning of equality, making it 
difficult to use as a middle- axiom, ie. as a common concept 
around which decision making can be worked out. 
Another factor which leads Preston to draw back from issuing 
' blue -prints' for society is his stress both upon eschatology and 
sin. His eschatological emphasis provides a strong reminder of the 
provisionality of any social organization. 
179 
Preston' s strong 
emphasis upon man's sinful nature is perhaps more realistic than 
Tawney in that he concludes that not only will man never achieve 
perfection in social organization, but conflict of interests will 
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always remain, 180 between producer and consumer, manager and 
worker. Hence, he argues strongly for the creation of institu- 
tions which would deal with conflict, as well as exploring the 
application of basic principles to institutions. As noted above, 
Tawney was aware of the continued presence of conflict in man' s 
na ture. 
181 
However, for him, principles and the working through 
of these to practice were precisely the way to approach conflict. 
Thus it was important to establish at the beginning, a framework 
of shared values from which conflicts could be handled. However, 
he did not pursue any particular institutions where prime purpose 
was to handle conflict of interest. 
In all this, Preston is very aware of the importance of self - 
interest and its appropriate use. 
182 
There is no doubt that whilst 
Tawney was aware of self- interest, he tends to move away from self- 
interest as narrowly defined and attempts to convince the individual 
of what is their best self- interest. 
183 
Such an approach did 
not rely upon 'using self- interest' but rather developing an 
understanding of self- interest, either in terms of duty to self 
and others, or in terms of reward for service to others. 
184 
In concluding this section on Preston, several points require 
underlining. Firstly, Preston was clearly influenced by Tawney' s 
view of equality, stressing the importance of it in relation to 
other principles and in relation to specific situations. In this, 
he recognizes that there can be no simple Christian view of equality 
which can be directly applied to society. Rather does the Christian 
view contribute to the wider view, always aiming to broaden it, and 
guard against essentialism of policy or principles. Preston, like 
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Tawney, holds a person -centred view of equality with stress on 
distributional and participatory equality as enabling power to be 
dispersed and freedom and fellowship to be developed. Secondly, 
Preston is very aware of the difficulties in relation to Tawney' s 
equality and to equality in general. His response to this is 
conceptual and in terms of method. He distances himself from the 
concept of function, as a concept both too essentialist and too 
coercive, and he distances the Church from drawing up detailed 
policies for similar reasons. 
In place of function and co- operation and shared principles, Preston 
looks for institutions which will handle the realities of conflict 
and self- interest. In place of direct policy formulation, Preston 
looks to the development of dialogue. 
185 With respect to the first 
of these, it is not clear how far Preston has solved the difficulties 
of the idea of function. In terms of handling conflict situations, 
the basis for any institution being given responsibility for this 
186 
and what power they would have, would have to be examined closely. 
In any case, no matter how skilled any such group maybe in enabling 
trade -offs between groups to resolve issues, it remains to be 
argued convincingly that such a basis of self- interest is the most 
effective way of handling conflict. In the long run, Tawney 
looks to the development of participatory equality in decision - 
making which will both more effectively respect the individuals 
or groups involved and will aim to explore differences and 
common views before conflict arises. This would indicate that a 
development of 'Tawney' s view would need to explore the methods 
of improving democracy in all situations. Preston, of course, is 
very aware of the need to extend democracy and make participatory 
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equality a reality. However, without more detailed plans or 
suggestions for democratic development, it is very difficult to 
see how the various elements of self- interest, common good, and 
democratic participation might be balanced and how the continual 
reformation may be achieved. 
With respect to Preston's insistence upon the Church using equality 
as part of a critique of society, there are two possible 
explana tions. 
As noted above, this may be simply a different perspective of the 
same equality as Tawney, ie. the theologian's view as distinct 
from the social moralist. It may, however, point to a more 
substantive difference between the two, with Preston viewing 
operative equality in a similar light to Temple. In so far as he 
advocates a middle -axiom method, and includes equality in this, 
there is no doubt that he does have a different view on the use 
of equality to Taney. 18 7 w However, before being conclusive on this 
issue, finer distinctions would have to be made by Freston, 
for example, in his use of the term blue- print. i-e cannot accept 
the use of an egalitarian blue -print, preferring the Church' s 
stance to be responsive or reactive to inequalities. 
188 
a blue -print, with all aspects of policy detailed and not for 
discussion, is surely different from a more proactive stance which 
requires that the Church initiate not simply discussion, but 
activity, and be concerned not simply to react to injustice, but to 
proclaim justice. The result of this approach is an equality 
which demands policy formulations, whilst accepting that any 
policy is by nature, provisional. In this light, it is patently 
possible to have an operative view of equality which demands 
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policy Formulation and not to see that as an inflexible blue- 
print. 
Finally, however, despite possible differences, and the lack of 
systematic development of the Tawney view of equality, Preston 
does develop and deepen the theological understanding of equality, 
retaining the liberal element of Tawney, and avoiding any temp- 
tation to subvert the autonomy of morality in general. In this, 
he retains the essential complexity of Tawney 's equality. 
John Atherton 
The link between John Atherton and .lr. Tawney is very clear. 
Firstly, Atherton has spent some time researching T_.ney1 s work, 109 
and came to the conclusion that he nade an important contribution 
to Christian Social Ethics. 190 Secondly, Atherton was a post- 
graduate student of Preston and sees himself very much _n that 
tradition of Christian Social thought. 191 
Like Tawney, Atherton is concerne_ to take princiw les and praxis 
equally seriously, expressing =h_ racttical as 
visionary pragmatism, realistic radicalir, and feas_rie 
a 1 terna tives.' 192 
Alongside this, like Tawney, ,thertton is =trot-ace.,d 
stereotyped party lines. Thus, whilst he favours social =? î 
he acknowledges that the important value in any _ -_ 
should be to enable the individual to zrow itsl pis cr her npte -,t__ 
He argues in this for a consensus of values Cwhic is "'e-;1 
careful consideration of what principles are inv*.ol-ved. 1 
contrasts thi s with the Butskiilitte "co;easo:s" l_-ss _ 
195 consensus of values and more a cosmci,iience of i..:attezest. 
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Like Tawney and Preston he sees the great 
'Christian moral presumptions and considerations' 
as pointing to a fundamental equality:196 
a) 'The unique significance of each particular person created in 
God' s likeness and redeemed by his activity on the cross; 
b) The fundamental unity of the whole human family in God which 
overrides all manufactured divisions; 
c) The essential equality of each person in the eyes of God; 
d) God' s particular concern for the vulnerable.' 197 
All this already has two important implications for :therton. 
Firstly, it presumes that certain rights are universal, and integral 
to human flourishing, and secondly that these rights are not 
essentially dependant on a prior contribution. 198 This mirrors 
Tawney' s stress upon the unconditional worth of the individual 
and the importance of enabling all individuals to receive the basic 
needs for individual fulfillment. 
199 
It must be noted that though 
Atherton begins to work a justification based on rights theory, 
such rights are in the context of communitarian justice, and are 
thus seen as 
'a means to and conditions for the contribution of love.' 200 
Despi te these points and the appar 'nt importance of the concepts 
of equal worth and equality of respect, 201 Atherton shows a deal 
of unease about the concept of equality. He is concerned, firstly, 
that the traditional term equality produces 
'either or stances which fuel those divisions associated with the 
existence of poverty in an affluent society.' 202 
It must be assumed that Atherton is here referring to equality as 
traditionally stated by the socialist movement, and he quotes 
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Gaitskill in this respect; 
'In the goal of equality, the determination to uproot the 
conditions of economic injustice, lies the true characteristic of 
the socialist.' 203 
This brings Atherton to his second reason, the growing conviction 
that the egalitarian bias of socialism would 
'reinforce the tendency of the state towards authoritarian 
cent'ralism.' 204 
Several points may be no ted about Atherton' s stance on equali ty: 
a) Atherton accepts that the concept of equality is useful, in 
the way that it concentrates upon relationships between 
individuals. 205 
b) He uses the term equality in several senses himself. 
206 
c) His concern about the concept of equality has echoes both of 
Temple' s concern and of the arguments of Crosland relating 
envy to equality. 207 
d) The thrust of Atherton' s position is unclear, and consequently 
his argument is ineffective. He uses consequential arguments 
about both the effect of the concept, that is, leading to 
centralist policies, and about the use of the concept in 
debate, that is leading to an exclusive or absolute position 
which would cause division. These consequence arguments in turn 
depend upon identifying a particular view of equality as both 
the fundamental and accepted view. However, this is simply not 
the case, for as noted above, even in socialism there are 
several different views of equality and its use. 208 Behind 
the argument lies the acceptable point that it would be wrong 
to make any principle exclusive or the instrumental principle 
of equality an aim. Of this, Tawney was perfectly aware, and 
209 
thus concerned to clarify the relationships between principles. 
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Atherton' s argument, however, is only valid against the 
misuse of equality and not against equality per se. The most 
it can be used to advocate is the clarification of the term in 
any context. Even the lesser thesis, that the term ?rhould be 
avoided in case it leads to misunderstandings or division, is 
inadequate, not least because the term is already in use and 
claimed by many different groups. It is therefore necessary 
at the very least to show the different Christian perspective 
of this concept. 
210 
To take the argument further would lead 
away from the context of Atherton' s point and on to the 
questioning of the nature of equality. This will be examined 
in chapter seven. 
211 
In an effort to avoid the concept of equality dominating the 
debate, Atherton argues for two fundamental principles from which 
'middle level principles' would emerge such as the revolutionary 
triad of liberty, equality and fraternity, or the 'Jarld Council 
of Churches emphasis upon justice, participation and sustaina - 
bility. The first of these is the Body of Christ, the second is 
the Common Good. In fact, as Atherton rightly points out, these 
are not 'principles' at all, but corporate images. With this in 
mind, what seems at first to be a radical development of, or even 
departure from Tawney's position, begins to look like a simple 
reformulation. The concept of the Body of Christ supplies a more 
theological view of humanity and society than Tawney developed, 
but with much the same results. Central to the Body is the inter- 
dependence of the members with each able to contribute to the whole. 
Though some members may have more important functions, all 
212 
contributions are equally important. The health of the whole 
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body is related to the 
'proper recognition and valuing of each part.' 213 
The proper functioning of such a community is, of course, marred 
by human sinfulness, and constrained 
' by the limits imposed by finitude.' 214 
Finally, a crucial part of the Body of Christ is its extension 
beyond itself in the world as the symbol of the Kingdom of God, 
transcending natural cultural or class barriers, holding the 
tension of the individualist and collectivist ideologies, and acting 
as, 
'instrument of God's purpose of reconciliation in and of and through 
the world.' 215 
The image of the Body of Christ expresses more clearly than 
Tawney the importance of community in which individuality is not 
lost.216 It does not, however, stress the liberal element in 
Tawney which saw him focussing on the individual' s development of 
217 
critical thinking, Moreover, the status of the corporate 
image of the Body of Christ must be questioned. Atherton gives 
the impression of this acting as the basis for secondary principles, 
218 
giving rise to and informing them. In fact, such an image is 
in itself the exemplification of a principle or attitude and is 
itself informed by that attitude. Thus, the image of the Body of 
Christ is an image of fellowship, and a particular view of fellow- 
ship ie, based upon the fundamental attitude of equality of 
respect. 
219 
In turning to the second corporate image supplied by Atherton, we 
discover a concept often used by Tawney. `:ore than Tawney, Atherton 
examines the history, justifications and problems of the image, 
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and is thus able to arrive at a more s ;rs tema ti c re- development 
o f i t. 220 And yet, as with the koinonia image, the re- formulated 
Common Good is ultimately an image which depends upon the acceptance 
of certain basic factors, three of which are strongly advocated by 
Tawney and two of which he acknowledges but does not develop. 
These five ' elements' go to make up the re- formulated 'Common Good' 
which in effect is made up of a basic principle, a view of humanity, 
and a series of implications for shared purposes. 
Firstly, the Common Good is explicitly based upon 
' equality in our relationships with each other in the ever - 
abiding context of God' s presence.' 221 
This relational basis to equality leads to a strong presumption 
in favour of equality of treatment and the need to distinguish 
between 
' legitimate or relative inequalities and illegitimate or absolute 
inequalities' 222 
This leads Atherton to assert a Christian view of anthropology 
which, like Tawney, focuses on and always holds 
together the commitment to the person as individual and the 
person in community.' 223 
In this view, human beings are interdependent and, 
to be a human being in the fullest sense(and it is to this that 
God always calls us), it is necessary to belong properly to and 
in society.' 224 
Secondly, the Common Good requires political action. This emerges 
directly from equality of respect which sets up a presumption for 
equality of treatment in 
the covenant relationships and structures of the world.' 225 
Given the view of the person in community noted above, the 
importance of the individual holding power over his or her life and 
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sharing in power over society becomes important. Equally important 
is power which will safeguard 
the great orders of creation and institutions of life because 
they have such an influence for good and bad in society.' 226 
The third element of the common good shared with Tawney is the 
insistence that a statement of it can only be provisional. The 
Kingdom of God, as both radical present and future eschatology 
'challenges any social order because it transcends them.' 227 
Fourthly, Atherton notes the importance of not arguing for a Common 
Good which excludes plurality and which can so easily lead to 
' corpora ti6m pa terna li sm and authori tariani sm.' 228 
Central to this view of the Common Good is the acceptance of 
ambiguities and a move away from any prescriptive methods of 
communicating the image. Thus, the Common Good is about acknowled- 
ging 
the general unity of common basic human needs,' recognizing 
'what belongs to our shared humanity', and also acknowledging 
'a diversity of understandings and practices which related to those 
needs and how we meet them.' 229 
In this, whilst the approaches are broadly the same, Tawney 
emphasises more the idea of shared common purposes, and thus some 
form of moral consensus underlying the differences in society. 
Atherton has written elsewhere of the rather narrow nature of such 
purposes in relation to a pluralist society. Eowever, as noted 
above, the idea of narrowness depends upon how general any such 
purposes are, and upon how such general purposes may relate to 
other principles. 230 In addition Tawney does not simply rely 
upon the abstract idea of common purposes but sees roles and 
231 relationships as involved in the defining of purposes. 
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The final element of the Common Good is perhaps more problematic. 
In this, Atherton argues for the need to recognize that conflict of 
interests will always exist in society. 232 He contrasts this 
specifically with the spirit of co- operation and fra tern ty 
advocated by Medhurst, 233 which he sees as avoiding issues of 
conflict or being proffered as an unrealistic solution to such 
issues. Ironically, Medhurst explicitly refers to Tawney in his 
advocacy of this fraternity. 234 In fact, as noted above, Tawney 
himself does not discount conflict and accepts that at one level 
it is actually healthy. 235 In addition, Atherton himself acknow- 
ledges that even conciliatory bodies may have to be coercive. 
The basis of this would be a commitment to the Common Good , which, 
'will always involve some restraints on the pursuit of some 
individual and groups' ends, including legitimate ones.' 236 
Medhurst in fact does not rely upon a romantic view of 
'co-operation' , but is very aware of the need to handle interests 
properly; 
The challenge is to fashion an over -arching framework of democratic 
values, practices and institutions which may, to some ex tent, 
harness the self- interest of sectional groups for communal 
purposes and set limits to the more destructive of sectional 
ambi tions.' 237 
In the same way, Tawney was concerned to set limits to individual 
or group power, to avoid division or irresponsible behaviour. 238 
It must also be noted that the basis of the restraints would be 
commitment to the Common Good, according to Atherton. However, it 
is not clear that such commitment would be possible without 
agreement on the principles which actually give meaning to the 
Common Good, including 
' commitment to the person as an individual and the person in 
communi ty,' 239 
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and an understanding of shared needs. This is very close to the 
general social purposes of Tawney. 
Once again therefore, it is clear that Atherton's image, whilst a 
rich and useful one is neither radically different from, nor a 
development of Tawney' s equali ty. Instead there is a change in 
presentation with certain elements more systematically worked 
through. 
240 
To test this conclusion out fully, Atherton' s view of freedom and 
participatory and distributional equality must be examined. 
241 
Atherton uses the language of rights more than Tawney. However, 
the rights are to do with human flourishing in communi ty. Central 
to this view is the importance of participatory equality ie. 
enabling the individual to partake fully in his or her work, or 
community. This involves the acceptance of democracy and its 
242 
extension to all levels, in economic life, intermediate associations, 
regional government. Significantly, Atherton's argument for 
participation in national government leads him to argue for the 
specific policy of proportional representation. 
243 
The effect of 
all this participation would be the erosion of the exclusive 
society. The value of participation, which Atherton argues, arises 
from the corporate images, is also important because it focuses 
upon human solidarity, taking in the cause of the poor, without 
making theirs an exclusive cause ie. identifying totally with their 
interests. Atherton argues that this is an important alternative to 
liberation theology. 244 Cnce again it must be noted that in fact, 
the value of participation is linked directly to the realization that 
'we are all one family of God' , and thus, fundamentally ecual.245 
Given this context, Atherton proposes, 
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' two equal, interdependant and interacting realities necessary 
for fulfilled human living in our kind of society.' 246 
Firstly, the basic and necessary 
'rights for participation in our society', 
and secondly, the basic and necessary responsibilities for 
responding to that society. 247 Atherton's vision, then is of 
'a participatory and reciprocal society' , and what is necessary 
to achieve this. 248 The basic rights which affirm the individual' s 
belonging to community, and which are necessary to participation 
are as follows:- 
249 
a) Civil and political liberties. 
b) Social rights ie. the right to live 
'according to self -chosen purposes.' 
Such rights include health care, housing and education. 
250 
c) Economic rights. These pick up the Titmuss point about 
economic dis-welfares which occur from technological transi- 
tion. In order to insure against these effects, income and 
employment would be necessary. 
251 
This much Tawney would have 
accepted. However, significant differences do begin to 
emerge. Firstly, Tawney does not specifically move into the 
realm of work as a right. He simply assumes a full employment 
si tua tion. 
252 
In any case, to argue that paid employment is 
necessary for participation in society raises many problems.253 
Secondly, as presented, his argument for economic rights moves 
away from Tawney' s position. He argues for communi tarian 
justice, but in fact argues for rights on the basis of their 
enabling the individual ' to realize their own ends.' 
254 
In this, Atherton begins to shift from an argument based upon 
a normative society to one based upon a 'normal society.' 
270. 
Thus he argues that the income necessary for articipation in 
society is that which allows the individual to play a normal 
255 
The context of ' normal' however is part in society. , 
not clear and could be defined in terms of an average, or 
acceptabi ti ty in material terms. For Tawney, however, 
distribution was intimately tied to the normative ie. duties 
owed to individuals, groups and society. 
256 
However, Atherton does not ultimately rely upon this rights or 
normalcy approach. When he moves to the question of responsibíli ty 
he returns to a Tawneyesque position. Like Preston, he does not 
see rights as tied to function, but does see contributions as 
'an indispensible compliment to rights; they are integral to a 
properly functioning person and community.' 257 
These important elements are then noted by Atherton. Firstly, he 
details the kinds of contribution that individuals can make. 
This list is very close to Tawney's obligation list, 258 but draws 
out more explicitly participation in cultural and leisure 
activities, in employment and in the informal economy. 
259 
Secondly, this appeal encourages a view of work as vocation. The 
theology of voca tion does two things. It 
' provides a disciplined purpose for work in all its legitimate 
forms by encouraging all to contribute in ways ultimately more 
beneficial to people and societies.' 260 
Thirdly, he argues that a Christian view of incentive is about 
more than self -interest. If the great importance 
'of the breadth of what people contribute to society, to human 
life and fulfillment' 
is accepted, 
261 
then the motivation of altruism cannot be 
excluded from public activity and must have an effect on the 
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question of rewards. If incentives are restricted only to an 
appeal to selfishness, this would ultimately radically of ect 
the common good. 262 Atherton quotes qogaman wi th approval on 
this. 
the fact that wrong incentives can exert such power often means 
that large numbers of people are given insufficient opportunity 
to experience human fulfillment. Lse of external incentives should 
be limited, where possible, to those things which lead people 
toward, not away from human fulfillment.' 263 
Thus, Atherton argues for the use of internal incentives (le. non 
financial) and for external incentives to be tied to service in 
some way. 264 Without specifying it, this brings Atherton very 
close to Tawney' s concept of function. 265 All incentives, 
including self- interest ones, should be, 
sublimated to the primary commi tment, the partici pa tins and 
reciproca 1 society.' 266 
Once again then, the conclusion must be tha t Atherton does not 
radically develop Tawney' s view of equality. He accepts both 
distributional and participatory equality as being essential and 
this in a framework of moral relationships where the state 
provides the individual wi th the opportuni ty to contribute and 
learn to contribute and this can expect the individual to do so. 267 
uS 
Atherton like Tawney, is concerned with both 
principles and practice and is content that the Church should 
268 advocate policy programmes. Thus, i f the Church is to be 
visionary, practical, and responsive to a complex and changing 
world, it must 
learn to think harder, and in more detail and more comprehen- 
sively than ever before.' 269 
His attempt to move beyond equality is, in effect, a deepening of 
equality such as Tawney attempted, which Atherton presents with 
272. 
greater theological depth and more systematically. The only 
substantive differences are threefold. 
Firstly, in stressing the rights of participation he gives more 
time to work its meaning and proposals for means of full employ- 
ment than Tawney. 270 Secondly, he continues the Preston theme 
of accepting the market as ' serviceable drudge' and not something 
inherently evil. 271 Thirdly, with :'_therton' s concentration upon 
corporate images and the ultimate allegiance to a participatory 
and reciprocal society, 272 he does not give evidence o the same 
liberal emphasis as Tawney betrays at various points. 273 
Wi th respect to the first of these differences, Tawney' s emphasis 
is far more upon work as community le. relationships and deci sion- 
making at work. '.Jith respect to the final of the differences, 
Atherton runs the danger of coercive government, he refers, on 
occasions, to the ' commi tment' or ' primary commi tment' tha t should 
be held to the Common Good. This commitment would involve 
restraints to individual interests, and incentives should be 
sublimated to the Common Good. 274 Of course, the primacy of this 
commi tment would not in itself involve coercion, providing that 
individuals had an opportuni ty to define the Common Good or social 
purposes 275 Atherton however, does not in their si tua tion. 
propose this or offer mechanisms whereby it might be possible. 
Tawney, of course, does not provide detailed mechanisms either, but 
is clear that social purpose is a dynamic thing involving the 
participation of individuals in defining and developing. 276 For 
Atherton, even his proposals for the reform o f democracy only begin 
to alter the basis of representation, they do not address the 
277 questions of active participation. 
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I would conclude then that despite an important attempt to 
resta to a Tawney view o f equality and develop i t, Atherton does 
not satisfactorily deal with the difficulties or shortfalls in 
Tawney, or always maintain the balance of Tawney' s position. 
Other Wri ters 
There are several other writers who have clearly been influenced 
by Tawney' s view of equality. However, in this section, I will 
confine mysel E to mentioning two writers in particular, who 
demonstrate how wide was the influence of Tawnev' s Christian view 
of equality. 
The first example is Robert Holman, a writer who clearly spans the 
divide between social policy and the Church. He was at one time 
a professor of Social Administration at Bath, and at the time of 
writing is a community worker at Casterhouse, Glasgow. He is also 
a Christian, a fact which he openly refers to in his writings. 
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In that context, he expresses his debt to R.H. Tawney and argues 
for the principle of social equality. Concern for this principle 
arises directly out of an examination of poverty. 279 Holman is not 
concerned wi th equality of treatment, but ra ther in promoting 
' each individual's uniqueness "without regard to the vulgar 
irrelevancies of class and income." ' 230 
He accepts relative equality, arguing against vast differences in 
income, wealth, environmental condition and power. 241 In all of 
this he follows Tawnev and especially in his concern for those who 
have not, 
control over the constraints which shape their responses and 
behaviour.' 282 
Holman' s justification of equality is consequential, in the sense 
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of giving more freedom for the indi vidual to develop. It also 
accepts some of Rawls' s view of egalitarianism as advocated by 
self- interest. 283 However, ultimately, Holman is not satisfied 
by the Rawls approach. He disputes that individuals behave in a 
consistently ra tiona l way. Moreover, he argues tha t it is not 
clear how Rawls' s cri teria of distribution are to be assessed, 
that is, 
need, merit and contribution to the common good.' 284 
A sounder basis for a caring society would ra ther be the un- 
condi tional recogni tion of human ty. 285 At this point, Holman 
introduces his deontological justification for equality, with 
particular reference to the Imago Dei argument. 286From that basis 
of the belief that 
' God created man in the image of Himself, and that He created the 
earth for man's benefi t,' 
Holman argues that three things follow. Firstly, all people 
are of equal worth. Social deprivation, which by definition leads 
to distress and disadvantage for valued people, should not be 
tolerated. 287 Secondly, the common sense of all people points to 
the basic ellowship - 
the commitment, concern and solidarity which could exist between 
people,' 288 
which should be pursued. Great differences in income and resources 
serve to break down fellowship. 289 Thirdly, Holman adds an 
element of the creationist doctrine not developed by Tawney, ie. 
the argument that as the earth is created for all, there can be no 
reason for restricting its abundance to only some. 290 This is 
central to '.iolman's argument for attacking inequality and depri- 
va tion. 
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Alongside the positive arguments for equality, Holman also 
stresses the dark side of the Christian concept of human nature 
and the implication of this for social organization. 
'It follows, as Tawney again argued that power should be dispersed, 
should not be concentrated in the hands of what could be an evil 
minority. Power as well as material resources should be more 
evenly distributed throughout society.' 291 
Holman does not fully work out the relationship between equality 
and other values, or for that matter between fundamental equality 
and distributional equality. Indeed, at one point he defines 
equality very narrowly as 
the drive to end social deprivations.' 292 
Nonetheless, like Tawney he accepts that there can be a plurality 
of values and cites democracy and freedom of expression as being 
important, alongside equality. Unlike Tawney he does not see 
those values as essentially related and writes of possible 
conflicts and complications. However, empirical evidence dem- 
onstrates that the pursuit of one value against the others is 
unsatisfactory. 293 Thus, whatever the difficulties, the various 
values must all be held in balance. Holman accepts then, the 
need for re- distribution of resources and with Tawney, the need to 
deal with underlying causes such as the private inheritance of 
wealth and the 
'stranglehold which public schools and older universities hold 
on the membership of eli to occupations.' 294 
However, he argues that Tawney along wi th other wri ters on social 
issues do not really tackle how their proposals are to be put 
into action - the means of change. 295 He argues that the means 
of change have to be political, personal influence and middle- 
class altruism being inadequate. However, he continues, political 
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means are rarely used to further social equality, precisely 
because the poor have no real political power and are thus unable 
to set the agenda for reform. Thus, 
the poor play little part in politics, in negotiating wage 
levels, or influencing the distribution of goods,' 
and participatory democracy becomes an 'illusion' 296 
Holman then contributes an im portant development to Tawney' s 
egalitarianism by arguing that community action would be an 
important means of helping the poor to develop a political voice 
for themselves. 
297 
Holman recognises that this is only one 
method, that there is not a great deal of empirical evidence to 
undergird it yet, 298 and that there are dangers involved in this 
299 
However properly run community method, a s with any other. ,   
action would involve greater control by the deprived over their 
environment and patterns of living, 
300 
and a greater voice in 
defining their aims, needs, problems and solutions. It would 
involve the individual in activity, and specifically, collective 
activity. By definition, one tenant refusing to be re- housed 
into slum property would have little impact, whereas a hundred 
such tenants would begin to exert power. 
301 
For Holman this is 
a process then of discovering power in collective action and 
learning to use it responsibly and effectively. 
302 
By this approach , not only is Holman developing the theme of 
participatory equality, he is actually using this as a means 
to change mal- distribution (and possibly also larger issues of 
democracy). Thus, communi tv action can bring, 
'harsh and unfair treatment' into the open, and persuade authori- 
ties to change their attitudes and practices. 303 
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In this, Holman plainly declares that the task of community 
action is not simply to further individuals and community interest, 
but to generate a debate on values and practice which the broader 
community can become involved in and thus take responsibility 
for espousing and declaring the aims and pin -poses of local 
government. As noted above, Terrill points to hints in Tawney' s 
work of the desire for a 'dialectical relationship' between an 
active community and a responsive government. 
304 
The concept of 
community action as put forward by Holman begins to put real 
flesh on these bones. Such action, also, when replicated through- 
out the nation could begin to set the agenda at national level. 
305 
The effect of such community action would not only be in terms 
of change of practice following a public examination of values, 
it would also involve a relational or attitudinal changebetween 
groups. ':fiddle class assumptions of the poor as inadequate or 
inferior would be challenged and gradually the poor's membership 
of society affirmed. 
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In one area then, Holman pays more 
attention than Tawney to the means of change and the way that 
equality of participation can become not simply a liberator of 
individuals, but also a liberator of whole communities, affecting 
both poor and non -poor. He recognizes that there is a thin line 
between simply asserting rights, and declaring common moral 
values. 307 However, in advocating the discovery and use of 
collective power guided by such moral insights, he provides a 
very real alternative to some liberation theologiaans. 
308 
Holman's centralist position is reaffirmedat the end of his book 
where he reminds us of his Christian and in particular Tawneyesque 
position. In this he argues that it is not possible for the 
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material and spiritual to be separated anymore than one can view 
an individual apart from community or the effects of social 
organization or attitudes. 
309 
Hence, like Tawney, he sees gross 
inequalities as leading to a breakdown of individuals and above 
all, fellowship; 
'when great disparities occur, then not only are distress and 
disadvantage created, but so are behaviour patterns which lead to 
apathy, extreme aggression and the inability to survive in modern 
society. In short, grossly unequal conditions are likely to 
promote those factors which inhibit the growth of happy relation- 
ships.' 
His final sentence is tantalizingly unclear. He declares his 
belief in seeking 
' those structural changes which will lead to a society in which 
the distribution of resources will facilitate concern for others, 
tolerance and sharing.' 
This would seem to indicate a mechanistic model whereby a change 
in patterns of distribution would lead to a change in attitude. 
310 
However, his writing up to this point gives the impression of a 
much more gradual process with, for example, social workers 
helping individuals to develop and promoting 'a concern for 
individuals', and communities articulating those views and 
Finding power. Nonetheless a change in structures remains 
important, to facilitate the continued growth of such attitudes 
and of fellowship as such. 
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A second writer who reveals the influence of Tawney is E.F. 
Schumacher. Some would see his writings in economic and social 
change as utopian, 
312 
whilst others categorize Schumacher as a 
istributist. 
313 
However, Schumacher makes frequent references to 
Tawney including the judgement that he is 
'one of the greatest ethical thinkers of our time.' 314 
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Schumacher does not spend a great deal of his time on equality per 
se. 'y'onetheless, his basic premise is that God' s purpose in 
creation is for all people to develop to their full capacity, 315 
which demands respect for the dignity and freedom of all men. 
316 
Like Tawney, however, he sees that equality of freedom carries 
317 Thus Schumacher emphasizes the th í t responsíbi 1i ties, p -.-' 
importance o` structures that will enable individuals to develop 
as autonomous, cri tical beings (' persons not puppets') 318 and also 
which would enable individuals to develop their sense of respon- 
sibility. Thus education must enable individuals: 
to act as neighbours, to render service to his fellows - man as a 
social being, To act as persons as autonomous centres of power 
and responsibility, that is, to be creatively engaged, using and 
developing the gifts we have been blessed with - man himself and 
herself.' 319 
At the base of this is, like Tawney, the moralist who sees moral 
awareness as common to all and this requires individuals: 
to act as spiritual beings, that is to say, to act in accordance 
with their moral impulses - man as a divine being.' 320 
The major focus of Schumacher' s wri ting though, is bo th narrower 
and broader than Tawney' s. He focuses on work and how equality of 
respect can be implemented in the work si tua tion, but also 
attempts to demonstrate its applicability to Third ;7orld as well as 
developed nations. Central to the work place has to be equality 
of participation enabling the individual to take control of their 
situation in work. Such industrial democracy would tend to become 
the most efficient form of work. 321 However, 
' it is not of decisive importance whether these arrangements work 
better or worse than undemocratic enterprise; they are better 
because they are more in line wi th the meaning of life than the 
wealth -producing machine which is based upon and motivated 
by the a,, ̂ ,uisitive instinct.' 322 
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Like Tawney, Schumacher is concerned with principles, motivation 
and action. Also like Tawney he does not accept functionless 
property as helping to motivate service or as respecting the 
dignity of man. 
323 
Through the private property of the passive 
324 
owner, reward is achieved parasitically, 'on the work of others.' 
Schumacher does not, however, draw from this that nationalization 
is the only answer, and where it is the answer, like Tawney, this 
is not on dogmatic grounds. 
325 
Thus retention of ownership of production will depend upon the 
performance of service. 
326 
This will most often pertain to small 
scale enterprises. 327 Producers 
'should also stand in a direct relation to the community,' 
so that their primary responsibilities be made clear and not 
forgotten in subsidiary responsibilities to shareholders. 
Nationalization of large industries thus made sense in that it 
clearly underlined the responsibilities of the industry and who 
they were accountable to. 
328 
Schumacher therefore, was less concerned with distributive equality 
and more with democratic arrangements both within industry and 
between industry and the consumer. In all this he draws heavily on 
Tawney, especially with respect to ownership. 
However, differences and developments do exist. Firstly, between 
small enterprise and large business, Schumacher argues for a 
range of medium scale enterprise to change to worker ownership, 
as in the case of Scott Bader. 
329 
Secondly, Schumacher 
moves most directly away from Tawnev's position when he argues 
that along with any change in the superstructure - including 
expansion of nationalization, welfare or re- distributive taxation - 
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there had to come a change in the technological base. Indeed, 
Schumacher argues that 
'If there is no change in the base - which is technology - there 
is unlikely to be any real change in the superstructure.' 330 
Schumacher's guidelines for appropriate technology are the subject 
for another debate. 
331 
It may, however, be noted in this 
debate that even these are connected by Schumacher to equality. 
Firstly, by looking for ' human -scale technology' , he is aiming to 
332 
y, argues that Secondly he  increase participation.  
'immense capital requirements are a principle of exclusion, are to- 
tally incompatible with any ideas of justice or equality.' 333 
Thus, great capital investments in for example the development 
of the motor car make the product a viable option for only some 
of society. 
Both Schumacher and Holman then are good examples of Christian 
wri ters outside theology who have been influenced by Tawney' s 
equality and who have taken important elements of i t and devel- 
oped it in strategies for action. 
Other Influences of Tawney' s Equality 
The examples above reveal the extent of Tawney' s influence upon 
some Christian thinkers at a theoretical and planning level. 
However, Tawney's influence is seen not simply in the writers who 
claim' him, or develop his point of view. It is also seen in 
the many committees and reports that he was involved in. 
Atherton notes this of many secular committees. 
334 
Two important 
Church reports also reveal his influence. The first worthy of 
note is the report of the Oxford Conference on Church, Community 
and S ta te. Tawney was a member of the commi ttee dealing wi th 
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Section III of the report on ' Church, Community and State in 
Relation to the Cconomic Order.' 
335 
Tawney' s paper, ' Christianity and the Social Order' was in fact 
written for the conference 
336 
and clear echoes of this can be 
found in the report itself. The report emphasizes the equal worth 
of all humans and notes that differences of class or race 
though important on their own plane, are external and trivial.' 337 
Any institution which obscures the common humanity of all by 
'emphasizing the external accidents of birth or wealth, or social 
position, is ipso facto anti -Christian.' 338 
The aim of any distribution is to reinforce the common humanity 
and enable fellowship to grow. 
339 
The report also shows concern 
for freedom in terms of the individual' s control of their 
situation and for a responsible use of power. 
340 
Also the 
report stresses the importance of social function in any view of 
property. Thus, 
'it should further be affirmed that individual property rights 
must never be maintained or exercised without regard to their 
social consequences or without regard to the contribution which the 
community makes in the contribution of all wealth.' 341 
The report, however, was light, compared to Tawney, on partici- 
patory equality and in particular on suggested plans for imple- 
menting equality. Like Tawney, it urges that the existing 
situation in society be thoroughly examined revealing 
the human consequences of present forms of behaviour.' 
342 
However, the report states that 
'Christian teaching should deal with ends, in the sense of long - 
range goals, standards, and principles in the light of which 
every concrete situation and every proposal for improving it must 
be tested.' 343 
In terms of changing the economic order, the re ̂ ort provi des only 
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one paragraph (p. 129) which stresses the role of the individual 
Christian, and their contribution to the economic order. This 
contrasts sharply with Tawney's Oxford paper, which emphasizes 
the importance of giving substance to princi pies in order to make 
the principles intelligible. 
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The second Christian conference which is worthy of note is the 
1924 C.O.P.E.C. 
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In this conference, Tawney sat on the 
commission for industry and property. Like the Oxford Conference 
report in which Tawney was involved, the report of the C.O.P.E.C. 
commission on industry and property is light on specific policy 
plans, and whilst it takes some time to consider the problems of 
industry and property as they then stood, it tends towards the 
generalizations which are often the mark of corporate productions. 
Nonetheless, some of the influence of Tawney may be seen in the 
emphasis upon equality as the first Christian social principle. 
The real meaning of the concept of human equality 
'is the immeasurable value of the individual personality to God 
and therefore to honest men.' 346 
This basic principle also demands, 
'the recognition of the freedom of the individual' 347 
in order to develop the personality. Crucially a 'reasonable' 
social order, 
'will Furnish the foundation on which individual Freedom may be 
built.' 348 
Alongside this was a concern for fellowship based upon the view of 
members of society as 'mutually dependent beings.' 
349 
These 
350 basic principles form the first test of any s ocial conditions. 
Though the report does not move forward to specific suggestions as 
to how these principles may positively be applied, it -'oes list a 
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series of objectives. Several of these reveal a Tawneyesque 
stance: 
an increase in participatory equality in industry 
more equal distribution of income and wealth 
- the substitution of the motive of service for that of gain 
- the tying of property rights to contributions to 
the good of the whole commun ty.' 351 
Conclusion 
Tawney' s view of equality has clearly influenced many Christian 
wri ters in Bri tain. The extent of that influence and the extent 
to which equality has been seen by church writers as a major 
principle in Christian social ethics has, however, varied. The 
reports mentioned above have tended either to avoid equality as a 
central principle or emphasize the importance of equality and 
a tti tudes, and a tti tude change, rather than outline specific 
egalitarian policies. 
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Theologians such as Preston and 
: therton have considerably deepened and developed the theological 
view of equality without developing specific aspects of egalitarian 
policy. Though they reveal sympathy wi th particular policies and 
recommend some, they either avoid the dangers of detailed policy 
work or, in some cases suggest policies which do not develop 
important aspects of Tawney' s approach. 
353 
They do, however, 
recognize, wi th Tawney, the need for a comprehensive approach 
taking in equality in relation to principle and practice. 
Perhaps the most striking examples of Tawney' s influence and o f 
development of his equality are found not in the wri ters of 
academic theology but amongst the lav Christian writers consi ern'. 
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Schumacher develops Tawney' s views of equality in industry, whilst 
Holman explores ways in which Tawney' s complex view of equality 
can be developed in local communities. The former has been 
judged by many to be utopian, the latter, however, places Tawney' s 
equality firmly in contemporary situations and examines mechanisms 
for distributing and developing the use of power. 
354 
doubt 
this reflects a different perception from the theologians, and it 
could be argued that the lay writers do not do justice to the 
theology. However, they clearly do more justice to the intent 
of Tawney vis -a -vis equality, ie. that it must be exemplified 
to be intelligible. 
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The influence o f Tawney' s equa li ty on Christian wri ters then is 
clear. That is perhaps equally striking, however, is the compar- 
ative lack of interest in Christian wri ters since Tawney, in 
ei ther developing Tawney' s equality, for example, in industry or 
education, or in new areas, or even in addressing the subj ect of 
equality in depth at all. 
356 
The last major work was 'Equality 
and Excellence'. The paucity of research is striking when compared 
to philosophy and sociology. 
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The reasons for this, as touched 
upon at various points above seems to range from fear of using the 
concept to concern that the church's identi ty be lost if it 
enters the arena of operative equality with policy programmes. 
Ranged against this is Tawney' s positive advocacy of equality, with 
a deep interpretation of equality of respect as the central or 
ultimate principle with dynamic relationships with other important 
ones. In the next chapter, I intend to relate Tawney' s equa l i tv 
to recent debate about equality and demonstrate its contemporary 
relevance. This will lead to some general conclusions about equality. 
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Chapter 7 Tawney's Equality and The Modern Debate 
Despi te Lakoff' s assertion that equality is no longer a major 
topic for debate, 1 it is still central to any discussion of policy 
and values. 2 Recent discussion has centred upon refining an 
acceptable definition of equality and finding uncontroversial 
grounds for this. 
In this chapter, I will examine attempts to do this in terms of 
person- centred equality, of a global domain. 
3 
In particular, I 
will focus upon the work of John Rawls and of socialist writers who 
have built upon his work. 
The conclusion will be in two parts. Firstly, I argue that 
Tawney' s posi tion is more convincing than ?awls and related views. 
Secondly, and more generally, I argue that person- centred equality 
of a global domain is not without a 
of respect and a perfectionist base, and that the Christian view 
provides these most compellingly. In all this, I do not argue 
simply that Tawney' s view of equality remains relevant. Despite 
limited awareness of some modern issues, Tawney's equality 
remains relevant precisely because by definition it is open to 
development. Rather does the chapter argue that Tawney' s view is 
relevant to the present debate. In pursuit of this I will first 
examine the justification, and then the meaning and practice of 
equality. 
The Justification of Equality 
A major element in the recent debates on equality has been the 
nature of any justification. Rawls, for instance, argues that to 
justify egalitarian justice, one is not required to work from first 
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principles or assumptions. For him, the justification of an 
egalitarian position 
'rests upon the entire conception' of a theory, 
'and how it fits in with and organizes our considered judgements 
in reflective equilibrium.' 5 
Justification is thus, 
'a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of every- 
thing fitting together into one coherent view.' 6 
In more detail this involves three elements. Firstly, the principles 
of justice are argued for 
'on the basis of reasonable stipulation concerning the choice of 
such conceptions.' 7 
Secondly, Rawls aims to demonstrate that the theory proposed 
'matches the fixed point of our considered convictions better than 
the other familiar doctrines.' 8 
This is achieved by examining the kinds of institutions demanded 
by justice and the duties and obligations imposed by it. Thirdly, 
the feasibility of the theory of justice is tested. Importantly, 
the stability and congruence of the theory and any underlying 
concept of right and good do not determine acceptance of the 
first principles but rather confirm this. 
In all this, Rawls is concerned to chart a course between 
utilitarianism9and perfectionism. 10 His concern with not justi- 
fying egalitarian justice from first principles focuses precisely 
on equality of respect. On the one hand respect is essential to 
the effective functioning of the principles of justice, for without 
it there can be no sense of justice, argues Rawls. However, 
' the notion of respect, or the inherent worth of persons' 
cannot be the basis of justice, precisely because 
these ideas call for interpretation.' 
11 
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Such provision of meaning is provided by t'he priciplès of right 
and justice, principles, 
'which are already independently derived.' 12 
Hence, argues Rawls, the so called first principles depend upon 
justice for meaning and the important level of justification 
concerns the concept of justice. 
There are two immediate problems with Rawls's view of justification. 
The first is that to place the burden of justification upon 
coherence does not provide adequate criteria for determining 
between different theories. As noted above, 13 Tawney' s view of 
equality can claim coherence. He too points to 'considered 
convictions' common to all which confirm the basic principle of 
equality. The problem is that his convictions and basic principles 
differ from Rawls at significant points, 14 and Rawls does not 
provide criteria to judge between them. 
The second problem with Rawls' s view of justification is that by 
relying heavily upon the confirmatory force of 'considered 
convictions' he seriously diminishes the applicability of his 
theory. 15 As Gutmann puts i t, 
' the claims to justification end where non -egalitarian 
institutions begin.' 16 
Thus, Rawls' s theory would find little acceptance in different 
societies or times where individualist or non- egalitarian conviction 
prevailed. In contrast to this, Tawney' s view of equality, 
because of its deontological element of justification, 17 claims 
to be applicable to all times and societies. This claim can be 
sustained precisely because Tawney appeals to a basic ideal which 
18 transcends particular social expression. 
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Nei ther of these two points are intended as knock down arguments 
of Rawls' s posi tion. Their aim is simply to point to limi tations 
and inadequacies of Rawls's view of the justification process. 
Perhaps more serious, and lying at the base of Rawls' s chosen 
method of justification, are the reasons why he argues that it is 
not possible to begin from the first principle of equality of 
respect, in terms of justification. As noted above, Rawls accepts 
the importance of equal worth. His theory of justice provides a 
rendering of the ideal, ie. 
' to respect persons is to recognize that they possess an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot override.' 19 
However, the ideal depends upon right and justice to find meaning. 
In this, Rawls,is arguing two things, firstly that equality of 
respect as such has no substantive meaning, and secondly that the 
only way of finding such meaning is with reference to the principles 
of justice, arrived at independently. Such a view of equality of 
respect is at best controversial, and at worst untenable, and that 
for the following reasons: Firstly, the term justice itself 
demands interpretation. Rawls spends much of his book not simply 
justifying his theory of justice, but interpreting the theory in 
terms of fairness, a term which in turn he interprets as the 
product of rational choice in reflective equilibrium. The meaning 
of this in turn depends upon a particular view of rationality 
which in turn is exemplified and confirmed in a particular 
anthropology. Clearly here there is the danger of circular 
reasoning. 20 Such a process, where one general principle finds 
meaning from other general principles, serves to warn against 
relying purely upon a concept of justice to interpret equality of 
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respect. The grounds of Rawls's method of justification become 
therefore no longer clear. 
The second and more important point, however, concerns the status 
of equality of respect and other possible sources of meaning. 
Purely as a formal /general principle, equality by definition, will 
always lack clear meaning. Hence, as noted above, it is necessary 
to develop a substantive or operative view of equality in order to 
find meaning. 
This does not, however, mean that the formal concept of equality of 
respect must of itself, become vacuous or otiose. On the contrary, 
even a minimal interpretation of the term respect points to a 
meaning of some care or concern for all persons. The meaning of 
the concept in this case is that of an attitude, and such an 
attitude contains elements both of the formal, in that it applies 
to all, and of the substantive, in that it is expressed in any 
substantive view of equality and affects how such a view may be 
put into practice. As noted above, such respect demands a 
commitment to the individual and his or her self -realization. 
21 
Rawls rightly argues that equality of respect could not be the sole 
basis for equality, at least in the sense of all justification 
flowing from the concept. However, this does not mean that 
equality of respect canbe excised from the justification altogether. 
It is therefore, at the least, questionable whether the meaning 
of equality of respectmust rely solely upon distributive justice, 
or even whether the meaning can be purely confined to philoso- 
phi cal categories. 
22 
Two points must be made finally in this section. Firstly, in the 
Tawney approach, the primary value of equality of respect actually 
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helps to define justice per se, and to target the aims of justice, 
freedom and fellowship. 
23 As shall be seen in the debate on 
substantive equality, this has important consequences in terms of 
participatory as well as distributive equality. 24 Secondly, 
the Christian view of equality of respect is clearly the strongest 
version of this particular approach. As noted above, it derives 
its interpretation from agape, and in Tawney s argument in parti- 
cular, from the Incarnation. This is a most remarkable combina- 
tion for not only does this express most profoundly the 'ultimate 
attitude', it also gives a substantive example of this in the 
person of Jesus Christ and the activity of God. Given such a 
meaning there can be no question of a conceptual regress, le. of 
always moving to another general concept for meaning. It may of 
course, be argued, that such a meaning would be very hard to 
justify, ie. that it would depend upon many controversial meta - 
25 
However, against  t that i t may be physical or religious ideas. ,  , 
argued that, like Rawls, 26 Tawney is not out to frame a proof 
based upon Christian doctrine. Rather does Christian doctrine 
provide the supreme exemplar of the ultimate equality of respect 
ie. God' s love in Christ. As such, belief in and an awareness of 
God provides the supreme experience of the attitude of equality of 
respect, with, as Jenkins emphasized, the central experience of 
being valued ie, forgiveness, 
27 
de may conclude then that Rawls does not give adequate grounds 
for his method of justification. At the very least he supplies no 
criteria for determining between his and another coherent justi- 
fication. More importantly, Rawls provides no adequate grounds 
for ignoring the role of equality of respect in any justification, 
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or for confining the meaning such equality to that of 
distributional justice. 28 
Examining the elements of Rawls' s justification in more detail, 
we must first note that it gives rise to two egalitarian principles 
of justice. The first defines the fundamental equality which 
applies to the 
'respect owed to persons irrespective of their social position,' 
29 
and is stated as follows: 
'Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system 
of liberty for all.' 30 
The second principle is about distributional justice and is stated 
as follows: 
'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings principles, and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportuni ty.' 31 
The first principle takes priority over the second. 
As already noted, the meaning of equality of respect is supplied 
for Rawls by the theory of justice which underlines these princip- 
les. As to how that differs in concept and practice from Tawney' s 
equality will be considered in the following sections. Here, it 
must be noted that Rawls relies heavily for justification upon 
firstly, the hypothetical description of a state of reflective 
equilibrium known as the 'original position' , and secondly, upon 
a particular view of anthropology. 
32 
The first of these justificatory appeals refers to a hypothetical 
congress of people each representing a social class. They are 
si tuated behind a ' veil of ignorance' , 
33 
which means that they 
do not know which social class they belong to or at what stage 
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of development their society is at, and that they have only 
general information about human psychology and the laws of science. 
From such a situation, Rawls argues, the congress will choose 
unanimously the principles which will regulate whatever society 
they turn out to belong to, this guided by rational self- interest. 
Each knows that he will have a plan of life (his own conception of 
the good) but does not know what this will be. The individuals 
will therefore agree to social principles which will give them the 
best chance of achieving their life plans, whatever this may be. 
B definition these decisions would not take into account special 
interests and so would be objectively just. 
The first point to note about this mechanism of justification is 
that it does in fact force the individual into deciding for these 
principles of egalitarian justice. Some philosophers have suggested 
that in fact members of the original position could have chosen 
differently. 34 However, it is clear that, if one accepts the 
scene of the original position, that the members would be obliged 
to choose some similar result. 35 It is not simply that the 
members are said to be equally ignorant of society and their own 
life plans, or that they all equally operate according to rational 
self interest. We are also told that all accept that there are 
certain ' primary goods' , headed by liberty and self respect, goods 
which are necessary for any individual to achieve life plans. 36 
Rawls does not specify the primary goods in detail when working 
out the original position. This comes later in his sections which 
confirm the insights of the original position. However, he clearly 
fixes primary goods as a sine qua non for the development of any 
life plan. The self- interested person would therefore in the 
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original position necessarily choose a situation where he or she 
would ensure an acceptable level of primary goods as this is 
deemed necessary even if the life plan of the individual will be 
to maximize material goods. However, this builds into the origi- 
nal position a logical inevitability such that there is little 
difference from the method Rawls himself wishes to avoid ie. 
drawing out the logic of a particular concept or first principle. 
The second problem with this approach then moves to any confir- 
mation of the original position If the original position has an 
almost logical force, then the real weight of any justification 
will in fact be placed on the so called confirmation. Granted 
that this would not constitute proof, there would nonetheless need 
to be convincing evidence about human nature and moral psychology 
that would lead one to accept the picture arrived at by the 
' original posi tion' . 
A crucial first question in this respect hangs over the so called 
'primary goods', the desire for which is part of the definition 
of a rational individual. 
37 
Rawls infers that self- respect is 
p primary good. This primary good is necessary the most im ortant  
because it provides the sense of worth and confidence which is 
essential for any intentions to be valued and action to be carried 
through. 
39 
However, whilst this may be an element of the role 
of self -respect, Rawls provides no empirical evidence to show that 
y self-respect In fact, it is this is exclusively how   is used, 
not difficult to imagine situations in which self- respect, far 
from preceding action, could depend upon the fulfillment of a 
particular action. This might be self- respect measured narrowly 
in terms of achievement in a chosen task, or profession, or more 
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broadly self- respect which arises from fulfilling ones duty either 
to self (in terms of developing personality and talents) or to 
others. For Tawney, reflection confirms that, 
'spiritual well- being' 41 does involve, 
' finding ones work and doing it,' and 
'performing certain primary duties, care of home, wife and family, 
direction of industry by which (one) lives, a share in public 
life.' 42 
In all this, Tawney would not deny the importance of self- respect 
as a primary good, and he specifically notes the effect of distri- 
butional inequality on the estimation of the individual' s own 
worth. 
43 
Rather, does he see self- respect as a more complex 
phenomenon, the achievement of which cannot depend solely upon 
distributional equality. 
44 
Given this, a crucial element in 
Rawls' s argument is taken away. On the one hand, this view of 
self- respect does not confirm the original position. On the other 
hand, i t demands the original position be broadened to take account 
of this greater complexity. Either way, the crucial justificatory 
weight which Rawls places on self -respect as a primary good 
becomes too much for the concept to bear. 
Significantly, Rawls' s view of self- respect depends heavily upon 
his conception of goodness as rationality. 
45 
This is the 'thin 
theory' of the good which Rawls uses purely as justificatory 
device. 
46 
However, in terms of self- respect it becomes a 
deceptive concept, which actually ends up defining the conditions 
of self and mutual respect. These conditions would 




'call upon their educated endowment and arouse in each a sense of 
mastery, and they fit together in one scheme of activity that all 
can appreciate and enjoy.' 47 
In his search for a non -controversial basis to justice, Rawls has 
here moved into further difficulties. Firstly, the fact that 
self- respect is characterized in terms of the conception of 
goodness as rationality confirms the view that his thinking is 
48 
circular. If considerations of self- respect are to confirm 
the original position, then an objective description of self - 
respect would be necessary in order to match the two. Rawls, 
however, draws upon his justificatory mechanism for the original 
position precisely to describe the basic ' primary good' which should 
be confirming the original position'. Secondly, in framing 
conditions for self and mutual respect, Rawls ignores a whole range 
of empirical evidence which argues that as individuals develop, 
they require respect which is not conditional. It is the giving 
of this love as the individual grows which helps them aquire the 
confidence and assurance of which Rawls speaks. 
49 
This is not 
to deny that respect for rational life plans etc. is important 
for the continued development of self- respect. It is to argue 
that there are no grounds for confining an understanding of self - 
respect to that. Rawls's position here underlines the difficulties 
in any contract theory, which are bound to exclude duties outside 
the basis for the contract, or similarly awareness of respect not 
seen in those terms, for example in the relationship of the 
family. 
Rawls' s attempt to view good in terms of rationality causes further 
problems for justification. Firstly, if good is defined as rationa- 
lity, then it would be interesting to speculate how Rawls could 
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accommodate either the concept of sin of evil. Presumably they 
would be described in terms of the non -rational or irrational. 
There must needs therefore be some judgement of value to distinguish 
that which was intentionally non -rational or perversly so and that 
which is acceptable. Of course, Rawls may wish to be without either 
of the two concepts. In that case he would fall into the second 
problem of how to explain so much patently evil behaviour in the 
world, even in terms of simply going against the principles of 
justice which he espouses. These points have great relevance to the 
justification of equality. It is precisely sin and the propensity 
of human beings to act irresponsibly in relation to great concen- 
trations of power which demands that power be dispersed and that 
accountability be improved. 50 Rawls' s' original position' 
provides a quite different picture with individuals ruled by reason. 
Of course, Rawls would not want to see this as reality but as a 
hypothetical mechanism for reachinga definition of justice. 
However, even if we accept the 'original position' as such a 
mechanism, there would be no reason for the individuals to abide 
by the rules established behind the veil of ignorance, once they 
had returned to the society which would eventually emerge from 
this exercise. It is precisely the conditions of the 'original 
position' which provide ' self- interested reasons' for continuing. 
51 
Once out of these conditions, self- interest and rationality 
would be determined in relation to different conditions. Thus, 
ei ther account has to be taken of man's sinful na ture, 
52 
or consistency demands a perfectionist stance which is more than 
self- interest le. which balances concern for self and others. 
53 
Alongside the 'original position' and confirmatory evidence, 
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Rawls' s justification relies heavily upon the concept of the 
moral person. The idea of man as a moral agent being owed respect 
is not, of course, new. 
54 
It, however, and the broader argument 
that equality of respect is grounded in certain features of humanity 
still holds currency in some circles. Rawls, quite apart from 
his original position, sees this as the basis of equality. Moral 
persons, 
'are entitled to equal justice' 
and moral persons are distinguished by two features: 
' First, they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a 
conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life) 
and second, they are capable of having (and are assumed to aquire) 
a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to 
act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum 
degree.' 55 
The upshot of this position is that 
those who can give justice are owedjustice.' 56 
A writer such as Lukes broadens the argument considerably, searching 
for the basic features of human beings which 
'command equal consideration or respect.' 57 
The features number three: 
a) the capacity of human beings to form intentions and purposes 
b) the capaci ty to ' think' thoughts and perform actions 
c) the capaci ty for self -development 58 
Lukes, in fact, sees himself as part of the Rawlsictn tradition 
and also calls upon Tawney for his characterization of self- 
respect. 
59 He sees the three above features as 
'at least part of the ground on which we accord (humans) respect. 
60 
Rawls is more specific, noting that there are many problems with 
the concept of moral personality or moral agent, and wri tes that 
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an argument from this basis is confirmatory rather than a direct 
justification. 
61 
There are, however, many problems with this whole line of justifi- 
cation. Firstly, as noted above, Rawls's use of the justification 
by confirmation is very questionable. Even with respect to moral 
personality, definition is entirely dependánt upon a concept of 
justice as fairness which requires confirmation in any description 
of the moral personality. In fact, the statement 
' those who can give justice are owed justice' 
62 
belies any assertion that the argument is purely confirmatory. 
The capacity to give egalitarian justice is a direct ground for the 
receipt of such justice. Secondly, to rely on such grounds 
leads, as Rawls recognized, to potential problems of exclusion. 
63 
If the features detailed by Rawls and Lukes are adhered to 
rigidly, then they would exclude the mentally handicapped, some 
forms of mental illness, and quite possibly some members of 
different cultures. 
64 
Rawls' s response is then to argue that in the first two cases, i t 
is necessary to assume that individuals have a life plan etc., 
they 
65 However, this entirely begs the or treat them as if  had, 
question as to why we should treat such individuals 'as if' they 
are humans. If the grounds for equal respect are the features 
referred to, then the grounds for equal respect for those who do 
not have those features must logically be different. Those grounds 
could only be found in either a broader view of what constitutes 
human ty 66 or an unconditional version of equality of respect. 
This latter is precisely the stance of Tawney's justification, 
which sees everyone born into the human species as being unique, 
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nd, by implication as having something to offer ie. a unique and 
important role or capacity or talent. As noted above, this leads 
to a view of equality which looks for pertinent differences in 
individuals. When applied to the mentally handicapped, this moves 
from the bland assumption of humanity to the very positive search 
for uniqueness in each individual. 
None of this is to deny that the features of humanity are relevant 
to the justification of equality of respect. At the least they give 
general pointers as to the conditions, resources and relation- 
ships necessary for self -development. Such features, however, 
cannot be the total ground for global, person- centred equality. 
The ground must necessarily be some form of the ultimate attitude 
of respect or concern for all. 67 Indeed, such an attitude is 
assumed in Rawls' s inclusion of the mentally handicapped etc. in 
his definition of humanity. He does not, however, draw this out 
or recognize the importance of it. Once again then, Tawney demon- 
strates a keener understanding of the necessary elements in any 
justification of equality. 
68 
Rawls's view and justification of equality has been very influential 
and one Rawlsian argument for equality and for minimally, the 
provision of a welfare state has been put forward by Raymond 
Plant. His argument is important to note not least because he is 
a Christian. 
69 
Plant's argument begins by accepting the basic 
liberal view that, 
'as purposive creatures, liberty to pursue our own good in our 
own way is central to us.' 70 
However, in order to pursue the 'good life' , the individual requires 
two goods, survi val and autonomy. These generate certain basic 
71 needs, including income and wealth, education and health care. 
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In this, Plant wishes to refute the New Right' s insistence that 
equality of respect should involve simply non -interference. 
72 
In so doing, he aims to demonstrate the connection between liberty 
and equali ty and argues that in addi tion to negative rights, 
there should be positive rights which secure the full value of 
liberty. The latter is a Rawlsian concept which refers to the 
liberty which genuinely enables an individual to pursue his or her 
life plan. 
73 
As stated, however, the arguement for distributional equality is 
limited. Firstly, it begs too many questions, such as what 
autonomy is, and how needs associated with it may be satisfied. 
Secondly, by seeing equality as primarily instrumental, íe. to 
achieving freedom, 
74 
Plant does not answer the question of whose 
responsibility it is to fulfill such needs in the first place. 
The important point here is that Plant' s initial grounds for 
commitment to equality are individualist and libertarian. He is 
concerned that each individual should be able to pursue his or her 
own good in their own way. However laudable this aim is, it does 
not as such provide the grounds for the fulfillment of the needs by 
the state. It could still be argued that such needs are best 
fulfilled by the individual themselves. At the same time, the 
pluralist vision of individuals pursuing their own good in their 
own way is also inadequate because it provides no moral context for 
those 'goods'. Without such a context this egalitarian position 
will gravitate to the negative morality of the marginal egalitarians 
in which liberty becomes indefeasible. 
75 
In short Plant' s 
argument lacks precisely the emphasis upon unconditional equality 
of respect and perfectionism which Tawney demonstrates. Without 
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these, he has no ground for commitment and relies exclusively 
upon liberty as his ground for morality. 
Plant, like Rawls, wishes to avoid perfectionism. 76 However, i t is 
not clear that their view of perfectionism is reasonable or that 
perfectionism per se should be avoided. Rawls sees perfectionism 
as prescriptive ie. prescribing specific ways of life as superior 
to others. 
77 
However, as noted above, Tawney provides a perfec- 
tionism which is not prescriptive. It certainly argues for a 
series of principles, and for particular means of implementing 
those. However, the principles themselves are too general to be 
prescriptive and the means of implementing them include a strong 
emphasis upon participatory equality which precisely gives indivi- 
duals opportunity to work out their own good in relation to the 
network of relationships and demands in which they find themselves. 
Significantly, Plant recognizes the importance of participatory 
equality, but his chosen argument precisely presents no grounds for 
i t. 
78 
Rawls, whilst protesting against perfectionism, consistently 
assumes some form of it, minimally that an autonomous life is 
essential to human well- being. Without an appeal to such a 
standard, writes Haksar, 
'Rawls cannot demonstrate why the doctrine of equal respect commits 
us to a belief in a liberal and open society.' 79 
Once again therefore, there is the need for grounds for commitment 
to the self -realization of individuals (equality of respect), 
and also a framework of moral meaning which broadly defines self - 
realization and the means to it, and explains why such a standard 
is important. Without such perfectionism of this second element, 
there can be no standard and wi thout a standard there can be no 
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ultimate justification. 
Another approach to the justification of equality has been that of 
' 
80 
Bernard Williams, in an influential paper 'The Idea of Equality. 
Faced with questions about the transcendgent basis for equality, 
and about the actual moral content of the concept of equality, 
Williams attempts to circumvent the level of moral discourse and 
find the ground for equality either in conceptual truth, or 
everyday language. This appeal also provides the criterion for 
distribution. Using the example of medical care, Williams rests 
his argument on the logic of relevant reasons. For Williams, the 
relevant reason for the distribution of health care is ill health. 
This relevant reason is basically found in the concept of medical 
care per se, or by an elucidation of the common moral assumptions 
81 
82 
which are the base of correct practice in our medical institutions. 
This same logic is applied to all the basic needs for the human 
being. 83 William' s method of justification then has echoes of 
Rawls in that he turns to moral practice 
84 
for confirmation. 
However, unlike Rawls he looks to the internal logic of the 
relevant concept or practice. 
Unfortunately, William' s method of justification is no more 
convincing than Rawls. The concept of relevant reasons is relative 
to the good social practices of an institution or society. What 
is precisely at issue is what practices are good, le. institutional 
practices themselves require to be interpreted according to some 
broader view of justice. Any attempt to rely solely upon concepts 
or practice would of course, lead to a serious limiting of the 
application of this method - for not all institutions or societies 
85 see need as exclusively the criterie/iof distribution. 
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Similar points could be made about the so- called citizenship 
school. Harris, for example, argues citizenship can be seen as 
the basis of entitlement to equal distribution. The distribution 
is of rights, which pertain to the recognition of an individual' s 
status as a member of society. 86 However, whilst the concept 
of membership is useful in articulating relationships and 
responsibilities, not least of society or community to individuals, 
itis not a sufficient ground, of itself, for entitlement to equal 
distribution. membership remains both a conditional ground, with 
difficulties arising as to individuals not counted as members, and 
a concept which ultimately rests upon a definition of society or 
community for meaning. It is thus possible to argue for a hier- 
archical society in which individuals are accorded different worth 
and in which citizenship requires unequal distribution. Harris's 
own view of citizenship remains morally neutral requiring equal 
access 
to valued forms of life.' 87 
As a result, like Williams, his view of equality becomes relative. 
Thus, even the concept of citizenship requires both a ground of 
unconditional worth and a perfectionist element which indicates 
roles and responsibilities which citizens are enabled to fulfill 
through distribution. 
88 
The evidence examined above indicates that Tawney' s justification 
of equality is more convincing than recent major attempts. These 
attempts provide no adequate reason for excluding equality of 
respect from any justification. The exclusion appears to be 
largely through a fear of perfectionism, and yet most of the 
attempts assume some form of perfectionism. In searching for an 
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alternative, non -controversial basis to equality, their arguments 
rely either upon some element of humanity, for example, rationali ty, 
the logic of institutions, or individualist objectives, all of 
which are limiting or excluding in some way. Additional support, 
defining morality as rationality, or descriptions of psychology 
or of human nature prove to be equally limiting, and insufficient 
grounds on which to base equality. 
Tawney, clearly shows that any justification of equality has to be 
complex, involving unconditional equality of respect, some form of 
perfectionism and a morality which is not confined to rationality 
as self- interest. Hence, as noted above, 89 Tawney' s view requires 
a two level justification balancing both deontologi cal and 
consequential elements. The question of the basis of morality 
and the importance of the Christian view of equality in all this 
will be examined in the conclusion of this chapter. 
In the meantime, the above work on justification has further 
suggested that justification and meaning are intimately related 
with respect to equality, and that in fact the Rawlsian view, 
whilst bearing surface resemblances to Tawney' s, is in fact, 
qui to different. Firstly, as noted above, Rawls' s view of equality 
of respect is qui to different, taking its meaning from equal 
liberty. Secondly, such liberty centres on distributive equality, 
and the principles for calculating such equality. Thirdly, Rawls 
has no place for fellowship in his view of equality or for its 
development in institutions. Inevitably, this affects his view of 
participatory equali ty. 
He defines ' the principle of (equal) participation' 90 as 
the principle of equal liberty, when applied to the political 
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procedure defined by the constitution.' 91 
What this means in practice is two things: 
a) As Gutmann observes, 
'Rawls is not concerned with the value of participation other 
than as a form of defense against subversion of constitutional 
rights of individuals and of constitutional government as a 
whole.' 92 
This would then involve the preservation of the basic political 
rights of 
'freedom of speech and assembly, and liberty of thoughts 
and conscience.' 93 
b) Besides advocating steps to preserve the 
'fair value for all of the political liberties', Rawls 
includes in his principle of participation his principle of fair 
equality of opportunity. Thus it demands that all 
'citizens are to have an equal access, at least in the formal 
sense, to public office.' 94 
There is, then, no sense in Rawls of participation as an expression 
of fellowship or co- operation, or of participation as an expression 
of control of the individual' s life, or as the expression of a 
need to serve. As a result there is no concern for equal parti- 
cipation beyond the political sphere. 
95 
This contrasts starkly 
with Tawney's emphasis upon participation as being an essential 
element in all institutions. 
96 
Fourthly, Rawls does not produce the substantive policy detail of 
equality that Tawney has. This is to be expected, as without any 
view of sin, Rawls is not concerned about detailed plans to 
equalize power. Also, Rawls' s view of distributional equality 
does not take into account the effect that this will have upon 
society in terms of building commuunity. Substantive policy 
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details are important for Rawls only in terms of how they can 
achieve the best distribution of resources. Whichever system, 
free market or socialist, achieved this would be judged to fulfill 
justice. 
97 
Finally, many of these differences and consequent difficulties 
can be seen in a comparison of the two writer's views of equality 
of opportunity. As noted above, equality of opportunity can be 
seen in two broad ways, involving equal prospects or equal means. 
98 
Like Tawney, Rawls is unhappy with the doctrine of 'careers open 
to talent' 99 and proposes instead the concept of ' fair equality 
of opportunity', by which 
'positions are not only open in a formal sense, but.... all should 
have a fair chance to attain them.' 100 
This would seem to involve some combination of both means regarding 
and prospect regarding equality of opportunity. As Rae notes, it 
101 
Rawls, however, attempts is very difficult to combine the two. , ,  
to find a compromise and defines his doctrine as 
'those with similar abilities and skills should have the same life 
chances. More specifically those who are at the same level 
of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, 
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their 
initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the 
income class into which they are born.' 102 
For Rawls, this is also in the context of the ' difference principle' 
which aims to maximize the prospects of those least favoured in 
the natural distribution of talent, or in any initial social 
position or status. Thus, in place of social or economic strata 
dictating opportunities, Rawls proposes talent strata. This means 
that equality of opportunity will be defined within what amounts 
to exclusionary strata. This causes several problems: 
a) It requires a phenomenology of talent to be worked out with 
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great care. Not only does Rawls not offer this, but it is not 
clear if a consensus about levels of talents and ability could 
be arrived at. 103 Notably, Rawls only defines the talent 
strata in terms of the equalities with which they are associ- 
ated. As Rae notes, 
'if they are not conceived and constructed independently, the 
whole requirement is circular.' 104 
b) Even if the conception of talent strata were acceptable, this 
would simply lead to prospect and means equality within strata. 
Tecnically it could lead to both unequal means and unequal 
prospects among persons in different strata. 
105 
The Rawlsian 
compromise is thus not successful. Tawney criticised the con- 
cept of equality of opportunity on two grounds. Firstly, that 
without a redistribution of resources, it was a fiction. 106 
In this, Tawney and Rawls would agree. Secondly, however, 
whilst accepting some degree of social mobility, Tawney set 
questions about the whole concept of equality of opportunity 
for scarce positions or rewards. A greater stress was laid 
upon equality of opportunity to fulfill that which was approp- 
riate to the individual, rather than achieve that which was 
deemed to be the prized status or reward in society. 107 This 
view of equality of opportunity then begins to set the concept 
more alongside equality of freedom and equality of power, as 
having relevance to all, not simply the few who achieved the 
'highest positions.' :Ioreover, such a view then puts far 
greater weight upon the liberal concept of the uniqueness of 
the individual, 108 and really looks to value and liberate that 
individual in their uniqueness. This is at least as compelling 
a view of equality of opportuni ty as Rawls' s and has none of 
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his contradictions. The problems for this, as shall be seen 
in the final chapter, are how to put this kind of equality of 
opportunity into action. Once one values the opportunities 
for individuals, then the worth of scarce opportunities begins 
to diminish. In that context it soon becomes apparant that 
such a shift in valuation will depend upon a framework of 
fraternity, or service, in which all parts would be viewed 
as both opportunities to serve society and to develop the self 
in one form or another. 
109 
Thus far, major difference have been noted in the equality of 
Rawls and Tawney. Difficulties with Rawls's view, quite apart from 
questions of justification, have involved contradictions in his 
view of equality of opportuni ty; lack of substantive egalitarian 
policies to exemplify his theory; and, despite lip service paid 
to democracy, an emphasis upon distributional equality at the 
expense of participatory equali ty. In each case, Tawney provides a 
more convincing view, with a richer concept of freedom, and a more 
balanced and integrated view of participation and distribution. 
As noted in chapter five, a further Rawlsian approach to equality 
does attempt to balance liberty and fellowship and so give greater 
emphasis to participatory equality. 
110 
In this, Bernard Crick 
argues that fraternity in terms of 'right relationships' is impor- 
tant if relative equality is to be accepted. Thus freedom is seen 
in the context of fraternity and this is developed through partici- 
pa ti on. 
However, it is not clear that liberty and fraternity can be held 
together without inconsistency unless equali ty of respect is 
involved in some way such as in Tawney' s approach. In fact, Crick 
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reveals two senses of equality. On the one hand, he argues for 
legitimate inequality, where equality is a distributional principle. 
On the other hand, he sees equality as a participatory principle. 
The first necessarily involves centralizing, because it is 
allocating goods across society. The second involves decentralized 
decision making. How to balance the two equalities is very 
difficult, hence, for example, Rawls and Plant tend to come down,, 
on the side of distribution. 
111 
Gutmann suggests that there is 
a clear relatinship between the two ie. that distributional 
equality enables the individual to participate. 112 Norman 
suggests that the important link is that both involve some distri- 
bution of power enabling the individual or group to take control. 
113 
approaches sees a similar relationship. However, these  
are ultimately unsatisfactory. Firstly, the link advocated by 
Gutmann or Crick is not absolute, by which I mean that not all 
participatory equality depends on receipt of any one distributed 
resource. Thus, for example, in order for one individual to 
participate in family life, they may require human resources to 
help them develop skills and awareness, as much as material 
resources. 
As noted above, so much depends upon what is meant by participatory 
equality. If it involves participation in decision making then 
besides human or material resources, therp opportunity, information, 
education and an appropriate process will be necessary. 114 None 
of this precludes the need for basic distribution of resources as 
an important element in enabling participation. It rather under- 
lines that the relationship between distributional equality and 
participatory equality is more complex than simple 
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instrumentality and depends upon which definition of parti' ipation 
is determined upon. 
A second and connected, difficulty revolves around the definition 
of participation. Even with Crick' s emphasis upon fraternity, the 
encouragement of participation at -local level would not prevent 
the growth of inter -communal conflicts resulting from subjective 
group identification. Participation in this sense would be 
instrumental to group achievements and thus could lead to precisely 
the kind of individualism or materialism writ -large which Tawney 
feared. 
115 
In turn, such a situation would tend to become 
inegalitarian in that it would challenge central distributional 
equali ty. 
In order to answer the first problem, a strong conceptual link 
is required between the two equalities. In order to answer the 
second problem, some form of perfectionism is required that will 
prevent participation from being used as instrumental to sectional 
interests and so lead to a major contradiction. It is precisely 
these which are supplied by Tawney' s Christian view of equality 
of respect with its attendant perfectionism based upon agape, 
seeing participation as both a means to self -determination and 
service, both for the individual and the group. 
116 Perfectionism 
thus is seen to be essential to the meaning and practice of equality 
as well as to its justification. Idi thout this Christian perfec- 
tionism it is clear that the very meaning and significance of 
participation will be limited and diminished. This , of course, is 
so for those who would espouse democratic equality. For marginal 
117 
egalitarians the issues are quite different. 
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It must be noted that in addition to this high view of equality of 
respect, a process will be required which enables such participa- 
tion to take place, without it being morally coercive. This will 
be outlined in the final chapter. 
Conclusion 
In examining the Rawlsian and related socialist views which argue 
for equality in a global domain, I have concluded that Tawney 
provides a more compelling view and justification. 
Tawney' s two -tier justification demonstrated the need for an un- 
conditional equality of respect, and a perfectionism based upon 
agape and confirmed by an holistic psychology and interactive 
sociology. The justifications examined above proved to be circular, 
relative, exclusive, and relying upon unsatisfactory views of 
psychology and human nature. The desire to avoid perfectionism led 
to a reliance on libertarian values and rational self- interest 
which in turn led to a limited view of freedom and of equality. 
118 
The problem over the substantive meaning of equality in all of 
this is not helped in Rawls' s case by the lack of policy sugges- 
tions. Participation was paid lip service by the above writers 
but was not integrated with distributional equality. Indeed, 
integration of the two equalities was seen to demand attention to 
the complexity of possible relations and to require a perfectionist 
stance which emphasized the balance of self- interest and altruism. 
Without this, the participatory and distributional equality run 
the danger of becoming contradictory, with in turn, freedom and 
fellowship becoming negative or exclusive. 
Two connected general conclusions may be drawn from this analysis 
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of the debate. :Firstly, unconditional equality of respect and 
a perfectionism based upon agape are necessary for the justifi- 
cation of global domain equality. 
119 
These elements are most 
clearly seen in the Christian view of equality set down by Tawney. 
Secondly, the Christian view of equality of respect ie. where 
respect involves enabling the individual to fulfill duties to the 
self and others, 120 is the only adequate basis for ensuring 
that participatory equality and distributional equality do not 
become either arbitrarily limited or contradictory. 
121 
One final observation should be made at this point. This conclusion 
has echoes of Charvet' s thesi, briefly mentioned above, that 
given an individualist and self- interest starting point, it is not 
possible to arrive at or justify a coherent conception of the 
individual's relationship to other individuals in the community. 
Indeed, 
(T)here always exists a potential conflict within the individual 
between the right of the particular self to its authentic self - 
realization and the objective requirement to respect the rights 
of others.' 122 
Charvet thus argues that the individualist stance can never be 
the basis of a coherent morali ty. 
123 
The fundamental error highlighted here is, 
the idea that objective value lies in a self -determining being' , 
and this assumption should be replace by the 'fundamental moral 
attitude' , namely, 
the mutual valuation of concrete persons as valuers of each others 
lives.' 124 
Only this can be the basis for negative freedom and a right to 
welfare. 
Like the conclusion that has been developed from Tawney's view, 
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Charvet finds the individualist base for global domain equali ty 
unsatisfactory. Charvet' s answer is to devise a perfectionist, 
altruistic base to morality. However, ultimately he lacks precisely 
the two major elements of the Christian perspective. Firstly, 
the moral attitude he propounds lacks the force of agape and this 
provides no ground for commitment to welfare rights. Secondly, 
his concern for others and value of them does not include the 
concern for their opportunity to serve, and thus misses the high 
form of altruism which frames individual or group goals in the 
125 
light of self and other concern. In addi tion , Charvet does not 
begin to resolve how this objective 'moral attitude' can be 
applied to commun ty wi thout diminishing communi ty or self - 
126 
de termina tion. 
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Chapter 8 The Modern Debate and Marginal Egalitarianism 
The relevance of Tawney' s equality to modern marginal egalitari- 
ans, ie. those who oppose the broadening of equality beyond formal 
property rights and certain civil and political rights, 1 may 
not seem immediately obvious. Indeed, some would argue that even 
the arguments used by Tawney against libertarians such as Hayek 
are inadequate and simplistic. Reisman, for instance, points out 
that in arguing against Hayek for the importance of planning, 
Tawney simply retorts that planning per se cannot be wrong, 
losing an opportunity to address Hayek' s points more fully. 
2 
Despite this in this chapter I will argue that Tawney's views 
on equality, taken as a whole, provide a very real and important 
challenge to modern marginal egalitarianism. I will then indicate 
ways in which his position must be developed and strengthened. 
Many of Tawney's points which address marginal egalitarianism 
have already been referred to, either in answering direct criti- 
cisms of Tawney, or in parallel arguments used with global domain 
egalitarians. 
3 
Equally, because there is a significant body of 
literature which addresses marginal egalitarianism, I am concerned 
not simply to duplicate their arguments. 
4 
In consequence, I 
will firstly sum up the relevant elements of Tawney's argument 
thus far, developing them where necessary. Secondly, I will 
examine in more detail three prominent arguments which underlie 
much of marginal egalitarianism - the principle of neutrality; the 
Gellner /Turner thesis, with its reliance upon empirical evidence 
to point to increased equality; the work of Lucas and Raz in 
questioning the philosophical status of equality. As with the 
previous chapter, I will not suggest that Tawney's work directly 
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answers these points, but rather that the elements of his argument 
for equality provide, as a cumulative case, the most convincing 
answer to them. 
The arguments already noted are as follows: 
a) Marginal egalitarians base their case on the primacy of the 
principle of liberty. However, their view of liberty is 
arbitrarily restricted to negative liberty. Furthermore, 
liberty per se is not indefeasible and therefore by defini tion, 
cannot by itself, be a primary principle. 5 Tawney not only 
argues for a moral context to liberty, but also broadens 
possible views of liberty. For him there is not simply 
negative and positive freedom, but also the freedom to serve. 
6 
It is worthy of note that both Rawlsian and marginal egalita- 
rians have their own conception of negative and positive 
freedom. Moreover, at the level of justification, both 
are very close, basing it upon self- interest and self- determina- 
tion, with no fundamental part for service or fellowship in 
relation to equality. 
8 
b) The marginal egalitarians' view of human nature and society is 
inadequate. Man is viewed as an individual existing prior to 
and apart from society. 
9 
Responsibility is seen to apply 
to individuals only and self- respect is gained as a result 
of individual effort. In all this, human nature requires 
competition and risk to flourish, with the necessity for 
associated virtues to flourish. 
10 
As noted above, Tawney presents a far more convincing picture. 
Self- respect is dependant upon treatment and service as well 
as 'achievement' in any narrow sense. 11 
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Given his view of the interdependence of individuals, it is 
not possible to confine responsibility purely to individuals. 
12 
Risk is accepted as important along with the virtues of self- 
sufficiency and responsibility. However, Tawney argues that 
risk and responsibility can, and should be shared. 13 Central 
to this is an argument that equality of respect demands such 
sharing. Given the holistic view of man as a mental, emotional, 
physical, spiritual whole, 14 to deny the individual oppor- 
tunities to exercise and develop this nature in an interactive 
society, is, itself, a denial of respect. This can be developed 
into an important argument for equality of participation. 
15 
In practice it is argued that marginal egalitarianism actually 
leads to increased freedom of choice and greater distribution 
of power and resources, with the market as an essential 
means to this, 16 along with sustained decentralization and 
17 
giving greater power to the individual. However, firstly, 
as noted above, increased freedom of choice by itslf is a 
contentious objective. As Tawney noted, such freedom of choice 
requires to be meaningful and relevant. 18 Secondly, the 
equali ty of opportuni ty, based upon ability, argued for by such 
as Friedman, is, as Tawney argued, useless without economic 
power 
19 In this, the market does to fulfill important choices. 
not enlarge equality of opportunity or freedom for distribution, 
these still remaining inequai table with wealthy individuals 
able to register a much wider range of preferences. 
Thirdly, it is clear that some forms of decentralization or 
dispersion of power actually deny freedom, especially with 
respect to decision making. Thus, for instance, to offer a 
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council -house tenant the choice between two possible landlords 
simply asks for a limited decision about pre -determined 
options. There is no opportunity for involvement in infor- 
mation gathering, discussion of values or ethos, setting of 
objectives, or in carrying out plans. In the context of 
exercising and developing their whole person, individuals are 
once again powerless. 
20 
c) Just as the marginal egalitarian view of human nature is 
arbitrarily limited, so is their view of society and history. 
Nozick, for instance, bases his view of property rights on an 
argument that any process by which material goods are produced 
is one which, by its very nature, attaches those goods to 
particular owners. To this extent the goods are already 
distributed and the individuals are entitled to them and thus 
any proposal for distribution in fact involves re- distribution 
21 
and this overrides the property rights of existing owners. 
Unfortunately this view relies upon firstly an amoral view of 
history, ie. one which ignores the fact that a good deal of 
wealth was first accumulated precisely by violating the rights 
which Nozick argues for. Secondly, modern society does not 
constantly relate ownership, production and wealth. The 
dominant form of ownership is corporate not individual. 
Nozick' s argument only begins to make some sense, for example, 
in the society of the early American 'West, with small farmers 
achieving their own living, cultivating land they had claimed. 
Against all this, Tawney argues for a relational view of 
property as power, 22 with workers as part of the process of 
production. 23 
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Allied to this view of society in Nozick, is a view of relation- 
ships as contractual ie. that no individual can enter anthers 
' space ' without the consent of the other. 24 Tawney' s 
argument against this view is twofold. Firstly, it is simply 
not true that all relationships are contractual in nature. 
He points to family and community loyalties which involve 
obligations and commitments prior to any contract. 
25 
Secondly, Tawney' s interactionist view of society demonstrates 
the way in which the rights of individuals are often infringed 
by those in power. 26 Such a view also effectively argues 
against any simple view of individuals as existing apart 
from society. 
27 
In all the above, it is clear that principles, values and empirical 
data are inextricably linked leading to different views of rights, 
virtues and concepts such as autonomy or coercion. Given this, 
three issues become essential to modern egalitarian debate: 
the status and relevance of morality; the use of empirical data; 
and the definition of equality. I will now examine important 
arguments supporting marginal egalitarians' conclusions in all 
three areas. 
The Principle of Neutrality 
In arguing for marginal equality there is no appeal to moral 
psychology, moral consensus or to any base principle other than 
freedom as relevant to all human beings. It is understandable 
that no weight is given to such evidence for the very status of 
moral knowledge is questionable in their eyes. This is so at 
least in the sense that no moral philosophy can be seen to have 
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necessary application to all humanity. To assert that would be, 
by implication, to assert that one moral view is better than that 
asserted by others. The basis of this position is what Ackermann 
terms the principle of neutrality: 
'No reason is a good reason if it requires the powerholder to 
assert (a) that his conception of the good is better than that 
asserted by any of his fellow citizens or (b) that, regardless 
of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to 
one or more of his fellow citizens.' 28 
Such a view of neutrality effectively destroys any conception of 
a common good that can be used as an overall purpose in social 
organization, for by definition, any moral purpose which is chosen 
as the aim of society is going to be perceived as superior to 
some individual's conception of the good. Hence, the assertion of 
one purpose as superior to any other, and the requirement that 
it be accepted becomes a form of coercion. Closely linked to 
this is the argument that any form of political activity, and 
thus distribution is coercive. 
29 
Several points must be made against this principle: - 
a) Just as the concept of liberty cannot be indefeasible, so it 
is not possible to have a morally neutral basis to social 
organization. Tawney clearly sees this in his argument for a 
moral context to liberty and in particular in his argument 
that principles, implicit or explicit underlie all social 
organization. 
30 
The implication of this argument is 
important, in that the principle of neutrality cannot thus 
be used as a blanket argument against egalitarian arguments. 
Cnce moral neutrality is denied, the argument shifts from a 
morally neutral position against a perfectionist to two 
opposing perfectionist arguments. The ultimate problem for 
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the marginal egalitarians is that moral neutrality and non- 
coercion are, in themselves, a moral position which form the 
basis of a social organization. Minimally, this principle 
requires that the state ensure that individuals are not 
coerced. However, it would require only one individual to 
demand that he or she retain responsibility for protection 
of their autonomy to make even a minimal state coercive. The 
logical end of this is to move to a purely evolutionary 
state. 
31 
b) All of this radically affects any view of morality or sin. A 
principle of neutrality radically questions the possibility 
of any moral dialogue, and of the development of moral meaning. 
Such a dialogue is possible under Ackermann's principle with 
individuals freely accepting other moral positions. However, 
the principle does not suggest what the basis of such a 
dialogue could be and suggests that a moral posi tion could be 
rejected simply because it is claimed to be superior and not 
on the basis of any reasoning or failure of reasoning behind 
it. Such a principle then runs the danger of actually 
limiting moral dialogue and thus the development of moral 
meaning. As noted above, Tawney looks to the development of 
a society in which individuals could explore and develop 
moral meaning, developing bonds of trust sufficiently to 
question and test the principles behind social organization. 
32 
Under this principle morality in the public realm becomes 
minimal and negative with sin confined to the concept of inva- 
ding others negative rights. Tawney presents against this a 
far broader view of coercion in his interactive sociology 
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and a clear view of how sin applies to the public realm and 
33 
affects both individuals and the health of society. 
Ironically, marginal egalitarians do advocate a positive 
morality in the private realm.34 Such a morality, however, 
much like Rawls' s equality of respect is seen as instrumental, 
in this case important for sustaining society and the market.35 
The problem for any marginal egalitarian is that under the 
principle of neutrality, it is hard to see how such values 
can actually be commended. Indeed, it is hard to see how any 
form of public health education or policy which implies a 
perfectionist stance can be justified. 
c) In the light of the principle of neutrality and the absolute 
view of liberty, Tawney' s criticisms of capitalism take on a 
more precise focus. As noted above, Tawney' s condemnation of 
the profit motive and of capitalism in general ran the 
danger of being too simplistic, ignoring the potential of the 
market as a tool. 
36 
In fact, in looking to pin down the principles underlying 
capitalism he notes several elements which are implicit in 
the principle of neutrality, in particular the denial of 
other than individual morality, the denial of responsibility, 
and the denial of freedom: in the sense that social relations 
in industry, however coercive, do not matter. 
37 
Such elements 
described by Tawney as principles, do not make capitalists 
evil individuals. 
38 
Nor do they necessarily lead to evil 
results. 
39 
However, such principles will tend to limit 
awareness of others, and limit the focus and breadth of any 
decision making. In this, absence of positive consideration 
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of principles, quite apart from the claims of individuals 
involved in any decision will tend in turn to restrict 
options to those which fulfill strictly contractual 
obligations. 40 Tawney' s attacks could thus be re- formu- 
lated along lines such as these: 
The absence of explicit consideration of major principles in 
institutional relationships or social organizations will tend 
to produce results which do not give equal respect to the 
members of such groups. 
At first sight this might seem to lack the bite of Tawney' s 
initial attacks, until that is, the flowers of such non 
principle thistles that it targets, be examined, for example, 
excluding individuals from decision -making, from the develop- 
ment of fellowship in groups, or from service. 
41 
Such reformulated argument requires a high view of man, which 
will be considered below. In addition to this softer re- 
statement of Tawney, it must also be noted that such exclusion 
of principles and claims has a stronger side to it in that it 
is precisely in such situations, where power is also concen- 
trated, that sin does tend to flourish. 
42 
The theme of neutrality is important in marginal egalitarian- 
ism, 43 and is partially an attempt, like Rawls' s view of 
goodness as rationality, to find a non -controversial basis 
of morality. However, as Tawney clearly notes, such neutrality 
is neutral only to the status quo and excludes all broader 
considerations of balance or concern. 
44 
prom this, it 
becomes clear that the only acceptable basis of a 'neutral 
position' is a Christian view of equality of respect. The 
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problem, as shall be seen below, is 'ow to develop a viable 
social organization from that. 
Empirical Data 
Alongside the principle of neutrality and an absolute concept of 
liberty, marginal egalitarians place great emphasis upon empirical 
data which demonstrates the bad consequences of equal distri- 
bu don. 
45 
The use of such empirical data is in fact highly questionable. 
46 
Firstly, it is often selective, ignoring 'hard cases. 
Secondly, as Tawney argued, there is simply no necessary connection 
between egalitarian methods and measures and, for example, the 
evils of totalitarianism. 
47 
Thirdly, as noted above, in a 
different context, the interpretation of any data takes place in 
some value context. 
48 
It is thus impossible to exclude princi- 
pies and their perception from the interpretation. Moreover, such 
principles and perceptions may radically affect any general 
conclusion drawn from particular data. 
Once these points are allowed, then the second great plank of 
marginal egalitarianism is taken away. For writers such as 
Friedman, Griffiths and Hayek, the use of empirical evidence 
depends upon it being viewed as objective, and upon the 
generalizable connection of certain data to particular forms of 
egalitarianism as being assumed. 
Much of this argument is implied in Tawney' s attack on Hayek' s 




However, a far more demanding thesis has emerged from Gellner 
and Turner which from empirical data claims: 
a) that inequality is inevitable, and that participatory 
democracy is not achievable, and 
b) that a form of equality has already been achieved vitiating 
any need for egalitarian policies. 
Here, empirical data is used to address egalitarian claims more 
directly, and without recourse to assumed causal connections. 
50 
Turner examines the evidence of small scale attempts at democracy, 
from utopian communities such as Owen's world village, to the 
kibbutz and finally to the attempt to create mass equality in 
Russia and China. The evidence for their success is not good. 
The smaller groups tend to either collapse following the death of 
a charismatic leader, or to revert over time to an authoritarian 
style of government. National attempts at equality do not in fact 
eradicate inequality in terms of income, prestige, or reward, 
now based upon bureaucratic power. 51 The sociological evidence, 
Turner argues, indicates therefore that inequality is inevitable. 
Some would argue that this is necessary for the functioning of 
society. Turner' s thesis is slightly less forceful than this, 
arguing that inequali ty constantly reasserts itself over time and 
that this is contained by 
'a natural sense of fairness and justice' in society. Thus, 
' opposi tion, conflict and resistence to inequali ty seems as 
inevi table as inequality i tself.' 52 
In addition to this, Turner extends the thesis of Gellner, to the 
effect that modern industrial society has tended to bring about 
the realization of the egalitarian ideal, partly as a result of 
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the decline of old hierarchical structures and a weakening of the 
culture which in the past legitimated inequality. Contributing to 
this effect has been: 
increased social mobility 
a levelling of human experience and attitude through technology 
a greater division between home life and work, which has 
encouraged the development of the individual and a positive 
view of privacy 
- the development of the mass media and the emergence of modern 
consumerism which has led to a decline in the traditional forms 
of cultural inequality 
- the standardization of mass education, leading to uniformity in 
training, leading to uniformity in behaviour and socializing. 
53 
Turner extends the argument. Firstly, he suggests that modern 
consumerism has been liberating, both in making more goods 
accessible and in eroding the traditional hierarchies. Secondly, 
he argues strongly against the suggestions that modern consumerism 
has had a negative effect, either on attitudes or on culture. 
In fact, it is precisely the positive effects of modernism which 
54 
lead to equalizing and which assisted the development of democracy 
This thesis is imposing. However, it ultimately fails, for the 
following reasons: 
a) In the first part, Turner does not distinguish the various 
levels of inequality, lumping together the evidence of small 
groups which aimed at participatory equality and nations which 
aimed at equality of condition. ?ore importantly, he does not 
consider the possibility of democratic organization which takes 
in both national and local organizations and thus cannot claim 
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from the available evidence that inequality is inevitable. 
In this is a more general point about the status of sociolo- 
gical evidence, ie. that whilst sociological data can dem- 
onstrate that some experiments in social organization have 
failed, and note the reasons, it cannot serve to generalize 
for all attempts at social organization - in this case 
parti ci pa tory equa li ty. Tawney' s view precisely demands a 
link between all levels of society, so that no one power 
perspective dominates, and also demands a frequent review to 
evaluate developments. None of these elements are present in 
the experiments referred to by Turner. Significantly, build- 
ing up a democratic process which includes the setting of 
objectives and reviews would actually provide mechanisms 
for the kind of development process which Turner describes. 
The process he describes however, is clearly haphazard and 
one which provides no opportunity for real development or 
learning. 
b) On the second part of the thesis, there are again questions 
about the sociological evidence, its interpretation and about 
the meaning that Gellner and Turner place on equality or 
democracy. In a weak version of the thesis all it has to say 
is that old hierarchies are breaking down, and that this could 
facilitate the development of equality. However, both 
Gellner and Turner admit that in certain areas 'modernism' 
has led to the development and firming of some hierarchies. 
Equally, in considering evidence, they do not examine the 
present distribution of power. As a result, they are not in 
a position to say if there has actually been significant 
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broadening of areas in which individuals are able to partici- 
pate in terms of decision making. Indeed, their own evidence 
would seem to militate against the development of such 
opportunities, and the whole concept of mass culture received 
by mass media would seem to go against the concept of a 
process involving participation in decision making. There 
is no doubt that the increased sharing of information by the 
mass media could lead to assisting the development of 
participatory equality. However, this depends upon how it is 
used and whether it aims to be part of an education or 
decision making process. That is clear, is that there is no 
firm evidence for a strong thesis that modernism has led to 
any meaningful relational equality. 
Though this thesis is well argued it ultimately falls into the 
same difficulties as those outlined above. It does not examine 
different particular concepts of equality, and inquire how they 
have been or might be put into practice. It does not therefore 
give full weight to equality as a principle. Instead, it 
concentrates upon equality and inequality as social phenomenon. 
In doing this, two things accur. Firstly, the particular principle 
of equality espoused by Tawney is not addressed and therefore 
cannot be said to be affected - even if all the evidence were 
accepted. Secondly, the use of such sociological evidence runs 
the danger of once more limiting discussion, and in particular 
of making discussion of principles secondary. Tawney argued 
that sociology could not simply be about the accumulation of 
55 
evidence but needed to articulate and discuss underlying principles 
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Indeed, sociological evidence was of little use wit:-out a clear 
understanding of principles. The danger in using empirical 
data in the egalitarian debate is precisely that it will take 
precedence over discussion of principles, and judgements on 
feasibility of options be deemed to be judgements on the principle 
itself. Hence, Tawney argued for the primacy of principles 
56 
and in his argument for equality balanced both deontological and 
consequential arguments. 
The Concept of Equality 
In support of empirical evidence and the principle of neutrality 
some marginal egalitarians question the very meaning and status 
of the concept of equality. Such arguments are basically stated 
by J.R. Lucas and J. Raz. 
57 
Lucas argues that equality involves two major principles - 
the principle of formal equality or universalizability, and the 
principle of equality of respect or universal humanity. The 
first of these is distinguished from the argument for sameness58 
and establishes little except that if two people are to be 
treated differently, there should be relevant differences between 
them. 
59 
The principle of equality of respect is perhaps more significant. 
However, argues Lucas, in this principle 
' it is the word ' Respect' - respect for each man's humani ty, 
respect for him as a human being - which is doing the logical 
work, while the word 'Equality' adds nothing to the argument and 
is altog ether otiose.' 60 
The rest of Lucas's paper argues that whilst both of these 
principles have an important part to play in politics, neither 
lead to the conclusion of full egalitarianism ie. equality of 
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outcome. 
'Legality, Justice, Fairness, Equity, Humanity, all will on 
occasion produce a measure of Equality, but this measure is never 
exact, and they are none of them essentially egalitarian.' 61 
Lucas concludes with an examination of the relationship between 
equality, fraternity and liberty. Whilst fraternity has important 
elements which overlap with equality of respect, Lucas argues 
that the two are contradictory. 62 Real fraternity demands that 
individuals be given freedom and are not forced into particular 
action. Liberty, he argues is about real choice: 
' Equali ty lays down how we are to treat people; but liberty 
entitles us to act as we choose not as some rule lays down.' 63 
Thus Lucas, having begun with what seemed to be a logical analysis 
of equality moves across to the basic libertarian argument that 
freedom is inherently unfair (ie. leads to inequalities) and if 
any value is to be placed upon the concept of freedom, then, 
'we must to that extent compromise the principle of Equality.' 64 
Raz frames a similar argument to Lucas, noting that, 
'Principles of equality always depend on other principles 
determining the value of the benefits which the egalitarian 
principles regulate.' 65 
Thus he distinguishes the concern for the hungry, needy and so 
on, as the relevant underlying principle, therebeing no 
'independent evil of inequality.' 66 
Raz then develops the argument by distinguishing between dimini- 
shing satiable principles and non -diminishing insatiable ones. 
The former require that the demands of the principles can be 
completely met. Once they are met, for example, in the case of 
reducing hunger, them the reason for distribution diminishes. 
Such principles are precisely independent and do not require 
eaua li ty. The second kind of principle can, by definition, never 
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be satisfied and is identified by aaz with the utilitarian 
principle of maximizing the net amount of pleasure for all. 
Such a principle could never act as the basis of equality pre- 
cisely because it provides grounds for resolving conflicting 
demands. The maximizing of pleasure principle provides equal 
reason for all demands to be met and thus would tolerate extreme 
inequalities. 67 Equality can therefore not exist with ei ther 
kind of principle being based upon pre -suppositions which are 
ei ther irrelevant to it or contradictory. 
A good deal of Lucas' s argument hangs upon two elements, a) his 
characterization of real egalitarianism and b) his analysis of the 
principle of equality. In the first of these, Lucas views 
egalitarianism as a position which demands identity of treatment 
and which therefore leads to uniformity. However, as noted above, 
this is an arbitrary perception of egalitarianism and cannot be 
used fairly in an argument against all forms of egalitarian 
theory. 68 Tawney explicitly accepts relative equality in terms 
of income,and equal provision in terms of welfare services which 
in itself demands a relevant and thus unequal response to indivi- 
duals and their needs. 
Lucas's analysis of the principles of equality is more subtle, 
but in the end equally unsatisfactory. normal equality certainly 
is problematic. By definition it does not say a great deal about 
justice or questions of distribution. Hence .:awls argued for the 
real meaning of equality as coming from a separately held principle 
of distributive justice. Equality of respect, however, is a far 
more difficult concept to analyse. Firstly, whilst Lucas is 
right that the concept cannot rest upon the argument from 
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sameness, ie. that all men are equal, it does involve some 
recognition of equal worth. Equality of respect is not then 
simply a principle of humanity ie. expressing an attitude of 
concern to all persons, it also recognizes that all human beings 
have equal worth regardless of their status, position, wealth etc. 
In this concept of equal worth, central to Tawney' s equality, 
the term equality directly informs the concept as a whole for it 
excludes the possibility of treating individuals as though they 
were not equally worthy and so points both to a sense in which all 
human beings are or should be treated as equals, and yet as also 
quite uniquely important. 
69 
The term equality by itself, has no clear meaning, as Tawney 
himself admits, 
70 
but this does not make the term otiose. 
The term is given relevance and meaning in context ie. in the 
light of what equality is referred to. 71 In Tawney's case this 
is a relational equality which cannot be contained simply in 
either the concept of formal equality or the principle of humanity, 
but rather, as noted above, involving aspects of both. 72 In 
its Christian form this attitude of commitment is far stronger 
than, for example, simply equal consideration of interests, being 
the development of the individual. 
73 
Secondly, just as Lucas's first argument finds it hard to cope with 
concepts or principles which do not fit neatly into formal or 
attitudinal logic, his second involves a categorical slight of 
hand, turning equality into an absolute principle. He begins by 
viewing liberty as an absolute, not formal principle. The 
difference between the two is clear. Liberty as a formal prin- 
ciple would simply lay down that all men should be free. =mss a 
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formal principle this is unexceptionable. Liberty as an absolute 
principle is expressed by Lucas as entitling human beings to act 
as they choose. This principle is far more precise, no longer 
formal and yet still it seems applies to all and in all situations 
- hence I refer to it as absolute. As an absolute principle, 
liberty is then put up against equality. Significantly, however, 
the form of equality which Lucas chooses to put up against 
liberty is another absolute principle. Hence, he argues that if 
we are to place any value on freedom, the principle of equality 
must be 
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To use this argument as a blanket 'compromised,' 6 
argument ' against Equality' is therefore quite unsatisfactory, 
once again arbitrarily restricting the concept of equality. 
Raz' s argument, despite its developments has similar problems to 
Lucas, Firstly, the distinction between diminishing satiable 
principles and non -diminishing and insatiable principles is at 
best contentious. His prime example to distinguish the two is, 
'Everyone should have as much pleasure as they can enjoy' (non 
diminishing, insatiable) compared to 
' Everyone's needs should be mett,' (diminishing and satiable). 
However, the validity of the distinction depends entirely upon 
how one defines the terms in each principle, and what status one 
accords to the principle. Thus, for example, seen in a formal 
sense, the second of these principles is certainly diminishing 
and satiable. However, the term 'needs' is open to many meanings 
and could logically refer to needs which whilst felt, could never 
be fully met, for example, psychological needs. 
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Secondly, and connected with the first point, any such principle 
depends in itself upon both the context le. in this case defining 
needs and which are acceptable ones and which should be met by 
the state, and upon some other reason to explain why the needs 
should be met. t1e are then forced to return to the concept of 
equal worth and respect. Thus, as with the discussion of Rawls 
in the previous chapter, there is need for perfectionism and 
equality of respect such as Tawney' s. 
For all these arguments self- determination becomes the basic 
moral principle. On the one hand, this acts as a perfectionist 
base. On the other hand it is an insufficient perfectionist 
base, precisely because it is both defeasible and has insufficient 
data . 
Two final points may be noted here. Firstly, Raz' s argument 
depends upon the distinction between diminishing and satiable 
and non -diminishing and insatiable principles. The latter is 
basically a utilitarian principle. Tawney, however, clearly 
argues against utilitarianism as being the foundation for equality. 
Primary to such considerations is equality of concern for all 
individuals. 
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It is precisely such an attitude and any sense of 
relational equality, that Raz' s argument fails to recognize. 
Secondly, and connected to the previous point, it must be noted 
that the characterization of equality as an absolute principle 
is vitally necessary to the libertarian arguments. It is not 
simply a case of mistaking or ignoring egalitarian arguments 
which do not refer to absolute equality. 76 Only if equality 
is seen in that light is it possible to maintain an absolute 
view of liberty. All that is required to undermine the marginal 
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egalitarian position then, is to demonstrate that such a view is 
arbi trary. 
Conclusion 
Taken as a whole, Tawney' s view of equality has an important 
contribution to make to modern egalitarian debate. It stands out 
against Rawlsian and marginal egalitarians, posing serious 
questions about their view of morality or neutrality, their 
definition of principles, their view of psychology and sociology 
and their use of empirical data. dorking from his view, it has 
become clear that self- interest is not an adequate basis for a 
moral position, and that an adequate view of equality requires 
some form of unconditional equal worth and of perfectionism. 
Tawney' s approach to equality in fact begins to break through 
what had become a sterile debate. It questions the claims of 
both groups in finding 'objective' criteria to judge between 
views of equality. The very term obj ective assumes shared meaning 
as the basis of significant criteria. However, with respect to 
equality, the meanings offered by,for example, Rawls and Nozick 
are so different, with justification tied closely to the meaning, 
g possible. The term obj ective, that no such shared meaning is í
also assumes some rational point of reference which can be 
arrived at independently of individual or group interpretation. 
However, as noted in Tawney' s view of human nature, personal 
qualities, mental characteristics, sinfulness, group identity, 
relative positions of power and so on, all influence the inter- 
pretation of any data, rational argument, or view of principles. 
78 
All of this rules out any essentialism with respect to equality, 
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restricting it to simply a philosophical concept, or restricting 
data or options. It also demands developments in methods of 
justification. As we have seen, Tawney' s Christian view of 
equality provides the basis and framework for such developments, 
79 
with a cumulative case which involves more convincing views of 
society, the individual, moral principles and empirical data. 
However, as noted above, this position requires further develop- 
ments both in theory and practice 80 and these will be considered 
in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
The analysis of Tawney' s equality, brought together into a 
systematic presentation from his writings, has revealed a concept 
which is complex and rich. As such, despite difficulties which 
require modification or developments, Tawney' s equality has a 
great deal to contribute, both to the theology of equality and 
to any secular views. 
In the final chapter, I will attempt to sum up this contribution 
and indicate the important areas of future research and develop- 
ment. 
Tawney, of course, was not a theologian, and was uneasy with 
theology as a discipline. As noted above, he can be criticised 
for the lack of any eschatßlogical element, running the danger 
of seeing policies as not provisional. 1 He also lacks an 
2 
explicit creationist theology to support distributional equality. 
There are, too, within Tawney' s view great tensions between 
order and self -determination, and fellowship and freedom, which 
are not totally resolved. 
3 
A more systematically worked out, 
explicit theology of equality is therefore a necessary development 
of Tawney' s posi tion, both to answer these criticisms and to 
sustain the debate with the marginal egalitarians noted above. 
4 
Tawney' s equality provides the framework for such a development. 
Central to this, is the way in which Tawney details the relation- 
ship between equality of respect, fellowship, freedom and 
participatory and distributional equality. 5 This demonstrates 
both that any theology of equality involves more than simply 
6 juxtaposing the principles of equality and fraternity and that 
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any so called middle level principles have very precise, often 
complex relationships. This provides a framework for 
synthesizing the various doctrines underlying any theology of 
equality. Such doctrines were detailed by Macquarrie as the 
Incarnation, through which God bestows equal value on all; 
9 
the doctrine of sin, often used as the basis for participatory 
equali ty; 10 the doctrine of creation pointing to ontological 
equality; il and the doctrine of the Church which focuses on 
relational equality in fellowship. Initial analysis of these 
doctrines reveals possible conflict, for the doctrines point to 
different kinds of equality which could be contradictory. 
12 
Much depends upon the statement of particular doctrines which 
themselves contain possible tensions, for example, between order 
and self- determination in the doctrine of the Church. All this 
underlines the need for synthesis, but also notes that some of 
the tensions referred to in Tawney's equality are inherent in 
the doctrines underlying the theology of equality itself. 
13 
The following is a brief indication of how a more systematic 
theology might develop. 
Tawney' s balance of principles would indicate a theology of 
equality with the Incarnation as the basic doctrine. Alongside 
this, the doctrines of creation and man come together to offer a 
Christian view of freedom, whilst the doctrine of the Church 
provides the foundation of fellowship. These last three 
doctrines provide the important link to participatory, distribu- 
tional, and relational equality, all viewed as an expression of 
equality of respect. 
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The Incarnation 
The doctrine of the Incarnation functions in several ways for 
equality: 
a) As the ultimate example of love, it provides the basis tor an 
agapaic view of equality of respect. As such, equality of 
respect becomes the basic moral principle, not one amongst 
many. 
b) Such a view of equality of respect takes equality out of 
any simple philosophical categories, not least because it 
involves an ultimate attitude of concern for the individual.14 
c) The inclusiveness of this concern makes it relevant to 
individuals in all situations, alone or in groups, throughout 
society, and involves a concern for the individual to realize 
their full potential. 15 Such potential would ultimately 
only be fully realized in relation to God. 
16 
This provides the ground, firstly, for theology and the Church 
to be concerned with society and social organization. 17 In 
this view, the development of a ' common culture' involves spiritual 
and social development. Secondly, equal respect generates the 
twin principles of freedom and fellowship. These provide the 
necessary condi tions for self-realiza tion, self -determination and 
service, involving obligations to self and others, recognizing man 
as a social and moral being. Equality, in the sense of equalizing 
measures, then becomes an instrumental principle, its aim to 
enable freedom and fellowship. Hence, distributional and partici- 
patory equality are not seen as ends in themselves but as expres- 
sions of equality of respect, and as such, once again, involve 
relational equality and the development of relationships. 
Equality of respect thus serves to generate various other prin- 
ciples, and remains a necessary base for holding together the 
potentially contradictory principles thus generated. All this 
militates against any principle being viewed in isolation or as an 
absolute, and looks to participatory and distributional equality 
as operative principles. One of Tawney' s important contributions 
to the theology of equality is precisely his argument for seeing 
equality as an operative principle applying to all society, and as 
involving substantive policy proposals. 18 Moreover, even at 
this stage there is a demand for a process whereby the various 
principles and objectives can all be explicitly handled in social 
organization, and monitored. 
Crea ti on 
Whilst Tawney has no explicit creationist theology, he does have 
an implicit doctrine of man as co- creator. 19 This is strongly 
seen in the high view of Man' s nature and potential. 
2O 
The 
doctrine of creation in this light moves away from its static 
use of justification for distribution, 21 and takes on a dynamic 
form, involving man' s role and therefore participation in creation. 
As co-creator, man requires freedom to create. Such freedom 
involves seit- determination, and the acceptance or responsibility 
and risk. 22 Responsibility includes responsibility to God, and 
for the created order including other human beings, as well as 
23 As Hull wri tes, Christ for ones own actions and development. 
deepens this view, challenging individuals to, 
become creative participants in their own development and in the 
task of understanding and changing the world.' 24 
The activity of creation involves the whole person, and the 
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material of creation is spiritual, social and physical. The 
whole person involves man as a spiritual, social, moral being, 
bearer of attitudes and values, focus of relationships and 
obligations. 25 To respect the individual as co- creator is 
therefore to enable him or her to exercise their creativity 
from principles, consciously determined, to practice. This 
specifically involves: - 
a) providing opportunities for involvement in decisions and 
activities in communities and situations of which an indivi- 
dual is a part. 
26 
b) enabling the individual to discuss and determine underlying 
principles and purposes which may be involved in such decision 
making, as well as allowing consultation on options and 
policies. 
c) enabling the individual to develop the virtues, personal 
qualities, mental chacteristics and all such skills necessary 
for the activity of creation, both in making decisions and in 
putting them into practice. 
Implicit in all this is the social nature of decision- making, and 
the need to broaden democracy into all parts of life. 
27 
Indeed, it could be argued that creativity is assisted by group 
consultation and discussions, precisely because it ensures that 
a broad range of principles is discussed, and helps to develop 
awareness and tolerance of co- creators. 
28 
As co- creators, individuals or groups take on the creative 
activity of God, in healing and challenging, in building and re- 
building communities, and in enabling individuals to grow and 
become whole. Besides this social and spiritual dimension, 
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property and material resources are seen as part of the material 
for creation. As noted, Tawney saw property as power for service, 
emphasizing its functional nature. However, the concept of co- 
creation is superior to function. Firstly, it maintains a 
balance between self -determination and concern for others, 
whereas function' s emphasis upon service to an overriding purpose 
runs the danger of denying self -determination. Secondly, co- 
creation looks to enabling the individual to fulfill a 
particular task of creation and thus avoids the possible clash 
between unconditional worth and conditional worth ie. where 
function becomes the sole basis for distribution. 
29 
The concept of man as co- creator provides strong basis for 
participatory and distributional equality, viewing both as enabling 
the group or individual to create. This also gives greater 
meaning to the concept of equality of respect outlined above, for 
respect for man as co- creator demands an empowering of individuals 
and groups for co- action. In terms of participatory equality, the 
consequential arguments used in its support by Mill and others, 
have much less force. 30 It also has greater force than Niebuhr's 
argument for democracy, which, noting the element of good and evil 
in all men, argues that each individual was good enough to be 
given some responsibility, but not of sufficient quality as to 
have dominion over his fellows. 
31 
None of this could be said to encourage dependence but rather 
responsibility and acceptance of risk. Equally, it broadens 
any concept of self -determination, for without full consideration 
of principles and some responsibility in the practice of decision 
making, it is difficult to see how the concept 'determination' 
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32 Such a concept have any meaning. of self -determination  
clearly involves some challenge to the individual, in terms of 
taking responsibility and considering all the principles and 
interests involved. However, a challenge per se is no more 
coercive or paternalistic than measures which empower individuals 
or groups to achieve self- determination. 
33 
The concept of co-creator picks up so much of Tawney' s contri- 
bution to a theology of equality, especially his interpretation of 
equality of respect and participatory and distributional equality. 
At the same time, it modifies the difficult concept of function. 
It stresses equality of freedom to create, denial of this equality 
being a denial of real freedom. Furthermore, it sharpens 
Tawney' s case for equality as an operative principle, for an 
equality such as that outlined above, has to be clearly set down 
in practice in order to differentiate it from egalitarian policies 
which are either ends in themselves or are not related in the saze 
way to other principles. 
None of this requires that a s to tuent of policy should be seen 
as the denial of its provisional nature. 
ßrß 
Also any a .p- iíc ti 
of such equality will demand sensitivity, with awareness of the 
need to clarify questions of roles, relat+<onsc ipa and elf ri¢ncy, 
especially with regard to participatory equality. 
3s 
Sin 
As noted above, the dark side of man pro vi des further ne 
reason why power should be dispersed. Phis parallels L9i; eb . 
argument for democracy, and argumenta for participa ? ana?_.:~ t c 
36 
based upon equal ignorance. 
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Apart from providing grounds for dispersion of power and shared 
and improved accountability and responsibility, the doctrine of 
sin is a further ground for a process of comprehensive decision 
making in participatory equality, in which principles are discussed 
and where there is opportunity to reflect upon and modify practice. 
Central to such a process would be the acceptance of different 
points of view, as openness to development, the acceptance of 
failure, and the experience of forgiveness. It is precisely this 




is central to the Christian view of equality. There are, of 
course, many questions as to how forgiveness could be part of an 
39 
However, minimally, i t points operative principle of equality. , y,  
to the development of an environment in which trust can be 
encouraged and developed, and this leads to a consideration of the 
doctrine of the Church. 40 
The Church 
Tawney has no clear doctrine of the Church and his view of community 
y ambiguities. 
41 
does betra  However, the strongest view of 
commun ty in his wri tings is one which is inclusive, wi th members 
holding mutual respect and aiming to serve society as a whole, 
as wellas their own interests. 
42 
In one sense, a clear mark of respect is the practice of distrib- 
utional and participatory equality. This in itself, enables 
freedom in the sense of the development of the individual as co- 
creator, and invol' -es the development of trust. 
43 
This under- 
lines the important point that ethos and attitude are a crucial 
element of the enabling process. Thus just as the Christian view 
of equality of respect brought the concept equality out of 
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philosophical confines, participatory and distributional 
equality must involve more than simply plans for efficient 
distribution and reasonable participation. Drucker was quite 
right that one cannot distribute an attitude ie. equality of 
respect. 
44 
However, any equalizing measure is ultimately the 
expression of an attitude and as such, the manner of distribution 
should reflect the attitude. Thus, no distributional equality 
should imply any exclusion or judgement of unequal worth. 
Where selective distribution is necessary, 45 it should be speci- 
fically enabling, supporting and affirming individuals and groups. 
Community or fellowship, would also provide the context of trust 
within which individuals can safely be challenged to examine and 
explore moral meaning in terms of their roles and responsibilities. 
Discovery of such moral meaning is important in itself, in the 
development of self- respect 46 and is thus a further element in 
the development of freedom. The very concept of discovery and 
the background of man's sinful nature pre- supposes a community 
which involves a continuous process of discovery, one which in 
a sense is provisional. Once again, if such relational equality 
in community is to be realized, it requires to be operative, in 
the sense of clear proposals, and to have adequate moni toring. 
In his view of community then, Tawney points up several of the 
central themes of Christian community; community as inclusive; 
community as pilgrim; community serving; and communi ty as the 
centre of empowering and as the basis for relational equality. 
47 
Thus, rather than simply using the doctrine of the Church as the 
focus of relational equality, Tawney extends these marks of 
koinonia into an operative view of equality, and this may be 
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developed to demonstrate how such relational equality ties in 
with participatory and distributional equality. 
The above is only a brief indication of how Tawney's work 
provided a framework for a theology of equality, and how it might 
be developed. It may be said that Tawneÿ s ultimate contribution 
was precisely in his comprehensiveness. His work provides the 
grounds for establishing equality of respect as the basic moral 
principle. , whose Christian understanding pervades any egalitarian 
measures. This principle generates and informs fellowship and 
freedom, and participatory and distributional equality. All of 
these principles are seen to be integrated, with the last two 
as instrumental, operative and relative. This provides a frame- 
work for integrating the various doctrines underlying any theology 
of equality. In all this, Tawney is both idealist and realist, 
recognizing both the spiritual and sinful nature ot man. Given 
such a complex view ot equality, it also guards against any 
absolute view of the concept. 
Tawney' s contribution was, as noted, wider than this, taking 
in the philosophy of equality in general. Tawney' s Christian 
view of equality was seen to be quite distinctive from major 
secular views and to rest upon a far more convincing cumulative 
case, balancing both deontological and consequential arguments. 
This case, which involved equality of respect, perfectionism, 
and a more convincing view of humanity, demonstrated the inade- 
quacy of attempts to base a view of equality on moral neutrality 
or upon rational self- interest. Such grounds were equally 
inadequate in providing a link between participatory and distri- 
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butional equali ty. 
Tawney' s contribution was also important in trying to form links 
with humanist views of equali ty, though given his complex and 
distinctive view of equality, it is clear that his use of equality 
cannot be confined to the middle -axiom method. The moral base of 
Tawney's Christian view of equality and development of it demands 
a particular view of equality of respect and distinctive models 
of participatory and distributional equality. Thus, a major 
thrust of any outreach work involves convincing others of that 
particular view of equality. This involves accepting the total 
framework and notsimply broad egalitarian objectives. 
48 
There have been, of course, many cri ticisms of Tawney' s equali ty. 
Some of these have been answered above, 
49 
others require 
developments or modifications such as suggested in the theological 
50 
outline above. Other criticisms centre on the practical 
development of Tawney's view of equality. These difficulties may 
be detailed as follows:- 
a) attempting to balance participatory, distributional, and 
relational equality, whilst at the same time accepting the 
provisional nature of any policies is, in practice, too 
difficult to achieve. It could lead, for example, to conflict 
between central distribution, necessary for essential goods 
and for a sense of equity, and local autonomy which may lead 
to wide differences of income in different areas. 
b) problems may arise between the development of social unity 
and common ends, and a participatory equality which demands 
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an element of self- determination. Central to such a problem 
would be how to define and sustain social purpose. 
c) a further practical problem is whether distributional equality 
would lead to dependency, having the opposite effect intended 
by Tawney. 
51 
Such criticisms do not, as such, damage Tawney's view of equality, 
tor practical difficulties cannot as such, invalidate a principle. 
Nonetheless, they do point to basic tensions existing in the view 
of equality, both at conceptual and practical levels. The 
presence of such tensions, however, is not in itself a criticism, 
tor the moral base of the Christian view of equality precisely 
demands that several potentially contradictory factors, freedom 
and fellowship, distributional and participatory equality are 
held together. Herein lies the core of Tawneÿ s view of 
provisionality. It is moral and social, not eschatological, for 
the different elements, self and other, self -determination and 
subordination, can never be balanced with complete satisfaction. 
By definition, there could be no conceptual or practical resolution 
of the tensions which could apply to all situations or at all 
times. What is required, apart from a conceptual framework 
such as outlined above, is the development of detailed models 
which would demonstrate how the elements can be held together. 
Despite the comprehensiveness of Tawney` s view of equali ty, i t 
is in such detail that he falls short. He does not, for example, 
provide the details of the democratic experiments he urges on 
industry, confining himself to elements of constitution-making, 
Nor does he demonstrate in detail how distributional equality 
349. 
and fellowship might be integrated more closely. 
52 
In the development of a theology of equality, it also becomes 
necessary to give detailed models of how participatory equality 
can provide a challenge which avoids dependence upon distribu- 
tional equality. 
Such models as these would be an important development of the 
argument against the marginal egalitarians, used as demonstrations 
against the accusation of paternalism. They would also involve 
an important development of Tawneÿ s own stress on operative 
equality and provisionality. 
53 
They would also be necessary 
if theology is to address society clearly on equality. Hence, 
a great deal of further research is required in developing models 
of equality which show how the various elements can be balanced 
in practice. 
I will confine myself at this point to simply suggesting a few 
areas in which such models could be developed. 
54 
The first area is industry. The above Gib would suggest 
that work is not simply a vocation, 
55 
providing the basis for 
improved distribution of such opportunities, 56 but also a 
community. Meaning, in the work situation, would therefore be 
as much a function of fellowship and service, within and beyond the 
industry, as one of fulfilling particular work tasks. 
57 
Research would need to indicate both how work might feasibly and 
better be distributed, but also how participatory and relational 
equality might be achieved, without losing efficiency, and fully 
enabling individuals to create. Several points are worth noting 
about the development of such models. Firstly, methods would have 
to be researched which ensured that the full range of principles 
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and interests were discussed in decision making. 58 
Secondly, a national framework within which such models could be 
developed would have to be worked out ensuring a balanced relation- 
ship between central government and local groups. 59 However well 
the industries may relate to society an overall framework would 
be necessary to plan for freedom, ensuring, for instance, that 
industry did enable participation. 
60 
Thirdly, there are already many empirical examples or models of 
participatory equality such as pyramid democracy, annual 
participatory reviews (fixing ethos and major aims), worker 
directors, consumer representation,which demonstrate that parti- 
cipatory equality can work, and which can be refined to enable 
individuals to participate fully in co- creation. 
61 
Fourthly, there are no a priori reasons why greater involvement in 
the decision -making process should clash with the roles and 
responsibilities of individual executives, providing expectations 
and accountability was clear. Fifthly, there are important 
additional consequential arguments which would support such 
models. The operation of such models would both increase commit- 
ment to the industry and its purposes, and involve the development 
of stated purposes and the forming of a consensus. 62 Thus, the 
difficulty of imposing purposes would be avoided. Such methods 
would help individuals and groups to explore moral meaning both 
within an industry and in relation to the community in general, 
63 
facilitating the development of fellowship and trust and education 
in participation.' 
Finally, such participation could have a direct effect upon 
distribution, narrowing the range. Properly set up, they would 
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lead to the affirmation of indi-ridual members in their roles, 
with emphasis upon distribution as enabling. In this context, 
it would be difficult to achieve wide differences in pay, and 
non -financial rewards could be developed. 
64 
A second area which would require development would be political 
equality. Tawney simply accepted that parliamentary democracy 
had achieved political equality. However, in the light of 
Tawney' s own view of equality, it is not clear that it has been 
achieved. With few political parties dominating politics, and 
providing a limited range of policy options, little systematic 
opportunity to discuss issues, for example, in elections, and 
accountability of elected representatives more to parties than to 
65 
people, there is a case for describing this as a ' pseudo -democracy.' 
Several ways of improving this si tua tion should be examined, from 
66 
referenda to proportional representation. However, perhaps 
more importantly, given the view of community above, the role of 
intermediary associations should be examined to see how they can 
facilitate greater discussion and communication of ideas, and how 
they could relate to the community in general. intermediate 
associations are often recommended to be strengthened, yet few 
detailed models are acutually suggested. 
67 
Intermediate 
associations, can, of course, have several functions, from 
developing a separation of powers from central government to 
supporting the meaning structure of the status quo. It is all 
the more important then that detailed models of how intermediate 
associations can enable co- creation in and with society should be 
developed. 
68 
As with industrial democracy, this is not an 
exhaustive consideration of areas of research, but a brief view 
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of areas in political democracy and methods which might be 
considered in researching possible models. 
Another area of important research would be in examining how 
distribution of benefits, health care, and social services should 
take place. This refers to the humanizing of distribution, 
referred to above, such that individuals and groups are affirmed 
in their self -esteem both as an individual and in their roles and 
relationships. Besides minimizing means -te sting and targeting 
the roles of carers, 
69 
this could involve measures from humani- 
zing the point of distribution, 
70 
to providing human resources to 
assist individuals in working through the meaning of their roles and 
relationships, and helping them to develop the related skills. 71 
Such support helps individuals to explore and develop moral 
meaning and empowers them to develop and sustain their roles. 
These are simply some ways of moving away from a consumer model 
of distribution to a community model which would be concerned 
to enable the individual and groups to develop as co- creators. 
Again, more empirical work should be pursued to monitor the 
effect of such 'humanizing.' 
These have been only three areas in which models of a complex 
equality could be developed, stressing the development of community 
and the enabling of co- creators. Such models themselves would 
require testing and any necessary modification. 
Thus far, developments have been noted in two levels of justifi- 
cation, in the theology at the base of deontological arguments, 
and in the development of models to strengthen the consequentialist 
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arguments. However, in any confirmatory justification, there 
was also the element of 'considered conviction% which, it was 
72 As noted above, were supporters of particular views. , 
the idea of 'considered convictions' has many problems, and its 
status and possible function is not always clear even in 
justificatory terms. However, the development of egalitarian 
community building, outlined above, does provide the framework 
within which convictions can be reflected upon, developed, and 
communicated. We could, of course, not presume to know precisely 
the contEnt of such convictions, especially if a dynamic process 
is enabling them to develop. Thus, they could not be used in a 
simplistic way as confirmation of a particular view of equality. 
However, it is safe to say that given the development of such an 
environment, it is unlikely that convictions would involve an 
absolute view of any principles, 
73 
and that such convictions 
would tend to stress the need to develop the common ' bonds of 
ci vi li za ti on. 74 
In all this, Tawney does not demonstrate any intermediate strate- 
gies for social change, such as Holman' s use of intermediary 
associations as both liberating and prophetic. 
75 
Such models 
would also need to be examined and empirical evidence collected. 
For Tawney, social change was perhaps seen in grander perspectives, 
involving political planning, with the fundamental principles of 
equality at its base. As such, he saw the importance of both 
planning for freedom, but also convincing society that freedom was 
based in equality, equality of respect, and related, distributional 
and participatory equality. 
There are, of course, parallels with liberation theology, with its 
354. 
stress on liberation, conscientization, and the importance of 
social analysis and of developing and deepening tradi tional 
theological views. The theology of equality, however, ultimately 
has a broader perspective. It is not confined to a Marxist 
analysis of society or history, and does not run the danger of 
association with particular group interest, precisely because of 
its balance of freedom and fellowship, of responsibilities with 
7b 
rights. Tawney' s equality ultimately looks to planning a framework 
within which learning and development can take place as part of 
the ' tissue' of life, whereas liberation theology views learning 
and development as necessary for social change. Whatever their 
differences, however, both see an important part for the Church 
in bringing about change, both in developing awareness of prin- 
ciples and of social conditions. 
In wri ting about equality, Tawney was concerned not simply to re- 
establish equality as a major principle and policy objective, 
but to establish a particular view of equality. Such a view 
was seen to be distinct from his contemporaries and from major 
modern views of equality. The influence of Tawney' s view was 
seen to be considerable, both in the Church and in social policy. 
However, even in writers closely associated with Tawney, such as 
Townsend and Titmuss, the richness and complexity of Tawney's 
view is not fully taken up, There are no doubt many reasons for 
this which will vary from writer to writer, ranging from differences 
in basic v iews of morality, to simple selectivity or ignorance 
of Tawney' s total view of equality. None of this is helped by 
Tawney' s lack of systematic treatment of the concept, or by the 
many claims upon different meanings of the term, which has led 
355. 
some commentator.? to argue that the concept of equality no 
longer has a meaningful use in theology or politics. This in 
turn, may account for the lack of any substantial treatment of 
equality in theological circles over the last quarter of a century. 
It is my hope that this thesis will contribute to a clear view 
of the full complexity of the concept of equality in Tawney's 
writing. In so doing, I further hope to have established the 
importance of the concept of equality both to theology and to 
social policy. Finally, i would hope that this thesis might go 
somewhere towards filling the gap in the theological treatment 
of equality, establishing the need to maintain and develop the 
concept at the level of theory and practice. 
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4. See chapter eight 
5. See chapter one 
6. See chapter four 
7. Unlike the loose association of middle -level principles 
suggested for example by Terrill. See chapter one. 
8. 'A Dictionary of Christian Ethics' ed. J. Macquarrie, 
1967, p. 108 
9. cf. G. Outka, 'Agape' pp 158, 159. 
10. cf. Reinhold Niebuhr 'The Children of Light and The 
Children of Darkness' pp 126ff. 
11. In addition the creationist argument sees material resources 
created for man, providing grounds for entitlement to 
distributional equality; cf. Ambrose' s Commentary on 
Corinthians II, 9,9, quoted in C. Avila 'Ownership' p. 
77. 
12. for example participatory equality, emphasizing personal 
involvement could be contradicted by distributional equality 
which is simply concerned to supply material resources. 
13. See also below 
14. See chapter one for Tawney' s concept of theology as a way 
of life. 
15. See chapter one on the aim of perfection 
16. Tawney does not state this explicitly. It is, however, 
implicit in the way he ties in the moral basis of self- 
realization with God. cf. C.B. p. 67, 68 
17. This is underpinned by an interactionist view of society 
and holistic view of man. The breadth of both these views 
owes much to the doctrine of the Incarnation. 
18. See chapter four above 
19. ibid 
20. cf. A.O.P. p. 182 
21. cf. Avila p. 77 
22. cf. C.B. pp 33 - 34 
23. Genesis 1 v. 26 - 31, 2 v. 15; cf. John Chrysostom, 'De 
Lazaro Concio', 2, 4, P.G. 48: 987 - 88 quoted in Avila 
p. 84 
24. J. Hull, 'What Prevents Christian Adults From Learning' p. 
237 
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25. See chapter two on Tawney' s moral psychology and chapter 
seven on a comparison with Rawls' s view of the moral person. 
26. This assumes involvement in a decision making process, 
without necessarily meaning that all decisions must be made 
by all participants. 
27. cf. R.T. p. 141 
28. This may be compared to D. Cupi tt' s ' New Christian Ethics' 
pp 127ff, 135ff, who sees the importance of creativity 
and taking responsibility in ethical decisions but who 
does not see this as a possibly corporate activity. 
29. See chapter three, section B. 
30. These including the arguments that equality of participation 
leads to better opportunity for sell- development, better 
protection against power blocs of any kind, and the argument 
that any individual will know the si tuation in which they are 
in the best, and should therefore be included in decision 
making about that situation. (cf. Gutmann pp 178 - 181). 
All are useful supporting arguments for both theology and 
philosophy. None, however, provide clear grounds for a 
right to participation, partially because it could be 
argued that self -development could be better achieved by 
some other method, partially because it may be argued that 
any situation is more objectively and clearly viewed by 
those who are outside it. 
31. Niebuhr pp 126ff. This argument certainly supports 
equality of participation, but says little about the 
quality of that participation. 
Tawney parallels some of Niebuhr's argument in his treatment 
of sin, for which see below. 
32. See chapter eight above for the limiting of self- determina- 
tion caused by marginal egalitarian approaches. 
33. cf. R.T. p. 108. The idea that some form of challenge 
(not seen in adversarial terms) is necessary to enable self - 
determination, applicable to institutional education or 
to education related to roles in society, is one which 
itself requires further research. 
34. See below 
35. See below on industrial democracy. 
36. cf. Niebuhr pp 126ff. 
37. cf. J. Habgood 'Church and Nation' p. 48 
38. See chapter six above for aL Jenkins's development of 
the theme of forgiveness. 
39. Not least of these would be how it might operate with 
respect to failure in work roles. 
40. cf. H. Willmer, 'Forgiveness and Politics' in Crucible 
(1979) pp 100 - 105 
41. See chapter four on equality and fellowship 
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42. ibid 
43. cf. Minogue 
44. See chapter three, section A. 
45. See chapter five on Titmuss 
46. cf. C.B. p. 56, 57 
47. For the concept of pilgrim community, stressing the 
provisionality of community from Old Testament models, see 
'Just Sharing' ed. Forrester and Skene, pp 68 - 70. 
Relational equality does not assume a maintenance of the 
s to tus quo. 
48. Hence Tawney' s emphasis upon the importance of principles 
and upon practical planning. 
49. See chapter three 
50. See on function above 
51. cf. A. Wright 'Tawneyism Revisited: Equality, Welfare and 
Socialism' p. 89 in 'Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought' 
ed. B. Pimlott 
52. Nor, as noted, does Tawney give consistent attention to 
economic planning. Where he does, as in the recommendation 
that the government should extend wartime economic controls 
(194) this does show clear evidence of planning for freedom. 
Reisman (State and Welfare p. 129) refers to an 
'elaborate and extensive web of State directives' which 
if pursued might limit freedom. 
53. See chapter three, section C. 
54. In addition to models of egalitarian management, models 
of economic planning would be necessary. 
55. P. Ballard, 'Towards a Contemporary Theology of Work' 
p. 36 
56. cf. J. Atherton, 'Faith In The Nation' pp 104 - 106 
57. It could of course be argued that vocation per se involves 
the idea of service. 
58. Such would range from the development of professional codes 
to the development of methods of group decision making 
which would ensure consideration of principles, to including 
all parties involved, both producers and consumers in annual 
review exercises. 
59. Research here is of paramount importance firstly to ensure 
some framework of overall planning and secondly to establish 
clear relationships between central and local bodies. 
This may well link in with the whole area of discovering 
moral meaning both in relation to the work community and the 
community as a whole. Writers such as Cole and Pateman 
(Pateman 'Participation and Democratic Theory' p. 35) tend 
to diminish the role of central government and thus neglect 
the means of maintaining relative equality amongst industrial 
groups. A further tentative conclusion that should be 
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explored here is how far the moral base of Tawney's equality 
is necessary to maintain the relationship between local 
autonomous groups and central government. (cf. chapter four 
on Cole). 
60. cf. chapter four on Cole 
61. cf. R. Norman 'Free and Equal' pp 156 - 172; P. Green 
'Retrieving Democracy' pp 241 - 266. 
62. cf. A.S. p. 100ff. 
63. cf. A.S. p. 100ff. 
64. In this situation a total process would take over from the 
simple application of function as a criteria of distribution. 
65. Green p. 13 - 24 
66. cf. Norman pp 156 - 172; Atherton ' Faith in The Nation' 
pp 73 - 76 
67. cf. Atherton pp 41, 76, 94; W. Temple, C.S.O. p. 70ff; 
Faith in The City pp 57ff. 
Intermediate associations or mediating structures are groups 
or organizations which exist somewhere between the State 
and the individual. The community groups of which Holman 
writes are a good example of such a group. 
68. cf. 'Democracy and Mediating Structures' ed. M. Novak 
pp 198 - 200 
69. for example through Child Benefit and care allowances. 
70. This may be in terms of environment or procedures 
71. This would range from work in secondary education to 
that of social workers or health visitors. See Holman on 
social workers p. 278. 
72. See chapter seven on Rawls' s justification. 
73. Such a process would necessarily involve a consideration 
of fundamental principles. 
74. This could be argued more from the basis of self- interest 
in that it would give the individual more control of their 
situation and more recognition. 
75. See chapter six on Holman. 
76. However, D. Sheppard in 'Bias To The Poor' rightly notes 
that some liberation theologians, such as Borino, see 
involvement with the oppressed classes as essential if a 
Christian critique is to be offered of their aims and 
obj ecti ves. 
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